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ABSTRACT
Since the 1930s, Louisiana has lost approximately 1,800 square miles of land due to the
subsidence of the state’s coastal wetlands. By the early 1970s, public officials and private
citizens were starting to become aware of the crisis on the coast, and a broad agreement
developed among state and federal representatives that action was needed to address the
problem. Over the course of nearly forty years, policymakers in Louisiana and Washington,
D.C., implemented a series of laws and regulations meant to protect vulnerable ecosystems like
the state’s wetlands. In the 1980s, officials also started crafting policies to help restore
Louisiana’s shrinking coastline. While considerable progress has been made to slow the
subsidence, stopping or reversing coastal erosion has proven to be nearly impossible. Inefficient
bureaucratic management, insufficient funding, and the failure to substantially alter land-use and
water-use policies in Louisiana have undermined the state’s conservation and restoration efforts
since the 1970s. The catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Katrina forced officials in Baton
Rouge and the federal government to correct some long-standing problems, but the
implementation of a fully comprehensive restoration and management plan remains piecemeal –
even a decade after the devastating 2005 hurricane season. This dissertation examines the broad
context of the political and economic climate that contributed to the development of coastal
erosion in Louisiana and closely examines the state and federal policy responses to the crisis
between 1970 and 2009.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1932 and 2010, the state of Louisiana experienced a net loss of land that totaled
1,883 square miles.1 The average rate of loss during the time period 1956-1978 was about thirty
square miles per year, while the annual rate of loss was approximately sixteen square miles from
1985-2010.2 The sinking of wetlands is a normal part of the deltaic cycle, but Louisiana gained
more land than was lost until the twentieth century. After the 1930s, the state’s coastline started
to retreat as wetlands were lost without being replaced. Government representatives and the
public became aware that Louisiana was losing land by the early 1970s, and officials began to
implement a series of laws and regulations to combat the erosion. Yet the policy responses were
often slow, poorly funded, or too fragmented to effectively halt the loss of wetlands. Not until
2007 did the state commit to the sort of large-scale restoration program that had been urged by
coastal experts for at least twenty years. Specific projects designed to reduce land loss and
flooding events did not appear in a comprehensive master plan until 2012.3 Given the
significance of Louisiana’s wetlands to its economy, infrastructure, and coastal population, one
might wonder what took so long.
A lack of support for coastal restoration does not seem to explain the long gap between
recognition and action. When state officials were considering whether to accept the master plan

1

Brady Couvillion et al., Land Area Change in Coastal Louisiana from 1932 to 2010 (Denver, CO: U.S. Geological
Survey, 2011) 4, http://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3164/downloads/SIM3164_Pamphlet.pdf.
2
Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, “Louisiana Coastal Facts,” (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, 2011), 1, http://www.americaswetland.com/photos/article/
Coastal_facts_sheet_03_27_2012.pdf. Rates of loss have been reported differently by public and private entities, and
rates of loss have also varied over time. The total land losses reported in the opening paragraph are current
government estimates and included to give an overall view of land loss since the mid-1950s. For the remainder of
this dissertation, rates of loss are reported as they appeared in source material. This is done to reflect the information
available to the public and policymakers at the time.
3
Amy Wold, “Protective Pattern – Master Coastal Plan Called Realistic,” Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA), January 13,
2012, sec. A, Newsbank Louisiana News Sources (MERLIN_17036557). For the remainder of this dissertation, the
Advocate refers to the newspaper published in Baton Rouge, and “NewsBank Louisiana News Sources” will be
abbreviated “NB LA.”
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in 2012, a poll conducted on behalf of the National Audubon Society indicated that eighty-six
percent of the state’s residents wanted their legislators to vote in favor of the proposal. Just over
ninety percent of Louisianans rated the coastal zone and wetlands as “very important” to the
future of the state.4 Groups such as the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana (CRCL) or the
Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation had been advocating for the protection and restoration of
Louisiana’s wetlands for decades. Political leaders such a U.S. Senators John Breaux and J.
Bennett Johnston had fought for federal assistance to help pay for restoration during the 1990s,
and Governor Mike Foster helped launch the America’s WETLAND Foundation to bring
national attention to the problem of coastal erosion in 2002.5
A lack of economic, social, or ecological importance also does not seem to explain why
the development of a large-scale comprehensive master plan took so long. In recent years, ninety
percent of the oil and gas that comes from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) flows through
infrastructure that is protected by Louisiana’s wetlands. A fifth of the nation’s commerce moves
through the state’s southern waters on an annual basis. Over two million people live in the
nineteen parishes that make up the coastal zone. The state’s wetlands serve as a habitat for five
million migratory birds every winter, and the marshes provide other critical ecological functions
such as storing flood waters and filtering nutrients.6 Seafood catches from Louisiana’s waters
account for twenty-five percent of the total annual yield from the contiguous United States. Each
of these resources is in jeopardy while the wetlands continue to disappear. More importantly, so

Amy Wold, “Poll Says Most Back La. Coastal Plan,” Advocate, April 4, 2012, sec. B, NB LA
(MERLIN_17753625).
5
Marmillion + Company, America’s WETLAND: Progress Report, 2002-2009 (New Orleans, LA: Marmillion +
Company for America’s WETLAND Foundation, 2009), 1,
http://www.americaswetland.com/photos/article/102408_aw-reportFinal.pdf.
6
Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a
Sustainable Coast (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, 2012), 20,
http://sonris-www.dnr.state.la.us/dnrservices/redirectUrl.jsp?dID=4379731; William M. Lewis, Wetlands Explained:
Wetland Science, Policy, and Politics in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 47-48; 52-53.
4
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are human lives. Even the mildest predictions of continued land loss estimate that the state risks
losing another 770 square miles of land by 2060 unless significant action is taken. Further,
scientists have projected that global warming will exacerbate the problem of sea level rise in
southern Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico could be anywhere from two to six feet higher by the
end of the twenty-first century. The economic costs associated with just infrastructure losses
could be a minimum of $7.7 billion per year over the next five decades.7
Clearly, there is ample evidence to support the necessity of protecting or preserving
Louisiana’s marshes and swamps, whether the reasons for doing so are economic,
environmental, political, or social. Yet the long delay between initial reports of land loss in the
early 1970s and the 2012 master plan occurred because combating coastal erosion required
altering policies and patterns that have provided the foundation for economic and social growth
in the state. One of the primary factors that contributed to the subsidence of Louisiana’s wetlands
was engineering of the Mississippi River. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, extensive
systems of levees were constructed to protect both lives and property from flooding events.
Humans were able to expand into areas that had previously been prone to inundation, but the
levees also prevented the river from flowing onto the land to deposit the fresh water and
sediments necessary to sustain the wetlands. The oil and gas industry has been a source of jobs
and government revenue in Louisiana since the early twentieth century, but the pipes and canals
built to facilitate production altered hydrology patterns along the coast. Large swaths of wetlands
died due to the resulting salt water intrusion, and the marshes have not come back. Many of them
never will.

7

George Hobor, Allison Plyer, and Ben Horowitz, The Coastal Index: April 2014 (New Orleans, LA: The Data
Center, 2014), 12-13, https://s3.amazonaws.com/gnocdc/reports/TheDataCenter_TheCoastalIndex.pdf.
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Undoing or altering the policies that contributed to land loss has been complicated by the
political climate in Louisiana, as well as how Americans in general have viewed the
environment. Ambitious politicians such as Earl Long saw the exploitation of natural resources
as a means of funding the expansion of government services, and the idea of protecting
ecosystems was not widely considered a national priority until the 1960s. In Louisiana, the
government was not well-suited to incorporate environmental protection into its political and
economic systems, especially when those protections clashed with industrial or urban growth.
When public officials and the citizenry began to recognize the loss of wetlands as a crisis in need
of a response, the policies and practices that supported Louisiana’s economy and politics were
already deeply entrenched and difficult to transform – particularly when doing so presented a
serious financial burden. The national government became a partner in encouraging
environmental protection and funding anti-erosion projects in Louisiana, but federal policies had
also contributed to the loss of wetlands in the state. Enacting effective protection and restoration
programs required navigating the political climate in Baton Rouge, as well as in Washington,
D.C.
If politics is how we determine who gets what and when they get it, then public policy is
how we implement those decisions.8 This dissertation is primarily a study of the policy responses
carried out by the state and federal governments to stop or mitigate the impacts of coastal erosion
between the early 1970s and 2009. By studying policy development over a number of years, we
are able to accomplish two goals. First, we are able to track changes in how a society prioritizes
what it values. In other words, what do we believe is vital enough to our existence to promote or
protect its sustainability and growth? As Americans started to place more importance on human

Broadly defining politics as “who gets what” comes from political scientist Harold Lasswell’s classic work,
Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: P. Smith, 1950).
8
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health and improved quality of life in the 1960s, reducing pollution and preserving natural spaces
became more prominent in public policy. As Louisianans began to realize the loss of wetlands
threatened their well-being, modifying activities in the coastal zone was integrated into
legislation. However, new priorities and values frequently clashed with older ones such as
supporting industrial growth. The resulting conflict between different values is related to the
second goal for studying coastal erosion and restoration policies. By understanding the
development of policy over a long period of time, we are able to gain insight about the strengths
and weaknesses that have been present in policymaking. A sense of perspective on what has been
effective in combating coastal erosion can assist political representatives and the public as they
make future decisions about how to protect Louisiana’s wetlands.
Through the examination of policy development, several themes emerge and will be
discussed in the chapters that follow. One is the impact that the state’s bureaucratic structure has
had on decision-making within Louisiana. Weak oversight in public institutions and piecemeal
planning were common among administrative agencies in Louisiana during the twentieth century
and that adversely affected the management of the coastal zone. Government was not wellorganized to facilitate developing the sort of comprehensive, streamlined policies that were
necessary for managing complex ecosystems such as the state’s wetlands. The bureaucracy
lacked well-developed mechanisms for resolving disputes among coastal users, and the state did
not have adequate planning processes to evaluate the broad impacts of economic and social
developments on its environment.
A second theme to emerge is that the policies which supported industrial and social
expansion in Louisiana also contributed to the loss of wetlands. Trying to incorporate
conservation or protection into policymaking often led to conflicts among coastal users, some of
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whom wanted to prioritize economic growth and some of whom wanted to see conservation of
the state’s wetlands as a primary policy objective. As a result, government officials attempted to
rely on the “multiple use” strategy to guide policymaking in an effort to satisfy the sometimes
contradictory needs of coastal users. The assumption that a single resource could fulfill multiple
functions exacerbated the development of piecemeal policies. Louisiana’s wetlands were simply
not an ecological system that performed important environmental functions; they were also the
site of economic, social, or recreational investments and had to be managed in a way that
supported those different uses. By pursuing policies that depended on the exploitation of the
wetlands for socio-economic growth, achieving a “sustainable” coast was an exceedingly
difficult goal to reach.
The involvement of the federal government as both a contributor to the problem of
coastal erosion and a partner in addressing the crisis is a third theme. Louisiana was not in the
vanguard of environmental protection during the twentieth century, nor did the state have the
financial resources to implement large-scale conservation, protection, and restoration programs
in the coastal zone. The federal government spurred Louisiana into developing those sorts of
policies and became the main source of funding for them. In turn, officials were able to use the
state’s importance to the national economy and the negative impacts of federal policies to
generate support for coastal restoration projects. Yet the state became so reliant on federal
dollars to pay for programs that officials in Baton Rouge frequently found their options
restrained not just by Louisiana’s own budgetary problems but also by congressional reluctance.
A fourth theme that emerges upon examining policy developments is the issue of land
use. Running as undercurrent to the discussions about how to promote economic growth or
implement environmental protections has been the issue of how Americans use the nation’s

6

lands. Closely related to ideas of land use is the control of water resources. A society will have a
difficult time growing and thriving if it cannot irrigate its lands or bring drinking water to its
population. In a place like southern Louisiana, the relationship between the use of land and the
control of water is even more pronounced. Earth and water have quite literally mixed to create
the landscape on which all activities occur, and cities such as New Orleans depend on
successfully managing both in order to survive. The failure to do so could be catastrophic, which
leads us to the final theme – the role of crisis in policy developments regarding Louisiana’s
wetlands and coastal erosion. Local groups or individuals placed pressure on officials to
implement policies to conserve or protect the wetlands, but external forces also played a
significant role in decision-making. Sometimes the outside pressure came from the federal
government, but in other cases the influence came from nature itself. In particular, hurricanes
and major floods were critical events that pushed lawmakers and the public to re-evaluate how
policies were crafted and implemented. Those shifts did not always lead to positive results for
the nation’s wetlands, but a major crisis could precipitate change more rapidly than was typically
the norm.
Other authors have examined some of these themes to varying degrees. In discussions
about American attitudes regarding land use, Aldo Leopold was instrumental in advancing the
idea that land should not be used merely to enrich individuals. He also enlarged the concept of
what constituted the human “community” in his work, A Sand County Almanac. Leopold argued
that soil, air, water, and wildlife – in essence, the components that made up the land – should be
included in the boundaries of a “community.” He posited the natural world was connected to the
human one and that responsible land use meant people had to behave as citizens of nature rather
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than its conquerors.9 His ideas about land and the need for a “land ethic” were extremely
important viewpoints that made their way into ecology and works like Silent Spring by Rachel
Carson.
Several historians have explored ideas about land and land-use practices in the United
States, including Kenneth T. Jackson and Adam Rome. Both authors examined the importance of
abundant land in the suburbanization of America, and each demonstrated that the expansion of
communities into open spaces was facilitated by government policies.10 Eric T. Freyfogle
discussed land use and its relationship to private property rights in This Land We Share: Private
Property and the Common Good. Like Jackson and Rome, he noted that American views about
land use and ownership have been influenced by government policy. Freyfogle argued
Americans have associated private property with economic or political independence, but he also
noted that regulation of land use has been a long-standing priority of government.11 Anne
Vileisis tied land use and property rights to environmental protection regarding the nation’s
wetlands in Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History of America’s Wetlands. Among the
many topics she covered in her writing, Vileisis noted that most wetlands have been privately
owned and established notions about land-development rights broke down rapidly when applied
to wetlands. Draining swamps or marshes can have a profound impact on an entire watershed,

9

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949),
203-204.
10
Kenneth T. Jackson’s work, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985) covered policy developments to promote housing, and one of the factors he identified as
crucial to suburban sprawl was the availability of cheap land across much of the country. Adam Rome also looked at
policies that facilitated the growth of suburbs, but he tied problems of suburban sprawl to the development of U.S.
environmentalism in his work, Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the rise of American
Environmentalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Rome posited that as suburban expansion
consumed more green space or moved into areas which were risky to develop, Americans saw environmental
protections as critical improving their quality of life.
11
Eric T. Freyfogle, This Land we Share: Private Property and the Common Good (Washington, D.C.: Island
Press/Shearwater Books, 2003), 13-20.
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not just the immediate area where the wetlands were converted. According to Vileisis,
Americans were relatively slow to recognize how vital wetlands were to nearby dry lands and
flowing waters.12
There have also been works dedicated specifically to the loss of wetlands and coastal
erosion in Louisiana. Journalist Mike Tidwell wrote about the impact on Cajun communities in
his book, Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast. After
several months of traveling through small towns and speaking to scientific experts, Tidwell
concluded that the residents of Louisiana’s coast cared deeply about the effects of coastal erosion
on their lives and livelihoods but not enough was being done to stop the loss of swamps and
marshes.13 Biologist Bill Streever also chronicled the problem of wetlands loss in Saving
Louisiana? The Battle for Coastal Wetlands through the lens of the scientists who study the
coast. Like Tidwell, the researchers and experts in Streever’s book generally concurred that not
enough was being done to save the state’s wetlands at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
A lack of coordination among government agencies slowed progress, but so did perceptions and
misunderstandings about the science of coastal restoration. Streever noted that the public
expected to see immediate success from all projects, but the scientists he interviewed stressed
that was not how the process worked. Many of the techniques or strategies being suggested by
experts were new and had never been tried before on such a large scale.14
Another book about the loss of Louisiana’s wetlands is Christopher Hallowell’s Holding
Back the Sea: The Struggle for America’s Natural Legacy on the Gulf Coast. In his work, he

Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History of America’s Wetlands (Washington, D.C.: Island
Press, 1997), 5-6.
13
Mike Tidwell, Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2003), 334-338.
14
Bill Streever, Saving Louisiana? The Battle for Coastal Wetlands (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press,
2001), 165; 177.
12
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described the effects of coastal erosion on the oil industry, alligator hunters, fur trappers, and
shrimpers, as well as the organizations such as the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana
working to bring attention to the issue. Hallowell argued saving the wetlands was imperative for
the state and the nation because a healthy environment was beneficial to humans and the
economy. He posited one of the most important lessons to be learned from Louisiana was that
Americans have long enjoyed easy access to plentiful lands and bountiful natural resources
without much thought about environmental limitations. As a result, the general public remains
woefully unprepared for the impending shortages of both as an increasing number of spaces
become ecologically compromised.15
Rather than looking at the impact that coastal erosion has had on a particular industry or
group, Jason Theriot examined how the oil and gas sector has affected the state’s coast in
American Energy, Imperiled Coast: Oil and Gas Development in Louisiana’s Wetlands. The
book followed policymaking and changes in environmental attitudes in relation to energy
development in post-World War II Louisiana. Theriot suggested that oil and gas production had
a significant, and perhaps unintended, impact on the state’s environment even while the industry
provided jobs. Similar to Hallowell, Theriot noted that healthy, sustainable wetlands would be
good for the oil business as the industry’s infrastructure is heavily dependent on coastal marshes
for protection against wave action. He argued that when politicians, residents, and environmental
organizations began to value the wetlands as ecologically important, policy changed to reflect
new attitudes about the state’s environment. Oil and gas companies were no longer permitted to

Christopher Hallowell, Holding Back the Sea: The Struggle for America’s Natural Legacy on the Gulf Coast
(New York: HarpersCollins Publishers, 2001), 217; 237.
15
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trek through the marshes without care. Instead, they had to follow a host of new regulations to
limit the damage done to the state’s wetlands.16
This dissertation builds on the work of these authors but also offers new perspectives.
There is not an overview of policy developments for Louisiana’s coastal zone management from
its genesis in the early 1970s through the post-Katrina time period, which this study intends to
remedy. Further, this work also places policymaking for the state’s wetlands and restoration
programs into the context of broader political and environmental trends in Louisiana and the
nation. The piecemeal, incremental approach to preserving and protecting the wetlands has often
resulted from the interplay of larger forces in the state and the nation. The general political
climate of Louisiana affected the specifics of coastal zone management, just as national shifts in
environmental attitudes boosted support for the conservation and protection of areas such as the
state’s wetlands. Yet new ideas or values that emphasized ecological vitality did not replace
older ones that promoted economic and social growth. Americans and Louisianans wanted to
have a healthy, appealing environment while also pursuing industrial and urban expansion.
Policymaking became an expression of negotiating between old and new. This dissertation
follows that process by looking at the concepts of multiple-use planning, management, and landuse philosophies in the context of the efforts to fight coastal erosion and rebuild some of the
marshes or swamps that had already been lost.
Chapter 1 discusses the broad political and economic factors in the state’s history that
have impacted the development of coastal conservation or restoration plans in Louisiana. As the
state’s government grew over the course of the twentieth century, certain characteristics became
entrenched in Louisiana’s political climate. First, the haphazard growth of bureaucracy resulted

Jason P. Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled Coast: Oil and Gas Development in Louisiana’s Wetlands (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 222-227.
16
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in disorganized administration, and government institutions were often ill-suited to resolve
problems that arose from competing interests. Second, Louisiana’s fiscal foundations were shaky
and tended to rely on extractive industries or regressive sales taxes to fund basic government
services. Both of those characteristics negatively impacted problem-solving and policymaking in
Louisiana, and each one manifested in coastal conservation and restoration programs.
The second chapter briefly explains how coastal erosion evolved in the state, as well as
attitudinal shifts about the environment that facilitated people viewing wetlands as ecosystems
worthy of legal protections. Engineering the Mississippi River for flood control and navigation
had the most significant impact on the development of coastal erosion in the twentieth century in
Louisiana. Two other important contributors were the construction of oil and gas pipelines in the
state’s wetlands and the conversion of marshes or swamps into dry lands for urban or agricultural
expansion. Each of these factors facilitated economic and social growth in southern Louisiana,
and changing the policies that supported them was extremely difficult. Yet pressure to alter the
state’s management of its wetlands grew starting in the 1970s as environmentalism became a
significant force in national politics. Americans saw the deterioration of their surroundings as a
serious problem that required government action, and efforts to protect Louisiana’s wetlands
were part of that trend. Officials had to address the public’s concerns about the degradation of a
vital ecosystem while still trying to maintain circumstances that were favorable to economic
growth.
With the relevant political and economic context established in Chapters 1 and 2, the
remaining four chapters trace specific policy developments from the early 1970s through 2009.
Chapter 3 discusses the policy developments undertaken by Louisiana and the national
government in the 1970s. Both state and federal officials crafted laws and regulations to improve
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conditions in the country’s environment and targeted specific ecosystems such as coastal
wetlands. However, the policies often contained significant gaps in protection. One of the
reasons for piecemeal policymaking was that officials tended to adopt the concept of “multiple
use” planning as the basis for legislation or regulatory schemes. Such an approach supported the
belief that economic and social growth did not have to be substantially curbed in order to have a
healthy environment. Americans could enjoy the benefits of a thriving economy and pleasing
surroundings as long as officials planned sufficiently for multiple uses. Another reason for
piecemeal policymaking was that Americans had fundamental disagreements about land-use
practices, which was an issue that affected discussions about conserving or restoring wetlands
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.
Chapter 4 explores the policy developments during the 1980s, some of which were
responses to the gaps that existed in contemporary legislation or regulations. State and federal
officials did not abandon the idea of “multiple use,” but there were efforts to fix some of the
contradictory policies that contributed to the loss of wetlands. Still, policymaking in the 1980s
continued to be only partially effective in reducing the loss of marshes and swamps in Louisiana.
Scientists and politicians agreed that the state needed to pursue restoration plans to help replace
some of the lands that had been lost, but a lack of funding impeded the implementation of that
agenda. The price of oil dropped during the early 1980s, and the decline in severance taxes
negatively impacted Louisiana’s fiscal standing. Paying for expensive restoration projects was a
low priority when the state struggled to meet its basic budgeting needs.
The fifth chapter examines policy developments in the 1990s and explores how the state
and federal government became partners in the restoration of Louisiana’s coast. The Coastal
Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act (CWPPRA or Breaux Act) passed in 1990
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and brought a steady stream of federal dollars to help pay for conservation and restoration
projects in the state. Hailed as a major breakthrough for saving Louisiana’s coast, the act also
established a task force to oversee the selection of projects and bring more cohesion to the
management of the state’s wetlands. Still, budgetary problems and inefficient administration
continued to undermine the efficacy of coastal zone protection in Louisiana. By the end of the
decade, government officials and private citizens agreed that the state needed a “master plan” to
guide development and management of the coast. Released in 1998, the Coast 2050 report
sought to unify the different approaches to coastal management and restoration, but inadequate
funding remained a major factor in implementation.
Chapter 6 discusses policy developments between 2000 and 2009 and examines how the
role of Hurricane Katrina changed the trajectory of Louisiana’s coastal restoration program. Prior
to 2005, many of the issues that had contributed to piecemeal policymaking in the preceding
decades were still present. While the state’s congressional delegation managed to secure two new
sources of federal revenues for Louisiana, the amounts promised to the state were insufficient to
the task. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005, the consequences of Louisiana’s
vanishing wetlands became clear in stark and dramatic terms. Several major changes followed
the 2005 hurricane season, including the consolidation of the state’s coastal administration, the
adoption of a master plan that incorporated restoration and hurricane protection, and a
commitment by the federal government to provide more funding. By 2009, Louisianans had
reason to be hopeful about the prospect that the state was finally on the path to a well-funded,
well-planned restoration program.
Residents of the state also had ample reason to be skeptical about the post-Katrina order.
Despite the progress made after 2005 in the management of Louisiana’s coastal zone, insufficient
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funding and unresolved conflicting interests persisted. More broadly, fundamental changes in
land-use patterns or altering the basics of the state’s budgetary structure failed to materialize.
The scope of Louisiana’s master plan expanded significantly after Katrina, but the vision for
rebuilding the state’s wetlands arguably remained too narrow. Policies in other states along the
Mississippi River impact the coastal marshes and swamps, but regulating activities across
multiple states falls under the purview of the federal government. Further, the effects of climate
change are likely to pose an increasing number of challenges as the globe continues to warm and
sea levels rise in response. These issues are discussed in the dissertation’s conclusion, along with
some of the lessons that can be learned by studying four decades of policymaking for
Louisiana’s wetlands.
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CHAPTER 1: LOUISIANA POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
“Louisiana Men of Good Purpose”
On March 28, 1950, one hundred fourteen men met at the Bentley Hotel in Alexandria to
form an organization that would “promote efficiency in government” in Louisiana. Inspired by
the good-government group New Orleans Bureau of Governmental Research, the Public Affairs
Research Council (PAR) agreed to “work in co-operation with public officials in the interest of
improvement of government” and to “tell the facts about municipal and state government no
matter who is in office.” The newly formed council would be based in Baton Rouge with
additional “focal points” in Alexandria, Lafayette, Lake Charles, Monroe, New Orleans, and
Shreveport. The Times-Picayune in New Orleans referred to the meeting’s attendees as
“Louisiana men of good purpose,” and the organization’s ranks included prominent
businessmen, lawyers, and other professionals from around the state. Despite PAR’s membership
hailing from the middle and upper classes, the organization’s leadership did not envision PAR as
being an advocacy group for well-to-do taxpayers.1 Rather, the council would be “non-political”
and dedicate itself to the “study of expenditures, operation and administration of state and local
government.” The executive director of PAR, Dr. Robert W. French of Tulane University,
emphasized the group’s non-partisan nature in 1951 when he stated the council would “endorse
no candidates and campaign for no issues. It analyzes problems, presents factual information,
and examines alternative solutions. Action will be left to individual citizens.”2
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There certainly was a need for an organization such as PAR in Louisiana during the midtwentieth century, and the council set out to inform citizens of the “Pelican State” about the
activities of their elected officials. Within its first regular year of operation, PAR began
publishing reports such as the 1952 “Voter’s Guide to the Amendments” to help residents sort
through the intricacies of state government and administration.3 The group also researched
budgetary matters, the use of patronage by the executive branch, and the persistent increase of
administrative agencies.4 By the 1960s, PAR was distributing regular newsletters that explored
the various challenges faced by the state, including analysis on health care for senior citizens, the
potential for using public bonds to attract industry, and the extensive powers held by the state’s
governor.5 As of 2016, the organization is still an active commentator on the public affairs of
Louisiana and continues to put out reports about a range of concerns, including briefs about the
state’s budget crisis and guides on constitutional amendments.6
Upon reviewing the variety of publications issued by PAR over the years, there is
remarkable consistency in the issues that the organization has commented on during the last six
decades – budgetary problems, explanations of yet more constitutional amendments, or public
health matters to name a few. The reasons for the consistency are tied to the historical events and
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circumstances of Louisiana’s development over the twentieth century. Reforms and changes to
the system of government in the state have often been slow, piecemeal, and unevenly
implemented. As a result, governmental organization in Louisiana has not been conducive to
coherent, comprehensive policymaking – particularly in areas that required long-term, nuanced
planning. Instead, the bureaucratic structure often led to inefficient administration, weak
oversight mechanisms, and favoritism toward special interest groups.7 The state’s fiscal policies
also failed to provide consistent funding for the services expected of governments as the
twentieth century advanced, and Louisiana has frequently attempted to meet its budgetary needs
by relying on extractive industries such as oil and gas production or on regressive sales taxes.8
The persistence of these issues has impacted the state’s response to a variety of
challenges, including the problem of coastal erosion. Administrative and fiscal weaknesses
present in the broad structure of government also manifested in the bureaucracy that managed
Louisiana’s coastal zone. The result has been piecemeal, inconsistent policy responses that were
often inadequately funded. Even as officials and the public acknowledged that the loss of
wetlands presented a serious threat to the welfare of the state, Louisiana struggled to create and
The concept of efficiency – whether a policy or organization performs efficiently or inefficiently – draws on
Daniel Elazar’s discussion of American political culture in his work, American Federalism: A View from the States
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972). Elazar defined “efficiency” as “the achievement of goals in a
manner that involves the least wasteful or minimum expenditure of resources” (91). He continued that “efficiency is
measured in predominantly commercial terms” and has often been expressed primarily in relation to the exercise of
power. In other words, a “hierarchical organization” such as a government agency would be considered efficient if
that agency were to use its authority to meet goals that further the “exchange of goods, services, or ideas” and did so
in a manner that generates as little waste as possible – waste of time, money, or resources (92). In this sense,
Louisiana’s bureaucracy often exercised power in ways that directly wasted time, money, or resources, and in some
cases, indirectly wasted those things by failing to address goals that could have prevented waste. See 90-93 in
American Federalism for a fuller discussion of Elazar’s examination of efficiency in the context of American
political culture.
8
Louisiana collects revenues from extractive industries in several ways. The severance tax is applied to the removal
of natural resources from lands or waters belonging to the state. Bonuses are paid one time when a mineral lease is
secured from the state. Rental fees are paid annually when a mineral well stands idle, and royalty fees are paid
yearly when a well is producing oil or gas. The value of those taxes and fees have varied over the years and were
mostly in place by the late 1920s or early 1930s. Severance taxes generally make up the bulk of revenues generated
by oil and gas revenues in Louisiana. See Diane M. Lindstedt et al., History of Oil and Gas Development in Coastal
Louisiana (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Geological Survey, 1991), 29-30; 103-104.
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fund conservation and restoration programs that were on par with the extent of the erosion crisis.
This chapter will focus on how bureaucratic disorganization and dependence on shaky revenue
sources such as severance taxes became part of the state’s political climate. The circumstances of
those two factors evolved and persisted as the twentieth century progressed, and each one
ultimately affected the state’s approach to coastal erosion.
Big Government Comes to Louisiana
Both state and national governments grew in size and scope over the course of the
twentieth century. Economic challenges, issues of national security, or increased demands from
citizens for political influence prompted governments to assume new roles and functions. With
more duties to fulfill, bureaucracies became more numerous and “big government” became a
fixture of American political life.9 The story of big government in Louisiana usually starts with
Huey P. Long in 1928. As the tale often begins, Long rescued the state’s population from
decades of neglect and a small, apathetic government that did little to assist the public.10 Long
advocated the idea that the state should spend money to help its citizens, even if that meant going
into debt or raising taxes on industry. While serving as governor, he orchestrated policies that
provided free textbooks to school children, increased people’s access to health care with new
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hospitals, and built over nine thousand miles of highways.11 However, Long’s attempts to make
Louisiana’s government more responsive to the needs of the people were not entirely
unprecedented. Governors in the early twentieth century instituted Progressive-style reforms by
abolishing the convict-lease program, introducing a primary system to select political nominees,
and establishing a minimum wage.12
Long set himself apart from previous politicians by attacking “the moneyed interests and
the corporations” and by seeking support for his proposals from “the people” – the groups “who
had neglected the political process and been neglected by it.”13 For example, small farmers and
merchants in the state’s northern and Acadian parishes gave him their enthusiastic support with
majorities of sixty and even seventy percent in some places during the primary election in
1928.14 Long used the increased participation of a “population previously ignored” by earlier
ruling elites to help him dictate the state’s political agenda.15 He also used the power of
patronage to maintain a firm grip over Louisiana’s government by handing out jobs to loyal
supporters. In a state devastated by the Mississippi River flood of 1927 and the Great
Depression, the promise of state employment held considerable sway. By 1930, there were over
ten thousand people on Louisiana’s payrolls and the numbers continued to increase over the
course of the twentieth century.16
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Long paid for a larger government and more services through a combination of taxes on
extractive industries and consumer-related goods and by taking out bonds to finance
infrastructure projects. Early in his tenure as governor, Long convinced the legislature to
implement what became a modest increase in severance taxes on oil, gas, and timber. Instead of
basing the levy on “percentages of gross market value,” the new rate of taxation would be “set by
the quantity and quality extracted.”17 The vast amounts of oil and gas that were available in
Louisiana brought in much of the money Long needed to expand services.18 When the state
required even more revenues to fund bonds for roads or salaries for new employees, Long
directed the legislature to raise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline. One source of funding that Long
did not take was the “dole money” being distributed by the federal government through New
Deal programs in 1933-1935. Though he was out of the governor’s office by that time, Long still
controlled Louisiana’s politics through his successor, Oscar K. Allen. The Kingfish had no
interest in accepting money if he could not dictate how it was spent.19
Long’s ironclad control over the state’s legislature, the judiciary, bureaucracies, hospitals,
schools, and businesses increased the dominance of the governor because there were “few checks
and balances to thwart his rule.” Yet the people of Louisiana did not seem to mind his dictatorial
style or the graft associated with his administration.20 Long appealed to the poor and working
classes by promising that the state would provide services without much cost to the average
citizen, even when he actually raised quite a number of individual and corporate taxes.21 The
circumstances of the Great Depression and Louisiana’s vast wealth of natural resources helped
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Long amass unprecedented power for himself. He also committed the state government to a path
where the idea of “free services” provided by numerous bureaucracies and paid for with mineral
revenues became part of the accepted political culture.
Sam Jones and the Entrenchment of Big Government in Louisiana
Growth in Louisiana’s government services continued during the 1930s, even after
Long’s assassination in 1935. Elected in 1936, Richard Leche and his administration enacted
several policies that benefitted the state’s residents. He made peace with the Roosevelt
administration and brought one hundred million dollars in New Deal money to Louisiana. The
governor also increased the homestead property tax exemption, established the first old age
pension for the elderly, and returned control of school boards to local parishes.22 However,
Leche and other public officials engaged in levels of corruption that could not be ignored by the
citizenry or the national government. In 1939, federal prosecutors issued 250 indictments against
legislators, department heads, and even the president of Louisiana State University (LSU).23
The following year, a majority of voters made their displeasure over the Louisiana
Scandals known at the polls. Though Louisianans elected Sam Houston Jones with just 51.8
percent of the vote, the margin was sufficient enough to remove the Long machine from the
governor’s mansion for the first time since 1928.24 An attorney from Lake Charles, Jones drew
much of his support from small business owners, as well as Louisianans who wanted to see a
more businesslike approach to government. During his campaign, he denounced the excesses of
“Longism” and said at an event in Shreveport in 1939, “Nobody is in favor of graft and
corruption such as it has been revealed in Louisiana in recent months. I invite all factions to unite
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behind the man who has the most strength so that we can defeat this crowd of grafters and
crooks.” Jones, of course, meant that he should be that man and promised to provide a “business
administration” for Louisiana.25 He also promised to reduce the number of state employees and
implement a merit-based civil service system. His proposals echoed early twentieth-century
governors by stressing that government should be efficient and not place an undue burden on
taxpayers.26
After his inauguration, Jones’ first major action was to reorganize Louisiana’s
government. In 1940, there were 174 different state agencies, boards, and commissions, some of
which were inoperative or only existed on paper. The Administrative Code of 1940 consolidated
the existing agencies into twenty different departments and four independent agencies. Under the
new code, departments with more than two divisions were required to keep centralized
administrative records and produce annual reports on their operations. Jones also ensured that
fiscal reform accompanied the administrative changes. Act 48 of 1940 introduced regular audits
of the state’s revenues and expenses, along with formal policies for purchasing and revenue
collection. Legal challenges from pro-Long factions eventually caused parts of the reorganization
to be scrapped, but the governor was still able to consolidate some of Louisiana’s unwieldy
bureaucracy.27
In addition to administrative reform, Jones intended to change how state agencies were
staffed. The number of employees working for Louisiana’s government had increased steadily
over the twentieth century, partly in response to the growing role that the state had as a regulator
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and service provider.28 The ability to fill those jobs had long been a source of power for
governors, and the power of appointment over various agencies, boards, and commissions had
been written into the 1921 constitution. Huey Long used that ability expertly, and by 1935,
controlled almost every state employee through patronage.29 Jones and his supporters believed
that such an approach had resulted in unqualified employees, inefficiency, and waste. By
implementing a system that relied on examinations and merit to guide hiring practices,
promotions, and pay raises, Jones argued that government could be more honest and less corrupt.
Voters agreed with his proposal and endorsed the plan in November 1940. Employees who
became “classified” as part of the civil service system could not be fired for political reasons, but
they also could not engage in activities such as campaigning. A commission comprised of five
members would oversee the civil service system and could not be dismissed by the governor.30
Newspapers and business-oriented reformers hailed the new system as a major step
forward for Louisiana. However, Jones’ civil service reforms did not undo the tradition of using
patronage to consolidate power for the faction in charge. The governor used the two years
between approval of the reform plan and its implementation to purge Long supporters and
replace them with his own people. That ensured Jones’ allies were more likely to remain in place
since the law stipulated that employees who held their positions when the service went into
effect had to take less stringent examinations. Future job seekers would have to take more
difficult tests to secure positions with the government. Further, a number of state employees
were excluded from civil service. Teachers, state board members, and highway workers were
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still dependent on political favor to remain employed.31 Jones’ reforms improved the
organization of Louisiana’s administration and also increased the level of professionalism in the
state’s civil service. The extent of his efforts to bring a “business administration” to Louisiana
should not be overstated though. An unwieldy bureaucracy remained in place at the end of his
tenure, and Jones did not fundamentally alter the use of patronage in the state.
World War II and its Impact on Louisiana’s Economy
Jones’ efforts to reorganize some parts of the state’s administration were not the only
changes that took place during his term. Events outside his control also had significant impact on
the state’s operations. In 1941, the United States entered World War II, and Louisiana became an
important part of the nation’s war efforts. Southern states received 17.6 percent of federal funds
spent on war preparation and production, and Louisiana was the second highest recipient in the
South. Over thirteen million dollars were spent on bases and training facilities for soldiers.
Louisiana factories manufactured high-octane aviation fuel, aluminum, shell casings, machine
lubrications, and ships.32 The state’s farms produced sugarcane, cotton, rice, and sweet potatoes,
much of which was purchased by the federal government to feed U.S. soldiers.33 Cities such as
Lake Charles, which had been an important industrial center since the 1920s, experienced
manufacturing growth and diversification during the war. Continental Oil Company built a five
million dollar complex in 1939, and factories around the port city began producing synthetic
rubber, ammonia, and magnesium.34
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The immediate effects of World War II helped end the lingering grip of the Great
Depression and brought about some notable changes to the state’s demographics. Per capita
income went up, retail sales went up, and more farmers owned their farms at the end of the war
than at the beginning.35 By 1945, the influx of military personnel and people looking for jobs had
increased the state’s population by over thirteen percent. More residents meant greater strain was
placed on public services such as schools, but the growth spike also meant more tax revenues.36
People moved to the cities during the war, and by 1950, Louisiana was more urban than rural.37
The war also brought federal dollars to the state. Between 1940 and 1944, the federal
government poured $1.7 billion into Louisiana through war contracts and helped move along the
state’s process of industrialization. Some historical features of the economy remained in place
though, even with the wartime changes. Per capita income stayed below the national average,
and agriculture remained the largest single sector of employment after the war ended.38
A signal of the coming post-World War II order, Louisiana’s petroleum production grew
in importance during war and was a significant reason for federal investment. Six of the seven
metropolitan areas that received over one hundred million dollars for plants and related
equipment were located in Texas and Louisiana. Five of those cities were home to substantial
petroleum-based manufacturing.39 As demand for petroleum products increased during the
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1940s, the oil and gas industry in states along the Gulf of Mexico responded.40 In Louisiana, oil
production went from twenty-three million barrels of oil in 1930 to over two hundred million
barrels in 1950. Production continued to climb during the next several decades, as did the
amount of money that Louisiana collected from the oil and gas industry.41 By 1960, severance
taxes made up forty-two percent of total revenues collected by the state, a trend which continued
until the mid-1970s.42 The growth of the oil industry had other long-term consequences as well,
specifically in terms of environmental impacts. Though pipelines had been constructed in
Louisiana’s marshes throughout the 1930s, their numbers increased during the war because of
fears related to German U-boat attacks.43 Eventually, the web of pipelines and canals constructed
on the coast would contribute to the loss of the state’s wetlands.44
The development of the oil industry as an important component of the economy and
budget was similar to events previously seen in the state’s history. Louisiana had exploited its
abundant natural resources before in order to fuel economic development. For example, in the
late nineteenth century, northern timber companies were looking for new places to harvest trees
for lumber. Many of the forests surrounding the Great Lakes had been significantly depleted, and
Louisiana held considerable promise. There was a large number of cypress trees available in the
state’s southern swamps, and there was also a desire for new types of industry to spur economic
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growth.45 Starting in 1876, developers bought one million acres of forestlands and launched a
forty-year extraction boom. By the mid-1920s, almost all of the mature cypress trees were gone,
and new trees could not grow in their places because the process of removal had been so
destructive. As the supply of cypress trees declined, so did the number of lumber developers. In
1915, there were one hundred and fifty mill towns. Five years later, ninety mill towns were still
in operation, but by 1940, that number was down to four.46 The decline of the timber industry in
southern Louisiana demonstrated one of the potential problems with relying on natural resources
to boost economic growth. If the resource disappeared, so did the industry and the funds that
went along with it.
“Uncle Earl” and Post-World War II Louisiana
After World War II came to an end, the American economy was growing steadily, and
Huey Long’s brother, Earl, decided to make a second run for governor in 1948.47 Voters
responded well to his bawdy humor and plain-spoken promises to serve the people by giving him
41.5 percent of the vote in the first primary. They then gave him an astounding 65.9 percent in
the February runoff. He won all but two parishes in the state and carried seventy-five percent of
pro-Long candidates to victory. Once in office, Long sought to undo some of the reforms from
previous administrations and resume the expansion of government services. He boosted the oldage pension to fifty dollars a month, increased funding for education to ensure school children
received a free, hot lunch, and gave teachers across the state a pay raise. Long also expanded
appropriations to the state’s universities, built hundreds of new schools, and increased funding
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for families with disabled children. He raised the homestead exemption tax credit for veterans to
five thousand dollars and gave them a thousand dollar bonus for serving in World War II.48
Expanding public services for the people was not the only item on Long’s agenda. He
also intended to consolidate his control of the government and Long-machine politics. The
governor convinced the legislature to repeal the civil service system in 1948, allowing him to
purge thousands of employees who held anti-Long sentiments. Long replaced them with people
who were loyal to him and added four thousand additional workers to the state’s payrolls. He
also established the Department of Administration to strengthen his control over the state’s
budget and hiring.49 The power wielded by Earl Long was perhaps related to his personality, but
his ability to control the government also rested in the worsening disorganization of Louisiana’s
bureaucracy. Even with Governor Jones’ attempts to increase efficiency and transparency several
years earlier, coherent administration in the state remained a significant problem.
Shortly after its creation, the Public Affairs Research Council published a set of findings
on the state of Louisiana’s executive branch in November 1951. The group observed that it was
“impossible to escape the conclusion that the present structure of the executive branch is not
conducive to efficiency, economy, or responsibility” and that “without a definite pattern of
observation, there will inevitably be a waste of state revenue and a level of performance below
that which the citizen has a right to expect.” The council also noted that the problem had deep
historical roots, asserting Louisiana’s executive branch was the “result of 140 years of haphazard
development” and also that it was “a hodgepodge of 151 separate agencies dominated by the
governor.” In many cases, those different agencies had been created by the legislature over
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successive administrations to “meet particular problems, without any over-all plan of
organization and with little consideration of existing agencies and their functions.” According to
PAR, the result had all too often been “conflict, duplication, and overlapping and gaps in the
administrative structure.”50
Long’s tenure as governor did little to ameliorate problems of inefficiency, and the
electorate voted Robert F. Kennon as chief executive in 1952. Hailing from Webster Parish in
northern Louisiana, Kennon campaigned against Longism and promised voters a “common sense
administration, efficient in its operation and devoid of deadheads.” 51 Once elected, the former
judge kept many of his campaign promises by pursuing the type of good-government reforms
that had been enacted during Sam Jones’ administration. Kennon brought back the state’s civil
service system and ensured that it would be properly protected by a constitutional amendment.
He also signed a law that mandated voting machines be placed in all state precincts to cut down
on election tampering, and his administration aggressively pushed to shut down illegal gambling
operations.52
Kennon’s reform agenda came to an end when Earl Long returned to the governor’s
mansion in 1956. Long campaigned by promising voters more services and increased spending
on education, health, and welfare. His appeals worked, and Long won the first primary with 51.5
percent of the vote.53 From 1956 to 1959, Earl continued his first-term agenda of expanding
public services. He boosted pensions for the elderly and gave school teachers a twenty-eight
percent pay raise. Appropriations for education, health, welfare, and highways all increased, so
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much that Louisiana ranked number one in the South for per capita spending on those services.
Within four years, state expenditures rose from $471 million to $566 million, but Long refused
to take on debt to pay for his programs. He kept balanced budgets during the late 1950s by
paying for expanded services with oil and gas revenues. That decision was good for Long’s
popularity, but the governor’s fiscal policies contributed to Louisiana’s shaky financial
foundations. Residents grew more averse to paying for services through increased income or
property taxes when mineral revenues seemed more than adequate to support the state’s
budgetary needs.54
Louisiana, “Uncle Sam,” and the Tidelands Controversy
Long’s willingness to rely on oil and gas revenues to pay for services had other lasting
consequences in the “Pelican State.” In what was known as the “tidelands controversy,”
Louisiana and the federal government became embroiled in a legal dispute over the oil and gas
reserves beneath the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Prior to the late 1930s, state ownership of
submerged lands that were adjacent to a state’s shoreline had been relatively uncontested. The
Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 required that applications for offshore leasing be directed
to the coastal states, which meant states could approve leases and then collect revenues from
production associated with those leases. However, in 1937, U.S. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes
began keeping applications for offshore leases instead of referring them back to the states. Two
years later, President Roosevelt ordered a study be conducted about how to approach ownership
or jurisdiction over the submerged lands of the continental shelf. For Roosevelt, the primary
issue was ensuring the federal government had the authority to protect adjacent waters in an
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international context. He was less interested in the implications that such an action would have
on state-federal relations.55
However, officials in the affected states were greatly concerned about the potential
encroachment of the federal government into offshore leasing. In response, the Louisiana
legislature passed Act 55 in 1938. The law was an attempt to keep recent oil discoveries under
state jurisdiction and declared that Louisiana’s southern boundary extended twenty-seven
nautical miles from the state’s coast.56 There was little debate over the issue during World War
II, but in September 1945, President Truman issued a proclamation that asserted federal authority
over continental shelf resources. Between 1947 and 1950, the Supreme Court ruled in three
separate cases brought against California, Texas, and Louisiana that the states had no jurisdiction
over the lands that sat beyond the low water mark next to their shores. States still retained rights
to the resources of lands up to the low tide mark, but officials in Texas and Louisiana were
furious over the Supreme Court’s decisions. Leases had already been granted in the contested
areas and losing them to the federal government meant losing out on potential revenues.57
While the Truman administration prepared its cases against the states in the late 1940s,
Congress involved itself in the debate. By 1947, over fifty bills had been introduced to prevent
the federal government from assuming jurisdiction over mineral leasing on the continental shelf.
Officials in Texas and Louisiana were aware of the impending lawsuits, and representatives from
both states sought out room for compromise with the administration. Speaker of the House Sam
Rayburn tried to broker a deal that would be favorable to both Texas and the federal government,
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but the state’s attorney general was not interested in compromise. Price Daniel argued instead
that Texas should have full sovereignty over the submerged lands past the low tide mark, up to
three leagues from the Texas shoreline. He convinced the state’s political leadership to reject
Rayburn’s proposal, and appeared before the Supreme Court to make his case in 1950. He failed
to convince the justices, which meant that Texas lost out on the potential revenues that would
have been part of Rayburn’s compromise. Daniel did, however, manage to use the controversy as
a central campaign issue in 1952 and won election to the U.S. Senate.58
Rayburn also attempted to facilitate a compromise between Louisiana and the federal
government in spring 1948. Concerned about the implications of the 1947 United States v.
California ruling for Louisiana, Earl Long sent his attorney general, Bolivar Kemp, and
lieutenant governor, William Dodd, to Washington D.C., to see if there were a potential deal that
could benefit the state. With Truman’s blessing, Rayburn offered the Louisiana delegation a
compromise similar to what had been presented to Texas: two-thirds of the revenues generated
by oil leases up to three miles off Louisiana’s coastline and 37.5 percent of the revenues from the
lands beyond the three-mile mark. Additionally, Louisiana could keep all the revenues from
leases already granted, and the state’s mineral board would be in charge of administering
offshore leasing and production. Both Kemp and Dodd were in favor of the deal, but they needed
Long’s permission to accept.59
When state officials and legal experts gathered in Baton Rouge to discuss the offer, most
were in agreement with Kemp and Dodd. The only political figure to object to the Truman
administration’s proposal was Leander Perez. Elected as district attorney in Plaquemines Parish
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in 1924, Perez had used his position to gain political control of Plaquemines and St. Bernard.60
He argued that Louisiana should fight for control of lands beyond the low-tide mark and failure
to do so was to surrender local power to the federal government. Though Perez had had long
made an issue over states’ rights, his motivation for opposing Truman’s compromise probably
had more to do with the economics of oil development. About thirty-eight percent of the reserves
off Louisiana’s coastline were adjacent to Plaquemines and St. Bernard.61 Perez had made a
personal fortune by serving as the attorney for oil companies that obtained lease rights in the
waters near his parishes. If the federal government assumed control over the lands, both he and
his allies stood to lose substantial amounts of revenue from future leases.62
Several days after the meeting in the state’s capital, Long announced that he would not
accept Truman’s compromise despite the advice from his attorney general and lieutenant
governor. His decision was almost entirely personal and held little relationship to what would
have been good for Louisiana. Leander Perez had ensured Plaquemines and St. Bernard went in
Long’s favor during the 1948 gubernatorial race, and the district attorney had also vowed to
undermine the election of Russell Long to the U.S. Senate if Earl took Truman’s deal. Earl Long
wanted to secure his nephew’s victory and thus strengthen the Long machine’s political power in
Louisiana.63 Perez was convinced that the state could win claims to the submerged lands beyond
the low-tide mark, but he and Long miscalculated badly. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
federal government in 1950, and three years later Congress codified the court’s decision in the
Submerged Land Acts and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.64
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Combined, the court rulings and legislation affirmed federal supremacy over offshore
waters and mineral leasing, but Congress attempted to mollify the coastal states with a few
concessions. The Submerged Lands Act established state control of underwater lands up to three
nautical miles from a state’s shorelines and also provided the opportunity to obtain jurisdiction
up to three marine leagues. Additionally, the act recognized that shorelines could change
depending on erosion and accretion, and Congress directed the states and federal government to
work out where the boundaries actually were.65 The 1953 laws ameliorated earlier court rulings
to some extent by granting states three-mile jurisdiction, but Louisiana still lost billions of
dollars in revenue that it would have received had Earl Long accepted Truman’s 1948
compromise.66 Litigation over Louisiana’s claims to offshore lands continued in the 1950s, but
after 1954, little challenged federal supremacy on the continental shelf.67 Earl Long’s blunder
would eventually prove even more detrimental to the state’s budget as coastal erosion
accelerated, and Louisiana’s shoreline boundary moved further inland.68
Big Oil Takes a Toll on the Environment
The growing impact of the oil and gas industry during the mid-twentieth century was not
limited solely to its economic importance. Several decades before the problem of coastal erosion
became clear, there was already an indication that the industry could negatively affect fish and
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wildlife habitats in Louisiana. When hunters and fishers demanded their recreational spaces be
protected from pollution, state officials had to decide how to respond. One example of that
dynamic took place in northern Louisiana near the Arkansas border. Located in Claiborne Parish,
Corney Creek was a small but popular stream for local hunters and fishers. In the early 1940s,
residents began to complain about the spot’s declining water quality.69 Oil-field brine discharges
from drillers in Arkansas were flowing into the Corney Creek system, and the runoff was hurting
the area’s fish and wildlife. After several unsuccessful attempts to work with state officials in
Arkansas and Louisiana, Claiborne residents gave up and decided to take their concerns to the
federal government in 1952.70
The U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), which was responsible for intervening in cases of
interstate pollution, initiated several investigations into the pollution at Corney Creek. Sensitive
to Louisiana’s resistance to federal intrusion in legal matters, the agency moved cautiously over
the next several years as it collected information. By February 1957, the PHS decided that there
was enough evidence to warrant federal intervention. Agency officials issued a cease and desist
order to eighteen Arkansas well operators and told them they could no longer dispose of brine
discharge into the Corney Creek system. When the agency did follow-up inspections three years
later, they found that the drillers were still in compliance and that the quality of Corney Creek’s
waters had improved.71
The involvement of the PHS stemmed from the fact that Louisiana’s officials had been
reluctant to take a strong position on pollution in the Corney system.72 The state’s abundant
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natural resources were a strong draw for manufacturers, and limiting the use of those resources
was considered to be a risk to industrial development and economic growth.73 Though there was
a constitutional mandate to protect Louisiana’s natural resources, enforcement of that directive
was relatively weak.74 The state’s administrative structure factored into the lax oversight. In the
middle of the twentieth century, the Department of Wild Life and Fisheries was responsible for
monitoring water pollution, but the Stream Control Commission was in charge of developing the
criteria by which to measure water quality. At least four other agencies had duties related to
environmental oversight, and there was no central authority to coordinate activities among them.
As a result, Louisiana lacked a comprehensive, systematic approach to environmental regulation
throughout much of the twentieth century.75 That fact was particularly important as the
petrochemical industry expanded its operations in the context of an administrative system that
was predisposed to favoring economic development over protection of natural resources. As oil
and gas extraction became more entrenched in the state’s coastal wetlands, protection of the
swamps and marshes in southern Louisiana had to compete with an industry that held
considerable economic and political sway.
John McKeithen, Administrative Problems Continue, and Growing Industry
During the 1963-1964 gubernatorial race, voters in Louisiana were more concerned about
issues of race than they were about offshore oil drilling or wildlife habitats. For that election, ten
candidates entered the field, including former governor Robert Kennon and Public Service
Commissioner John McKeithen. The latter had been a floor leader during Earl Long’s
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administration and like most of his fellow candidates, McKeithen voiced disapproval of federal
meddling in the issue of civil rights. Combined with folksy requests for the people to “please
h’ep” him, McKeithen used the issue of defending segregation to appeal to voters. He employed
that strategy in the primary and then again in the run-off, which allowed him to do well in rural
districts and parts of New Orleans.76
Once in office, McKeithen recognized that resisting desegregation was futile. He created
a biracial commission to discuss race relations in the state and strongly supported the
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under his leadership, schools in Louisiana
continued to slowly, and for the most part, peacefully integrate.77 Many white residents of the
state were displeased with his actions, and tensions sometimes escalated into violence. On one
occasion, McKeithen sent the National Guard to Washington Parish in order to protect civil
rights protesters. The issue of race did not dominate McKeithen’s agenda though, and he focused
much of his attention on good-government reforms and economic growth. He signed bills that
expanded the investment of state funds and initiated an inventory of public properties.78 The
governor kept one of his campaign promises and oversaw the establishment of a state ethics
commission, along with the creation of a strong code of ethics for state legislators.79
McKeithen also appointed thirteen members to a committee formed by the legislature “to
study possible changes in the powers, duties and responsibilities of Louisiana’s Chief
Executive.” In May 1966, the committee issued a report, detailing the problems, weaknesses, and
disorder they found in an examination of the state’s government. Some of their findings echoed
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the observations made by PAR fifteen years earlier, particularly in regard to how the executive
branch was structured. For example, the committee determined that the governor had the ability
to unduly influence local politics through the power of appointment. According to the group’s
assessment, the governor should not be involved in deciding the composition of “city athletic
commissions” or “water district boards” because “generally speaking, governors do not know
local problems.” Further, the process of filling over one thousand “appointive positions” that had
“local characteristics” was “time consuming and [detracted] from important duties at the state
level.”80
The committee went on to observe that the governor’s ability to effectively oversee state
government was compromised by the “useless agencies and overlapping boards.” By the report’s
estimation, if the chief executive wanted to spend time on addressing administrative issues in
“the sprawling empire of agencies,” he might have one day every two years to do that. With 240
agencies to supervise, the governor simply did not have the time to oversee such a large
collection of bureaucratic entities. The structure of the agencies themselves hampered
administration as well. Overlapping and duplicative duties undermined smooth operations, and
the committee stressed that a lack of effective communication and clear outline of
responsibilities for agencies was also a substantial issue.81 Committee members made a number
of recommendations to address the problems they identified with Louisiana’s government, but
reform at a constitutional level would not take places until the 1970s.
While McKeithen’s administrative reforms were relatively limited, the governor invested
a considerable amount of energy into recruiting business. He toured the world to lure large
corporations to Louisiana, and his efforts proved quite successful. Over two billion dollars
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poured into the state’s economy to fund construction of new plants. Fifty thousand Louisianans
found employment in the growing manufacturing industries, and many of the positions paid
extremely well.82 Production in petroleum, chemicals, textiles, paper, glass, and machinery all
increased.83 The years 1964-1968 were particularly notable for how quickly industrial expansion
occurred. During those years, petrochemical growth in Louisiana “outpaced all other states” in
the country. A reduction in taxes on natural gas was especially important for luring new
companies, along with other tax incentives offered by McKeithen. The governor’s push to bring
petrochemical companies to Louisiana continued into the following decade and was hailed as a
major boon for the state’s workers and economy.84
Big Reforms, Small Changes
With economic conditions favorable during the early 1970s, seventeen people entered the
gubernatorial race in 1971. The top two candidates in the primary were state Senator J. Bennett
Johnston and U.S. Representative Edwin W. Edwards. A native of the Shreveport area, Johnston
had the support of the northern parishes, middle-class whites in large cities, and oil and gas
interests. Born in Avoyelles Parish and having practiced law in Crowley before being elected to
Congress, Edwards was backed by Cajuns, Catholics, labor groups, and African Americans. The
lead-up to the runoff was brutal and expensive, but Edwards managed to secure a narrow victory.
He went on to defeat the Republican candidate in the general election, though the campaign was
tougher than Edwards expected.85
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Once in office, Edwards set out to fulfill a campaign promise to modernize and
streamline Louisiana’s government – a goal that had been pursued or at least considered by
governors for over thirty years. In 1974, PAR reaffirmed the observations made by the group in
the early 1950s, stating:
One of the most significant defects in Louisiana state government is its administrative
structure. The structure is weakened by the multiplicity of separate agencies and by the
fragmentation of authority among numerous elected officials and commissions which
enjoy special constitutional protection.86
Perhaps the most pressing issue to help with administrative reforms was the state’s need
for a new constitution.87 Since 1921, Louisiana’s governing document had been amended 536
times and consisted of 255,000 words.88 The constitution contained conflicting amendments and
provisions specific to individual parishes or municipalities. Measures dealing with local sewage
treatment plants or the classification of civil service employees who worked for cities were the
sort of issues routinely put before the entire state. Further, interest or even understanding of the
lengthy constitution among Louisianans was dubious. During the 1950s and 1960s, as little as six
percent of the electorate voted on the amendments put before them.89
Edwards called for a convention in 1973, and most of the delegates who participated
were middle-class businessmen, lawyers, or representatives already serving in the legislature.
After several months of work, the convention produced a constitution that was an improvement
over the previous one and contained articles that gave some protection against discrimination,
normalized the meeting schedule of the legislature, and increased the independence of parish and
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municipal governments.90 The constitution protected the status of homestead exemptions, but tax
breaks for industry were not included in the new document. That meant that voters had to
approve any increases for personal property taxes, while the legislature could raise taxes on
businesses by statute. Critics of the convention charged that the new constitution included too
many of the special provisions and tax breaks that had riddled the 1921 document. The Public
Affairs Research Council concluded that the constitution was unfavorable to business interests
but benefitted middle-class homeowners.91 Despite the criticisms from groups such as PAR,
fifty-eight percent of the voters approved the constitution in 1974.92
The new constitution helped modernize Louisiana’s government by re-organizing its
bureaucracy into a cabinet-style system. The problem of numerous agencies, appointees, and
insufficient management pointed out in 1966 had not improved considerably. By 1973, there
were 267 agencies, boards, commissions, and offices and mostly administered by gubernatorial
appointees.93 Louisiana’s governor was responsible for appointing approximately 1,425 officials
to the state’s multitude of bureaucracies. Such extensive appointment powers endowed the
governor with huge leeway in doling out patronage to loyal supporters but also impacted
effective oversight. The new constitution sought to reduce the number of agencies and called for
no more than twenty departments. Nine departments would be headed by elected officials,
including the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Eleven departments, such as
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) or the Department of Revenue and Taxation, would
be administered by appointees of the governor. Reorganization began in December 1975 and was
completed in July 1978. The number of gubernatorial appointees fell to 1,340, and almost ninety
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agencies, boards, commissions, and officers were absorbed into the new departments or
abolished completely.94
Another area of significant change that took place during Edwards’ first term was in
regard to severance taxes. In 1974, the governor orchestrated a change in how levies on mineral
extraction were assessed. Under the new policy, severance taxes on petroleum became based on
the market value of oil rather than the volume removed.95 Edwards’ decision to change the
method of assessment came from his desire to increase state services without significantly
raising taxes on the state’s residents. In 1972, the state spent less than $1.9 billion per year; by
1979, that figure had increased to $4.5 billion. The influx of oil and gas money allowed Edwards
to eliminate the state property tax and reduce the sales taxes on food and drugs.96 In 1979, the
State of the State report noted that Louisiana had “been able to sustain a lower per capita
collection of sales and income taxes through the receipt of sizeable severance tax revenues” but
that the scenario was likely unsustainable. “A major proportion of Louisiana’s severance taxes
are paid by persons living outside of Louisiana…as Louisiana reduces its reliance on the
severance tax, it will be less able to ‘export’ a part of its tax burden.”97
The Oil Bust and “Slaying the Dragon”
In 1979, the state elected a Republican to the governor’s mansion for the first time since
Reconstruction. David Treen, an attorney who was born in Baton Rouge and raised in New
Orleans, had made a strong showing against Edwards in the 1972 governor’s race. After his loss
that year, Treen went on to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives for three terms before
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returning for another run at the governor’s office. While Treen worked in the nation’s capital, the
number of registered Republicans in Louisiana had climbed from twelve thousand to over one
hundred thousand. Democrats still outnumbered Republicans by a margin of ten to one, but the
Republican Party was slowly gaining momentum. During the campaign, Treen proved preferable
to the electorate than the liberal Democrat who had placed second in the state’s initial primary.98
Treen’s victory thrilled business leaders and good-government proponents. The newly
elected governor had campaigned on reducing the size of the state’s bureaucracy while
increasing efficiency, but his supporters were ultimately disappointed. Even with the
reorganization efforts of the late 1970s, the state’s poor administrative structure continued. For
example, in 1979, the legislature passed the Louisiana Environmental Affairs Act, which
attempted to place most pollution-control programs under the authority of the Department of
Natural Resources. Four years later, at Governor Treen’s prompting, legislators established an
entirely separate agency to oversee pollution regulations when they created the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ). However, not all pollution control programs were moved to the
DEQ. The Department of Agriculture and the State Police continued to have enforcement duties
related to pesticides and transportation.99 With supervision and control spread across multiple
agencies, Louisiana continued to experience pollution problems even after the state created a
department specifically to oversee its environment.
Dispersed authority was not the only issue; the size of Louisiana’s government had
continued to grow even after constitutional reforms. The number of agencies, boards, and
commissions swelled to 325, and gubernatorial appointments climbed to 1,556. Treen struggled
to manage such a large bureaucracy effectively and his decisions contributed to inefficient
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administration in the state. In one case, he created yet another commission to see how the state
could reduce the amount of redundancy in its agencies.100 The governor also refused to use
patronage as a way of rewarding loyalty and neglected to remove Edwards’ supporters from their
positions. In another instance, Treen appointed associates of an influential state legislator from
New Orleans to the state mineral board. That particular board had usually been considered offlimits to anyone but the governor’s personal allies because it was responsible for granting
lucrative state mineral leases. Treen hoped placing the legislator’s preferred candidates would
lead to more bipartisan cooperation, but instead, he found that the board often voted against his
wishes.101
Despite his difficulties with administration, Treen remained personally popular among
Louisianans. The state’s residents considered him to be honest, and they generally liked him. He
also managed to get some of his legislation passed. One example was bringing an end to lifetime
certification for teachers and linking their pay raises to college attendance, though he failed to
stop legislators from lowering some of the requirements in the final bill. In one of his more
popular moves, the governor oversaw an increase of the homestead tax exemption to $75,000,
and he reduced personal income taxes by more than $100 million. To pay for those tax breaks
and increases in employment, Treen tapped into the $515 million surplus left to him by Edwards
– a surplus which had been partially generated by booming oil revenues.102
By using that surplus to pay for his political agenda, the governor’s fiscal policy was not
all that different from those of his predecessors. However, during Treen’s tenure, Louisiana
began to experience significant economic trouble when the price of oil crashed half-way through
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his term. Louisiana’s heavy reliance on the petrochemical industry made the state especially
sensitive to the decline in oil prices, particularly since the changes to severance tax assessments
in the mid-1970s. He had to rescind the income tax cuts he had made and then initiate spending
freezes. As Treen prepared to run for re-election, the recession plaguing the rest of the nation
finally came to Louisiana. Edwards, who had amassed over $12 million in campaign funds for
the 1983 race, hammered Treen on the vanishing surplus and mounting budget shortfalls. Treen
hoped to appeal to voters on the basis of integrity, but they were more interested in the faltering
economy than honest government. With over one million ballots cast in his favor, Edwards won
the first primary with sixty-two percent of the vote.103
Edwards’ third term turned out to be quite different than his first two. The economy
continued to founder, and instead of cutting state employment to save money, Edwards proposed
tax increases to make up for falling revenues. The first hike came from taxes on gasoline and was
used to pay for road construction and maintenance. He went on to propose a $1.2 billion tax
package, only half of which got through the legislature. There was some discussion of repealing
the homestead exemption, but the idea never gained any real traction. Compounding the
economic problems faced by the state, Edwards had to deal with personal and ethical problems.
In 1985, he faced federal corruption charges and endured two different trials before being
acquitted in early 1986.104
When the 1987 gubernatorial campaign began, support for the embattled governor had
eroded but not disappeared. He still had the loyalty of the state’s black constituents and their
votes almost guaranteed him a spot in a run-off. Also hoping to make their way to the second
election, the sitting secretary of state and four current or previous congressmen entered the race.
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Among them, a relatively unassuming and underfunded candidate emerged as a late favorite in
September 1987. Charles “Buddy” Roemer, who hailed from the Shreveport area, proved to be
particularly appealing to young, college-educated voters when he promised to “slay the dragon”
of big, inefficient government. Despite the early assumptions that Roemer was a longshot
candidate, his promises worked and he placed first in the primary with thirty-three percent of the
vote. Edwards came in second with twenty-seven percent of the vote, but instead of going on to
the run-off, the governor decided to concede the election to his opponent. The move was a
calculated one; by denying Roemer the opportunity to gain a majority of votes in a second
election, Edwards hoped to undermine any chance that the Democratic congressman might have
at claiming a mandate.105
Though he took the governor’s mansion with only a plurality of votes, Roemer had grand
ambitions. He intended to reduce government patronage and address the state’s continuing fiscal
problems. His first order of business was to tackle the $800 million budget deficit he inherited.
To accomplish that, Roemer and the legislature approved one billion dollars in bonds to cover
the state’s debts. The bonds would be paid for by setting aside one cent of the state sales tax for
the next seven years. Along with the money from the bonds, spending cuts, and fee increases
helped produce a balanced budget for the first time in three years. When Roemer moved on to
restructuring the state’s tax code, he had far less success. He eventually got the legislature to pass
a bill that raised “sin” taxes but left personal and industrial income taxes mostly untouched.106
Despite his efforts to alleviate Louisiana’s budget problems, Roemer continued to face
shortfalls even after taking out bonds worth one billion dollars. The oil bust that occurred in the
mid-1980s continued to undermine the state’s economy, and to make up for a lack of funds,
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Roemer decided to support certain forms of legalized gambling. In 1990, he endorsed a
constitutional amendment that created a lottery. One year later, the governor approved the
introduction of video poker machines and riverboat casinos. Raising taxes to cover the state’s
expenditures on services and employment was not politically viable, and gambling money was
an easy way to fill in some of the holes left by the decline in oil revenues. Along with playing an
increasing role in the state’s economy, the gaming industry exerted a growing influence on
Louisiana’s politicians. By 1995, campaign contributions from gaming surpassed those coming
from petrochemical interests.107
Chemical Reaction
Even though the gaming industry had emerged as a powerful interest in the state, the
winner of the 1995 gubernatorial election ran on anti-gambling platform. Republican Mike
Foster placed first in the primary and then went on to defeat a far more liberal candidate in the
run-off.108 However, Foster did little to roll back the gaming industry once he was in office. He
blocked the legislature from banning video poker machines in 1996 and oversaw the opening of
Harrah’s Casino in New Orleans in 1999. Foster’s reluctance to put an end to gaming in
Louisiana might have been the result of the industry’s extensive influence, but the governor also
likely recognized its economic importance. The state had not fully recovered from the financial
malaise of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the gaming industry was a source of jobs.109
Unemployment remained higher in Louisiana than the country as a whole, and the state’s per
capita income sat at eighty-one percent of the national average.110 By the end of the century,
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gaming revenues contributed nine percent to the state’s budget. In comparison, the revenues
from Louisiana’s mineral reserves provided eight percent, which was a significant decline from
the 1970s and early 1980s.111
To help spur economic development in areas other than gaming, Governor Foster
followed the precedent set by John McKeithen and worked to recruit large corporations to
Louisiana. One example involved a Japanese chemical firm named Shintech. In 1996, Foster
offered the company tax breaks worth $135 million if it constructed a new complex in the
state.112 Shintech found the offer appealing and applied to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for emission permits under the Clean Air Act. The company wanted to build a polyvinyl
chloride plant near the tiny town of Convent and needed both state and federal approval to
operate.113 Advertising that their $700 million establishment would bring 165 positions, Shintech
developed a close relationship with the officials of St. James Parish who were supportive of the
deal.114 There were also some residents who favored construction of the facility. Doris LeBlanc,
a St. James resident who helped push for the plant’s approval, stated, “Everybody who lives near
the plant wants it. We want the plant. We need the jobs.”115 A spokesperson for the St. James
Citizens Coalition commended Shintech, saying, “It was the only company that ever came to talk
to the people in the neighborhood who wanted to listen. I welcome Shintech.”116
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Even with an unemployment rate of thirteen percent, other residents in Convent were
unconvinced that the jobs would be worth accepting another chemical company in their
community. There were already a dozen plants nearby, and few of the town’s people worked at
them. Local activists were concerned about the impact of adding more pollution to the air,
especially when past promises of employment went unfulfilled.117 When the state showed little
interest in reversing its approval of Shintech’s operating permits, organizers turned to the federal
government for assistance and asked that the Environmental Protection Agency take action to
stop the plant’s construction.118 In early September 1997, the EPA responded to the community’s
concerns and put the company’s emissions permits on hold. A year of public hearings, protests,
and legal maneuvering followed the EPA’s decision, and in 1998, Shintech abandoned its plans
to build the plant in Convent.119
Despite the events in St. James Parish, successful opposition to industrial development
was not widespread in Louisiana. An eighty-five-mile stretch between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans had become home to over one hundred and thirty petrochemical companies in the
decades following World War II. Drawn by cheap land and easy access to the Mississippi River,
companies such as Shell Chemicals and BASF built huge complexes along the “Chemical
Corridor.” The residents who lived in the corridor’s neighboring parishes were among the
poorest and least educated in the state and lacked the clout to block development.120 They were
also exposed to high levels of pollution. In 1996, the EPA cited Louisiana as having one of the
worst environmental enforcement records in the country. With the exception of Buddy Roemer’s
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administration, the Department of Environmental Quality tended to work with industries rather
than acting to regulate them. In response to the EPA’s criticisms of its performance in the mid1990s, the DEQ said that issuing high fines for noncompliance would harm industrial
development and cost the state jobs. Yet at the end of the twentieth century, Louisiana lagged
behind other states with large petrochemical industries in economic growth and quality of life
indicators.121 Despite its abundance of natural resources and extensive mineral wealth, Louisiana
failed to elevate its citizens’ standard of living in significant ways. In some cases, as with
pollution in the Chemical Corridor, residents actually saw quality of life indicators decline as
more industries moved into their neighborhoods.
Conclusion
The poor condition of Louisiana’s environment in the 1990s was a testament to the state’s
legacy of inefficient bureaucracies and heavy reliance on extractive industries to meet budget
needs. Government agencies were structurally limited in managing the state’s natural resources
due to dispersed authority and oversight. Political leaders such as Earl Long were prone to rely
on the revenues generated by resource extraction, while officials such as Mike Foster saw
Louisiana’s natural abundance as a recruiting tool for industry. That is not to say there were no
efforts to conserve resources or protect the environment during the twentieth century. Despite
their difficulties with leadership, both David Treen and Buddy Roemer sought to enhance
environmental protections. However, Louisiana’s institutions were not well-suited for broad,
comprehensive management of complex ecosystems. They were geared toward supporting
economic growth, which often depended on exploiting the environment and “improving” lands
to support development. Officials did make attempts to conserve, protect, or restore Louisiana’s
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wetlands starting in the 1970s, but their efforts were rooted in a political climate that did not
have the means or inclination to consistently prioritize environmental protection in
policymaking, especially when doing so challenged existing bureaucratic and economic systems.
Those tendencies and weaknesses would manifest themselves in the state’s anti-erosion efforts as
well, along with the long-standing idea that the environment was a commodity to be exploited
rather than an ecosystem to be maintained in support of ecological and human vitality.
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CHAPTER 2: THE POLICIES OF LOUISIANA’S COAST
AND AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM
“A One-Block Disaster Area”
On May 3, 1978, the metropolitan area surrounding New Orleans received over ten
inches of rain in a twenty-four hour period. The heavy rains surpassed the previous record set in
1948 and caused severe flooding in Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes. Five people
were killed during the storm, and public officials estimated damages at $240 million.1 One of the
locations to sustain the worst flooding was Coubra Drive, “a one-block disaster area” situated in
the neighborhood of Bayou Estates in Marrero, Jefferson Parish.2 Residents who lived on Coubra
Drive had experienced flooding prior to the May 3 storm, and they would see their homes flood
again in 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1983.3 The homeowners lost vehicles, appliances, and other
possessions due to repeated flooding, and as a result, twenty-four families or individuals filed a
lawsuit against Coubra’s developer and Jefferson Parish in August 1978.4 A second lawsuit was
filed in relation to the 1982 flooding event. In each suit, the plaintiffs alleged that Regent
Development Corp. and Jefferson Parish contributed to property damages through shoddy
building practices, improper inspections, and negligence.5
The charges levied in the lawsuit were not unfounded. Coubra Drive was a foot lower
than other streets in Bayou Estates, and when Regent cleared the block for development, the
company improperly filled the area with tree stumps. Further, a study conducted in 1968 by an
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engineering firm noted that the pumping stations responsible for draining the area would be
inadequate with the addition of more streets. There was also some question as to whether local
officials had followed appropriate procedures before accepting the street for public maintenance
in 1972. Charles Julian, an engineer who worked for Jefferson Parish’s Department of Roads and
Bridges, testified during the civil trial in 1983 that he never gave approval after his initial
examination of the site. The parish council voted to accept the street anyway, despite the lack of
records for Julian’s decision.6 While human error and negligence certainly contributed to the
suffering of Coubra Drive’s residents, there was perhaps another, more fundamental problem
with the development. The street had been built on swamplands that were drained during what
the Times-Picayune called a period of “build now, worry later” growth in areas such as Jefferson
Parish. Other neighborhoods on the West Bank experienced flooding during heavy storms, and
Coubra Drive had simply become “an embarrassing symbol” of a larger issue – poorly planned
urban expansion on “hastily drained wetlands.”7
Clearing out swamps to allow for housing development was taking place throughout the
nation by the mid-twentieth century. Starting in the late 1950s, home builders accelerated the
construction of neighborhoods on drained wetlands in states such as Florida, New Jersey, and
Ohio. Wetlands were not widely seen as productive ecological areas in need of preservation;
rather they were impediments to social and economic growth.8 Yet the potential consequences of
building on drained wetlands could be seen in the cracked foundations and flooded homes of
Coubra Drive. Certainly, there were actions that builders could take to mitigate flooding. For
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example, had Regent used sand instead of trees the street’s sinking might have been less
pronounced. Improved drainage mechanisms could have also reduced the severity of flooding.
Still, even when the alteration of wetlands was carried out with more caution than had been
exercised on Coubra Drive, the loss of swamps and marshes for urban expansion was part of a
broader trend in southern Louisiana during the twentieth century – the engineering of the state’s
coastal zone to facilitate economic and social growth. While there were benefits to pursuing
activities and policies that promoted development, Louisianans also began to experience
significant drawbacks from alterations to the coast. In fact, the loss of the state’s wetlands after
the 1930s became increasingly detrimental to the very economic and social growth that
government officials sought to support.
Simmering beneath the political discussions and decision-making about Louisiana’s
environment and natural resources was the issue of land use. Questions about how Americans
should use the land they lived and worked on were linked to questions about what the
government should do to facilitate the social and economic development of communities. This
chapter will examine how Louisiana’s coast formed geologically and how specific policies
contributed to the high rates of land loss during the twentieth century. Discussions about the
development of environmentalism in the U.S. and changing perceptions about the value of
wetlands are also considered. Examining how the problem of coastal erosion evolved in
Louisiana and what shaped reactions to the loss of wetlands are vital to understanding how antierosion and coastal restoration policies progressed after 1970.
A Coastal Environment
Louisiana’s coastline stretches three hundred and ninety-seven miles along the Gulf of
Mexico and is bordered on the east by the Pearl River and on the west by the Sabine River. The
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state’s tidal shoreline, including areas such as barrier islands that are affected by tides, is 7,721
miles.9 When land-water interfaces such as marshes, lakes, and canals are all considered, the
total amount of “coast” in Louisiana reaches almost 30,000 miles.10 That vast expanse of land
includes over nine million acres of swamps, marshes, and barrier islands.11 When discussing
“Louisiana’s wetlands,” these are generally the areas that come to mind – the mixture of wet and
dry places that exist somewhere south of Baton Rouge and north of the Gulf.
The state’s coast and wetlands have been primarily created by the Mississippi River and
its drainage basin, which began to form about eighteen thousand years ago toward the end of the
last ice age. As massive sheets of glacial ice retreated across the North American continent, they
gouged huge grooves in the land. The melting glaciers filled what became small streams, and
over several thousand years, those small streams eventually merged into a larger, more complex
water system. The largest part of that system became the Mississippi River. Early in the river’s
history, its waters carried tremendous amounts of sediment toward the Gulf of Mexico. Time and
gravity caused a large portion of those sediments to accumulate into six different “lobes” or
deltas where the river met the sea. Vegetation and natural rises in the land took shape as the river
deposited sediments over the course of several thousand years.12
Land loss is a normal part of the cycle that formed southern Louisiana. Tidal action,
subsidence, and major storms are all reasons why coastal wetlands might be lost – that is be
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transformed into open water. For much of the state’s history, the loss of wetlands was not a
threat to the coast’s sustainability since the delta-building process was able to create more land
than was destroyed. In the twentieth century, that dynamic began to change and wetlands were
lost faster than they were built. As a result, the state’s coastline started to retreat because, in
essence, the wetlands are the coast.13 The decline in vegetation that held the soils in place was
one of the key reasons why Louisiana’s “boot” began rapidly disappearing after the 1930s.
The high rates of loss over the last eighty years are almost entirely related to human
activities. Three major factors have contributed to the loss of wetlands and coastal erosion in
Louisiana: the manipulation of the Mississippi River for flood control and navigation, conversion
of wetlands to dry lands for agriculture and urban sprawl, and finally, the creation of
infrastructure to support the extraction of oil and gas in Louisiana and the Outer Continental
Shelf. In all three cases, the state and federal government enacted policies that supported the
development of flood control, land conversion, and the oil industry. Exploring how these factors
became interwoven in political, economic, and social developments in Louisiana is critical to
understanding why modifying them has presented substantial challenges – even when officials
and the public began to recognize the environmental significance of the state’s wetlands.
Engineering the Mississippi River
Perhaps the largest contributor to coastal erosion has been the engineering of the
Mississippi River for flood control and navigation. The most significant alterations to “Big
Muddy” took place during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but human attempts to control
the river started much earlier. As the Spanish and French began exploring the Mississippi Delta
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they observed that the Native Americans who
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inhabited the area seemed content to live with the annual flooding of the river. They adapted
their lifestyles to work with nature, rather than trying to force nature to work for their way of life.
French settlers had no such intentions when they set out to make the delta theirs. Settlers began
constructing artificial levees to keep the river from inundating their living spaces. By 1726,
levees ranging in height from four to six feet surrounded the city of New Orleans.14 Within a
decade, the French had constructed fifty miles of levees on both sides of the river and added
another ten miles to their network by 1752 to protect a growing number of plantations.15
Spanish and American landowners continued the French policy of building levees to
contain the river. By 1812, the levee system extended more than one hundred and fifty miles
north of New Orleans. In 1858, the network consisted of over one thousand miles of levees on
both sides of the river. Constructing levees reduced flooding to a certain extent, but the structures
also created new problems. Critics voiced concerns about the increasing height of the levees as
early as 1816 and suggested that artificial spillways be constructed near New Orleans. They
argued that an outlet could be used to funnel water from the Mississippi during flood stages and
reduce the risk of a levee failure. Proponents of the levees opposed constructing outlets because
they said doing so would remove the amount of liquid volume from the river. Less water flowing
down the channel would result in a reduced speed and allow sediments to accumulate, thus
raising the height of the river.16
In 1861, the differing opinions on how best to contain the Mississippi became far less
important as the outbreak of the Civil War consumed the nation’s attention. Due to general
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neglect and devastation from the war, the levee system was almost completely destroyed by
1865.17 After hostilities ended, Louisiana officials discussed rebuilding the state’s levees without
federal assistance but made limited progress over the next decade. A shift in national policy
occurred in June 1879 when President Rutherford Hayes signed legislation that created the
Mississippi River Commission (MRC). The law established a seven-member board to plan for
the management of the Mississippi River and consisted of both military and civilian engineers.
Though the bill that created the MRC emphasized navigation more than flood control, the new
commission represented a major step forward in the federal government’s willingness to take
broader control of the river.18
Congress charged the MRC with the authority to improve navigation conditions along the
Mississippi River, and in the early 1880s, the seven-member board began considering its options
– whether to “tame” the river for better navigability, reduced flooding, or a combination of both.
Ultimately, the commission chose to implement what became known as the “levees-only” policy.
The MRC decided that the best way to manage the Mississippi River was to contain it within a
consistent, well-built system of levees. By squeezing the Mississippi’s waters into a confined
space, the MRC reasoned that the river would deepen its own channel, enabling ships to pass
more freely and also reducing flood events. There would be no outlets or cutoffs to allow the
Mississippi to interact with the deltaic plain, even in circumstances “controlled” by humans.
Such a policy had been rejected by the experts who studied the river over the course of the
nineteenth century. The MRC pursued the levees-only policy anyway as congressional interest in
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the Mississippi River waned during the 1890s. Those members who still supported the MRC
were unwilling to fund construction for projects that were more expensive than the levees.19
As the MRC continued to oversee levee construction during the early twentieth century,
the board’s main mission remained navigational improvements rather than flood control.
However, severe floods in 1912, 1913, and 1916 challenged congressional reluctance in
supporting flood control measures. Property damages from the 1912 flood reached over $40
million, and local governments were quickly approaching a crisis point. The cost of maintaining
and repairing levees had become increasingly prohibitive without federal assistance.20 A bill cosponsored by Louisiana Senator Joseph Ransdell in 1913 acknowledged that issue, declaring that
states “unaided, cannot cope with this giant problem.”21 Still, conservative members of Congress
continued to resist providing more direct assistance until 1917, when pro-flood control members
finally prevailed. About a month before the United States entered World War I, President
Woodrow Wilson signed the Flood Control Act of 1917. The law provided up to $45 million in
funds for levee construction related to flood control and required that states match federal
spending. Once the levees were completed, states became responsible for maintenance.22
By the mid-1920s, the MRC and federal policy regarding the Mississippi River was fully
dependent on levees for flood control. In 1926, the commission issued a report that rejected the
possibility of building spillways due to high costs. One year later though, the MRC and the
national government had to reconsider the country’s approach to flood control. In 1927, a series
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of floods sent the Mississippi River spilling across the delta, inundating communities from
Missouri to Louisiana.23 Over the course of several months, the river flooded sixteen million
acres, destroyed 41,000 buildings, and displaced at least 600,000 people. As many as five
hundred individuals lost their lives. The devastating flood of 1927 brought into question the
wisdom of relying exclusively on levees to control the Mississippi. Congress held hearings in the
wake of the disaster, listening to three hundred witnesses and sifting through dozens of proposals
for better flood control practices. One plan emerged as the compromise most likely to be
accepted by Congress and President Calvin Coolidge. Proposed by the Chief of Engineers for the
U.S. Army, Major General Edgar Jadwin’s plan upheld the importance of the levees but
acknowledged other measures should be employed to control flooding along the Mississippi
River.24
The Army’s chief engineer called for a new spillway to be constructed close to New
Orleans, modest extensions of the existing levee system, and federal fiscal contributions of up to
eighty percent.25 Despite heavy criticism of the bill for not being bold enough, Coolidge
indicated he would veto anything more expensive. Congress conceded to most of Coolidge’s
demands, and the president signed the Flood Control Act in May 1928.26 Politicians in the
Mississippi Valley states considered the act’s appropriation of $325 million too low, but the
legislation signaled a major shift in flood-control policy.27 Controlling flooding was finally
considered a national priority. Yet structural improvements were not the only contribution of the
Jadwin plan; it also implicitly endorsed the idea that Americans could rely on engineering
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measures to protect properties in risky areas or turn to federal assistance in the event of a
technological failure. The new approach was based on an old idea – that humans could control
natural processes for the benefit of society. The “control” in the Jadwin plan would simply have
to be savvier than the measures employed by the MRC in earlier decades.28
Tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 1928 Flood Control Act, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) eventually made modifications to the basic premise of the
Jadwin plan. Between 1932 and 1935, the Corps constructed cutoffs along the Mississippi in
order to “straighten” the river’s course and encourage its waters to flow more rapidly down the
main channel. The maximum height for levees was raised, and new outlets were built to ease
pressure on the Atchafalaya River during severe flooding.29 Construction of higher levees
proceeded throughout the 1930s, and by 1941 most of the structures had been completed.30 Two
major outlets were built between 1929 and 1953, the Bonnet Carré Spillway in St. Charles Parish
and the Morganza Spillway in Pointe Coupee Parish. In addition to construction, the Corps also
routinely dredged parts of the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers to maintain navigation
channels.31
Engineering adjustments were not the only challenges that the Corps faced during the
mid-twentieth century. After the 1927 flood, there were increasing concerns that the Mississippi
was going to abandon its main channel for the Atchafalaya. By the late 1940s, those fears
seemed increasingly likely. In 1888, seven percent of the Mississippi’s waters flowed into the
Atchafalaya, but that number had grown to twenty-five percent by 1950. If the Mississippi did
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“jump” channels, such a scenario would have been devastating for the economies of Baton
Rouge and New Orleans. More immediately, the loss of water moving down the river’s main
channel meant more sediment could accumulate on the riverbed and potentially raise flood
heights.32 The Army Corps of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission held a series of
meetings between 1951 and 1952 to discuss possible solutions.33 By 1955, the Corps and the
MRC devised a plan that would keep the Mississippi River from switching channels and would
also make use of the Atchafalaya as an outlet for floodwaters. The Old River Control Structure
was completed in 1963 and designed to direct all of the waters from the Red River and twentyfive percent of the Mississippi into the Atchafalaya. That same year, the Corps also dammed the
Old River and cut it off from the main course of the Mississippi.34
Despite investing billions of dollars to tame “Big Muddy,” the nation still faced the
prospect of ever-increasing flood losses due to population settlement patterns. After 1930, floodrelated property damages climbed even as death rates declined. Construction rates increased as
the twentieth century progressed, and the per capita losses from flooding more than doubled in
the years between 1951 and 1985. In the late 1960s, Congress attempted to discourage people
from living in high-risk locations through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), but the
law had little success in promoting more judicious use of the land. Rather than outright limiting
development to keep people out of harm’s way, governments instead tried to rely on technology
to control nature and protect property.35 However, the efforts to safeguard property and lives by
engineering the Mississippi had serious consequences for the state’s coastal lands. The sediment
load of the river fell by sixty percent after the 1950s, and much of what remained ended up in the
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Gulf of Mexico instead of being deposited in the wetlands. Those sediments were crucial to
maintaining the cycle of land-building in the southern part of the state.36
Converting Wetlands to Dry Lands
Another way that humans contributed to coastal erosion during the twentieth century was
closely linked to the engineering of the Mississippi. The river’s propensity to flood regularly put
lives and property at risk but also made agriculture difficult to pursue. More specifically, the
Mississippi’s flooding made the sort of agriculture that European settlers were accustomed to
hard to implement. The French colonists who built the first levees along the Mississippi did so
because they could not envision living in an environment that was prone to regular flooding.37
Educated Anglo-Americans shared the French view that dry lands were preferable to wet ones.
Nineteenth century engineers spoke of “reclaiming” forests and swamps in southern Louisiana
and also equated improving the land with improving morality.38
Such sentiments were present in 1849 when congressional delegations from Louisiana
and Missouri proposed legislation to facilitate the conversion of swamplands to areas suitable for
farming. Proponents of the Swamplands Act argued that creating farmland in Louisiana was
good for the entire country. Not only would small, independent farmers produce food for the
nation, they would also contribute to the strength of American democracy.39 Speaking of the
impact that swamp reclamation could have in Louisiana in 1848, a member from the House of
Representative’s Committee on Public Lands asserted:
The most of these overflowed lands are represented as the richest in the world, being
admirably adapted, if reclaimed, to the cultivation of sugar, rice, and [cotton]; and there
would be no doubt that the proceeds of their products would support a population of
millions…when it is found that these rich lands can be cultivated without risk of life or
36
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health, it does not require the gift of prophecy to foretell that they will immediately be
settled by an industrious and enterprising population, who will soon transform the tangled
forests and gloomy cane breaks into fruitful fields and smiling gardens.40
The bill passed easily in March 1849 and established a program to help Louisiana
encourage agricultural development and acquire funding for levee construction. The
Swamplands Act transferred federally owned swamplands in Louisiana to the state government,
which officials could then sell to private interests at low prices. Money raised from the sales was
to be used to fund levee construction and drainage projects. By providing the opportunity to get
cheap farmland, supporters of the deal believed that more people would move into the state and
expand the tax base. Proponents also argued that the national government had a role to play in
encouraging agriculture because farming was essential to the moral and economic health of the
country. The ideas and proposals proved so appealing that one year later, Congress passed a
second Swamplands Act and expanded the program to include fourteen additional states.41
Despite some of the high ideals behind the Swampland Acts, neither brought about
substantial drainage of swampy areas. One of the problems that arose was trying to define which
lands were swampy enough to qualify for transfer. Even after the federal government and states
determined what areas could be included, states still did not have enough money to pay for largescale drainage projects. A lack of technology to drain lands effectively presented another
challenge.42 Attempts at turning wetlands into dry lands took place again in Louisiana at the
beginning of the 1900s, but those too failed for many of the same reasons that had complicated
efforts during the previous century.43
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Widespread drainage in the state finally occurred during the 1930s and 1940s as a result
of New Deal programs. The Flood Control Act of 1936 authorized the Army Corps of Engineers
to expand its levee building and dam construction. As a result, lands that had previously been
unsuitable for farming or residential development became available for those purposes. In 1940,
the state of Louisiana initiated its own program to build on federal efforts to create a more
effective system of drainage. World War II caused a delay in significant drainage, but the state
had begun “reclaiming” wetlands for farmers and families by 1944. The state identified eleven
million acres that could be drained and transformed into cropland. One year later, Louisiana set
aside $5 million to fund the drainage programs and negotiated with the Army Corps of Engineers
to build improved outlets.44
Louisiana’s encouragement of wetland drainage was typical of national trends in both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When Europeans first began settling in North America, there
were approximately 224 million acres of wetlands in what is now the contiguous United States.
Between the initial arrival of Europeans in the sixteenth century and 1954, approximately forty
percent of wetland areas were drained and converted to dry lands, primarily for agricultural
purposes. Conversion slowed after 1954, but reclamation remained common with an average of
458,000 acres per year being transformed to dry lands. After the mid-twentieth century, wetlands
were increasingly likely to be drained to support urban expansion instead of agriculture.45 For
example, in southern Louisiana, almost two thousand acres of wetlands were destroyed by the
construction of federal highways between 1967 and 1976. The expansion of interstates had an
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indirect effect on the wetlands as well by encouraging population dispersal.46 During much of the
nation’s history, Americans wanted to use their lands for economic and social development and
wetlands were not considered suitable for such purposes.
Building up Big Oil
A third way that humans contributed to coastal erosion in Louisiana was related to the
extraction of oil and gas. More specifically, infrastructure built during the twentieth century to
support the expansion of the oil and gas industry exacerbated the loss of wetlands. After
kerosene became a popular fuel for lamps in the mid-1800s, demand for petroleum products
began to increase. In 1866, drillers dug an exploratory well in Louisiana’s Calcasieu Parish but
did not find commercial quantities of oil for nearly forty years. Another exploratory well turned
into a “gusher” in Jennings, Louisiana in 1901, and the state became more attractive to oil
prospectors. Locating additional fields in the marshy swamps of southern Louisiana was difficult
though, and much of the state’s early oil development took place in the northern parishes of
Caddo and Monroe.47
Starting in the 1920s, technological advances improved exploration techniques and
allowed the oil industry to move into areas that had previously been too difficult to develop. By
the 1930s, innovations such as the “marsh buggy” and submersible drilling rigs facilitated
operations in Louisiana’s coastal parishes. Greater understanding about geological processes also
bolstered activities in the southern part of the state when prospectors connected the presence of
salt domes to potential oil reserves.48 Experiments with barge-based platforms and improved drill
bits during the late 1930s allowed explorers to tentatively move offshore. In 1937, Pure Oil and
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Superior Oil built a platform in fifteen feet of water, one mile from the nearest on-shore supply
station in Cameron Parish. By 1938, oil companies had seven hundred wells that were
surrounded by water.49
Labor shortages and rationing created a lull in offshore exploration and slowed onshore
development during World War II, but the oil industry remained crucial to the nation’s war
efforts. Oil was necessary for the production of vital materials, including TNT, synthetic rubber,
gasoline, and lubricants for machinery. Concerns about U-boat attacks elevated the importance
of pipelines for transporting oil and gas from the Gulf to the major population centers on the east
coast. There were fears that shortages could undermine the war effort, and the federal
government created the Petroleum Administration for War to ensure that the country had
adequate supplies. Significant amounts of oil were required to fly airplanes, fuel warships, and
drive trucks domestically and abroad.50
After the war ended in 1945, demand for oil accelerated rather than declined even as the
military demobilized. Americans began buying more homes, automobiles, and appliances, and
European countries started to transition from coal to petroleum as their main source of energy.
The United States needed greater access to oil, and companies looked to places where they could
expand their operations. Oilfields in the Middle East were one source, but the oil industry still
believed there was potential beneath the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Companies purchased
surplus boats, engines, and other materials from the War Assets Administration and used those
items to resume exploration in the Gulf. In 1947, the Kerr-McGee Corporation drilled an oil
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well eleven miles off Louisiana’s shore and was soon followed by California Oil and Humble
Oil. Drilling technologies, radio, and sonar also helped oil companies explore further offshore
during the late 1940s.51
To support the exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil and gas in Louisiana and
eventually the Outer Continental Shelf, infrastructure had to be expanded. During the mid-1950s,
pipeline expansion projects began with the three hundred and fifty-five mile “Muskrat Line.”52
The oil and gas industry also needed better ways to move people and equipment through the
wetlands of south Louisiana. The federal government responded and during the 1960s and 1970s,
Congress instructed the Army Corps of Engineers to build navigation channels to facilitate
transportation. In southeast Louisiana, the Corps built the Houma Navigation Channel, and in the
southwest portion of the state, the Calcasieu Ship Channel. Both the pipelines and the navigation
channels were important to the development of oil and gas in Louisiana and in particular, the
OCS. Without the ability to move oil, gas, and supplies in a cost-efficient manner, development
would have likely proceeded at a much slower pace.53
Currently, over nine thousand miles of pipelines crisscross the state’s coast, a total that
includes 191 major pipeline systems coming in from the Outer Continental Shelf. Additionally,
thousands of miles of canals have been constructed to support oil and gas development. Some of
those canals are small and are used mainly to access drilling wells, while others such as the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway are much larger and are used for commercial transportation.54 The
infrastructure is crucial to the nation’s energy supply, but the pipelines and canals have also
Penney, “In the Wake of War: World War II,” 55-56.
Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled Coast, 46-47.
53
Ibid., 76-77.
54
Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, Integrated Ecosystem Restoration and Hurricane
Protection: Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Coastal
Restoration and Protection Authority, 2007), 7, http://sonris-www.dnr.state.la.us/dnrservices/
redirectUrl.jsp?dID=4063376; Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled Coast, 3-4.
51
52

69

contributed to the loss of the state’s wetlands. Initial construction of pipelines and canals directly
removes wetland vegetation, but a secondary and more damaging effect is the long-term problem
of saltwater intrusion. The loss of vegetation alters the local hydrology of marshes as salt water
moves into areas with plant life that is not suited to increased salinity levels. That causes more
vegetation to die, which results in salt water moving further inland to damage more areas.55
Despite the problems associated with pipelines, stopping the extraction of oil and gas has
not been a particularly attractive political option for public officials. Similar to engineering the
Mississippi or converting wetlands to dry lands, policies that supported oil and gas production
became firmly entrenched in the state’s politics and economics during the twentieth century. A
degraded coastal ecosystem put lives, property, and commerce at risk in southern Louisiana, but
policymakers had to contend with enduring notions that prioritized economic growth over
environmental protection. Americans have long seen the environment as a commodity to be used
for the financial benefit of individuals, but the deterioration of the nation’s waterways,
landscapes, and breathable air prompted public demands for action after World War II. The
response to the loss of wetlands in Louisiana would be shaped by these sometimes contradictory
impulses – the desire to promote socio-economic growth and the aspiration to protect the
environment.
An American Environment
From the founding of the nation through the nineteenth century, Americans viewed their
surroundings in two distinct ways. First, humanity was not part of nature but rather maintained a
dominant position over the natural world. Second, nature was to be tamed and used to help
human society expand. Further, land and natural resources were seen as unlimited on the North
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American continent, and humans could make use of both without reservation. Growth – whether
that meant territorial acquisition or economic prosperity – was seen as an unquestionable good.
Early Americans did not think about their surroundings in terms of preservation but rather
exploitation. That viewpoint remained an integral part of the nation’s attitude toward the natural
world well into the twentieth century.56
Regardless of attitudes about exploitation, Americans still found their surroundings to be
worthy of admiration. In the 1800s, landscape painters such as Thomas Cole and Thomas Moran
were wildly popular. Their works showed imposing mountains, sweeping meadows, and idyllic
streams – images of the American continent where nature was mighty and undefiled. The natural
majesty in the United States was seen as a key component of American identity; the republic’s
strength came from the moral purity derived by a blessed landscape. Even as industrialization
transformed some parts of the continent into unnatural, sullied spaces, Americans could look to
the West and to the paintings of Cole or Moran to comfort themselves that pristine nature still
dominated.57
Mountains, forests, and rivers were not the only features of American topography though.
There were millions of acres of swamps, marshes, and bogs that were part of the nation’s
landscape, but those areas were not viewed with the same reverence or awe. Instead, colonial
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settlers and early Americans tended to view swampy areas with suspicion or outright disdain. 58
They also sometimes saw wetlands as impediments to development, especially in cases like those
related to transportation infrastructure. Roads and bridges had to be built outside of swamps, and
when doing so was not feasible, canals had to be constructed.59 By the mid-nineteenth century,
Americans associated wetlands with outbreaks of malaria and believed that the “bad air” of
swamps caused people to become ill.60 There was little incentive to protect wetlands, and the
scant legislation that existed was meant to encourage drainage for agriculture, flood control, or
public health.61
Despite the prevailing view that the exploitation of nature was a common good, there
were a few Americans who questioned that perspective. Writers such as Henry David Thoreau
worried over the decline in the nation’s pristine wilderness and questioned how the loss of those
spaces would affect American character. For Thoreau and others who shared similar ideas,
nature sustained the human spirit and gave strength to civilization.62 Abundant, unsullied natural
spaces provided Americans with a political and moral advantage over the rest of the world.63 As
industrialization hastened the exploitation of nature, there were a variety of growing concerns
about the ramifications of unchecked progress. For example, citizens across the nation began
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pressing municipal governments to temper the excesses of development that threatened to
undermine human health and well-being. Doctors, women’s clubs, social workers, and engineers
formed grassroots organizations to demand that public officials craft policies to better regulate
sanitation or air quality.64
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Progressives at the national level started to
advocate for the use of professional expertise and scientific management to counter some of the
worst problems created by unregulated growth. For Progressive politicians including President
Theodore Roosevelt, a properly managed natural world could serve as both a respite from
industrial cities and a source for American prosperity. The philosophy of conservation developed
within Progressive circles and called for using natural resources as efficiently as possible to
ensure long-term sustainability. Under a conservationist outlook, resources would no longer be
exploited by individuals without regard for future generations. A scientific, centralized approach
to nature would be employed to control consumption of resources, and public management
techniques would be included in policymaking instead of relying on private entities to regulate
themselves.65
Conservation persisted as a guiding influence for federal policies regarding natural
resources through World War II, but the management approach often became undermined by
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competing interests.66 Republicans in the 1920s saw little reason to intervene, and in particular,
President Herbert Hoover believed the best approach to managing the environment was to
encourage voluntarism among states and businesses to regulate the use of natural resources.67
The Great Depression brought about a return of more conservationist activities by the federal
government, but the purpose was not necessarily to boost efficiency in resource usage or protect
forests from degradation. Rather, President Franklin Roosevelt’s use of conservation was closely
tied to the creation of jobs, and agencies such the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) taught
farmers how to manage their soil to avoid erosion problems. The “New Conservation” was also
influenced by the goal of “improving” natural spaces to benefit society. For example, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) built sixteen dams by 1946 and helped bring electricity to
some of the most impoverished states in the country.68 That “improvement” came at a cost
though. When the dams were built to control flooding or create hydroelectricity, over five
hundred thousand acres of land were submerged and approximately seven thousand rural
families had to abandon their homes.69
New Deal conservation emphasized the economic benefits of conservation but did not
significantly challenge the nation’s perceptions that natural resources were meant to benefit
human society. That attitude continued during World War II as industrialization spread beyond
the Northeast and port cities of the nation. States such as Nevada, Oregon, and New Mexico saw
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new pockets of wealth with the development of airplane manufacturing or magnesium
processing. In fact, Americans across the country saw their incomes rise as they went to work in
wartime factories and shipyards. Even groups that had long been at the bottom of the economic
ladder benefitted, including African Americans and rural migrants from the South. However,
wartime manufacturing took a heavy toll on the environment. Sewage and industrial wastes were
dumped into waterways, and factories released emissions into the air without much consideration
about the potential impacts of pollution. In fact, such practices as they were often viewed to be a
necessary part of the war effort.70
An American Environment in Crisis
While Americans enjoyed unprecedented economic prosperity following the end of
World War II, they also experienced a growing sense of anxiety.71 As more people moved into
suburban areas outside of cities, there were renewed concerns about the loss of natural spaces.
Less than a decade after the war’s conclusion, those worries were reflected in a controversy
about a little known national park.72 In the early 1950s, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed
flooding the Dinosaur National Monument as part of the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP).
Located near the border between Colorado and Utah, the area had been classified as a national
monument in 1908 to regulate the removal of dinosaur fossils. By the 1920s though, most of the
fossils were gone and the area mainly became a recreational space. However, visitation to the
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monument was relatively low due its remote location. When the Bureau of Reclamation
proposed building a dam that would result in the area’s flooding, agency officials and supporters
of the CRSP expected there to be little opposition.73
Instead, almost three hundred state and national conservationist organizations rallied
together to block the Bureau’s plans and tried to persuade federal officials to leave the
monument alone. When the pressure proved to be ineffective, conservation groups appealed to
the broader American public with the use of pamphlets, movies, and newspaper articles. Proconservation forces argued that flooding Dinosaur National Monument would be the essence of
unchecked development and could lead to the persistent loss of open spaces. The public relations
campaign was effective, and conservationist organizations managed to make the remote park a
national concern. Congressional offices were inundated with mail from people throughout the
country who opposed to the project, even though most of them had never been to the monument.
After several years of intense debate, Congress approved the CRSP in 1956 without the dam that
would have flooded the park.74
Six years later, Americans received another jolt that forced them to rethink how the
country used its resources when Rachel Carson published Silent Spring. In the opening pages of
her book, the author refers to a town that had once been full of beauty but had become stricken
with a “strange silence.” Humans and animals became mysteriously ill, and plants withered and
died. Though the place she describes was imaginary, Carson wrote that real towns across the
country were suffering similar fates. She asked, “What has already silenced the voices of spring
in countless towns in America?”75 Her answer was the proliferation of chemicals such as DDT
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that had been used to improve agriculture but instead had poisoned the animals, plants, and rivers
of the nation. She argued the relentless use of chemicals endangered human lives and that
diseases such as small pox were no longer the main concern of civilized society. Rather, humans
had created a more dangerous environment with their overuse of synthetic chemicals. Carson
emphasized that all of the planet’s life forms were connected and that harm to even the smallest
creature could reverberate up to more complex organisms. She referred to this “web of life” as
constituting the basis of ecology.76
With eloquent writing and well-explained science, Carson exposed Americans to the
ideas of ecology and the harm that unchecked “progress” could do to the planet and human
bodies. While conservationists had primarily been concerned about preserving natural spaces,
Silent Spring argued that society and nature were intimately connected. Carson also advocated
the idea that humans had a duty to protect nature from destruction, and her perspectives found a
broad audience. Silent Spring spent thirty-one weeks on the New York Times’ bestseller list in
1962 and sold over one million copies. The television network CBS aired a special based on
Carson’s work in April 1963, and individuals and groups began protesting the indiscriminate use
of chlorinated hydrocarbons in the following years. Within a decade of Silent Spring’s
publication, the federal government banned the use of DDT.77
The debate over Dinosaur National Monument and the publication of Silent Spring are
generally considered important milestones in the development of modern environmentalism.
Both served as indicators of how attitudes about the environment were shifting. In the minds of
many Americans, humans were no longer dominant over nature but rather part of the “web of
life” described by Carson. A growing segment of the population also began to recognize that the

76
77

Ibid., 187-189.
Opie, Nature’s Nation, 413-415.

77

negative impacts of environmental exploitation could be seen in urban and suburban spaces.78 By
the mid-1960s, politicians were facing a steady rise in public pressure to do something about
deterioration in the environment. State and federal officials responded by crafting a series of new
policies intended to increase protections for ecologically valuable spaces. Those policies initially
drew on tactics used by conservationists in the early twentieth century, but legislative efforts
eventually expanded to address specific problems of pollution and land use in the 1970s.
Post-World War II Efforts to Protect Natural Spaces
One of the ways the federal government protected wildlife or scenic landscapes prior to
the 1970s was to designate tracts of public land as wildlife refuges or national parks.79 To assist
with that goal, Congress authorized the Wilderness Act in 1964, which established the National
Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS). The act immediately set aside 9.1 million acres and
banned timbering, construction, and most use of motor vehicles on those lands.80 Congress also
established the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) in 1965 to help state and federal
entities purchase private lands for the purposes of turning them into reserve areas. In the early
1970s, about sixty percent of the LWCF funds went to the states, and the remaining forty percent
went to the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
and the Bureau of Land Management.81 By the late 1960s, about five percent of the nation’s
lands had been set aside for public purposes such as wildlife protection.82
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In addition to setting aside tracts of wilderness, political representatives pursued other
strategies to address concerns about the American environment. The protection of natural spaces
was becoming more important, but so were issues of urban and industrial pollution. Yet
economic growth remained a top national priority, and government officials sought ways to
balance that growth with preserving environmental quality. In 1961, President John Kennedy
requested that the Secretaries of the Army, Interior, Agriculture, and Health, Education, and
Welfare prepare a set of standards for the executive branch that would guide the development of
water bodies, such as rivers, and nearby lands influenced by those waters. One year later, the
four secretaries presented their report to the administration and outlined what they believed
should be guiding principles for decision-making.83
The committee stated that water resource development should be based on the promotion
of economic growth, preservation of natural spaces, and protection of the “well-being of people.”
To give each of those principles sufficient consideration, the committee suggested two strategies.
The first was to plan for multiple uses of water and related land resources. Recreation,
navigation, protection of historic sites, and safe drinking water were all equally viable uses of
water resources, and planners should encourage management schemes that allowed for each
when possible. The second strategy was to use river basins as a geographical unit of planning.
Doing so allowed for the consideration of a broad range of impacts without the area becoming
too large and unmanageable. State and federal agencies could form river basin commissions to
oversee regional development and would be responsible for evaluating projects that took place in
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their respective basins. Project proposals had to be evaluated by several different criteria,
including the necessity of the project, how the project related to the entire basin, whether there
were more suitable alternatives, and if the public supported the proposal.84
Congress approved the committee’s suggestions and translated them into law in 1965
with the Water Resources Planning Act (WRPA). The act recognized that river systems and
nearby lands were interrelated and that long-term planning was the best way to ensure multiple
uses of the nation’s water resources. When commissions considered project proposals, they
would have to weigh economic development, the need for conservation, and public opinion
before making a decision to approve. The WRPA created a national Water Resources
Commission (WRC), which would provide technical advice and help resolve potential conflicts
in development decisions. No state could be compelled to participate but would become eligible
for financial assistance from the federal government if it chose to do so.85
States in regions such as New England and the Pacific Northwest eventually formed
commissions, but the successful implementation of the WPRA was limited.86 When funds from
the act became available in 1967, states were reluctant to commit matching assets in order to get
federal monies. State and local agencies were more likely to invest in waste treatment rather than
planning development activities.87 However, the WPRA was a precursor of trends in
environmental legislation that evolved in the 1970s. Considering the impact of projects on
natural resources along with economic benefits became an important policy mechanism, as did
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expecting resources to fulfill multiple functions. Additionally, state and federal agencies
increasingly turned toward making cooperative plans that encompassed broad areas or systems
instead of seeing localities as unrelated to one another. Those ideas formed the basis of
comprehensive planning - a technique that assumed that natural resources were interrelated, that
those resources often needed to fulfill multiple uses, and that an effective strategy would
accommodate as many interests as was economically and ecologically possible. Comprehensive
management would be used during administration and would follow the principles developed
during planning.
Policymakers considered applying comprehensive planning and management to areas
other than river systems, including the nation’s marine resources. In 1969, the Commission on
Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources (CMSER) published a landmark report entitled Our
Nation and the Sea. Generally referred to as the Stratton Commission in honor of its chair, Julius
A. Stratton, the CMSER had been established by the Marine Resources and Engineering
Development Act of 1966. Though the commission did not give a precise definition of what
constituted the “coastal zone,” the report assumed that the area generally meant the landward
side of the low tide mark. The commission recognized that increasing pressures on marine
resources would result in irreparable damage to the nation’s coastal zone if development was left
unchecked. Commissioners also noted that comprehensive coastal zone management was not a
major priority in states and efforts by the federal government were scattered at best.88 To help
consolidate federal activities, the commission recommended that the newly created National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) be placed in charge of reviewing state plans,
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as well as offering technical expertise and assistance to state officials developing management
programs.89
The WPRA and the Stratton Commission acknowledged the need for a broader outlook
when making decisions about resource development and that cooperation among state, federal,
and research institutions could facilitate policy planning. However, there was no legal
requirement to encourage state or federal officials to do so. The country had some programs to
protect or preserve specific resources, but there was little incentive to consider broadly how
socio-economic growth might impact the environment. Development projects were generally
designed and implemented based on concerns about cost or technical feasibility, not on how they
might affect the condition of natural resources. By the end of the 1960s, representatives in
Congress recognized that the country needed such a policy and took action to formulate one.
Incorporating the Environment into Policy
In December of 1969, both houses of Congress passed the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), which President Richard Nixon signed into law on January 1, 1970. The act
included several of the principles that had been present in the WPRA. One, federal agencies
would be required to give equal consideration to the environment when making policy or
development decisions.90 Two, any action or piece of legislation that could have a significant
impact on the environment had to be evaluated by the planning agency and a “detailed
statement” on the proposed project had to be compiled.91 The findings of that statement then had
to be made available to both decision-makers and the public. Finally, NEPA established the
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Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which would serve as an advisory body for the
president on matters relating to the environment. Additional legislation in 1970 empowered the
CEQ to develop guidelines and recommend priorities for Congress and federal agencies to
follow when making decisions.92
The National Environmental Policy Act became the basis of environmental protection in
the United States and reflected some of the proposals made in the 1960s. Evaluating projects
solely based on cost or technical feasibility was no longer sufficient; officials also had to
consider the impact on natural resources or the potential pollution hazards. Seventy federal
agencies became obligated to follow NEPA, though some such as the Forest Service already
considered environmental impacts in their planning processes.93 By compelling officials to
consider possible damages and design alternatives in decision-making, the authors of NEPA
hoped to prevent environmental damage instead of trying to repair harm after it had already
occurred.94 One of the most well-known examples in the early history of NEPA’s impact on
federal policymaking was the decision by President Nixon to halt the construction of a barge
canal being built to cross northern Florida. The Army Corps of Engineers had already completed
a portion of the canal when the CEQ advised the president to abandon the project out of concern
over environmental damage. Nixon concurred with the council’s recommendation and ordered
the Corps to stop the project from proceeding any further.95
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One of the ways that NEPA nudged government agencies into considering the
environment was to include a mechanism that required officials to examine potential impacts on
natural resources. Referred to as a “detailed statement” in the law, that mechanism eventually
became known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).96 Major projects required the
planning agency consult with relevant bureaucracies at local, state, and federal levels and issue a
report that explained the purpose of the project, potential impacts, and possible alternatives. The
report was then open to the public for review and could lead to modifications or abandonment of
the project.97 Non-governmental parties were also subject to the provisions of NEPA by way of
having regulatory powers applied to their activities. For example, if an oil company wanted to
construct a canal through a waterway overseen by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Corps
would have to evaluate the potential environmental impact of the canal before granting
permission for its construction.98
Incorporating consideration of the environment as a matter of policy was a new trend for
the federal government in the 1970s, and legislative and administrative actions to protect specific
resources from degradation also became more stringent.99 Two of the most significant laws that
passed were the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments in 1970 and the amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1972.100 The former established air quality standards
in relation to six major classes of pollutants and required that emissions of those pollutants be
reduced by 1977. Under the CAA, states would be responsible for developing implementation
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and monitoring plans. The primary goal of the act was to protect human health, while secondary
goals included protecting property and preserving the scenic beauty of landscapes.101
Two years after the CAA became law, Congress passed amendments to the FWPCA of
1948. The objective of the amendments was “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”102 Federal legislators were interested in protecting
water quality for human health, wildlife, and recreational purposes by limiting the amount of
pollution discharged into the country’s waterways. One of the strongest indicators that Congress
was serious about improving water quality was the funding provision that obligated the federal
government to cover up to seventy-five percent of construction costs for municipal wastewater
treatment facilities. The law also directed the newly established Environmental Protection
Agency to develop standards for pollution emissions by stationary sources such as factories. The
EPA, which had been created by presidential executive order in 1970, had become the nation’s
central anti-pollution agency and was in charge of overseeing enforcement of the CAA and the
FWPCA amendments.103
Protecting air and water quality were major steps taken by the federal government in the
early 1970s, but there was also interest in applying more comprehensive management techniques
to land use. In the context of policymaking, “land use” usually referred to planning for social,
economic, and industrial growth in a deliberate, orderly fashion and had long been the
prerogative of municipal governments. In 1909, Boston and Los Angeles passed some of the
earliest ordinances regulating land use by restricting building heights in certain areas. Those
types of laws generally became thought of as zoning, which was how governments decided to
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direct use of the lands in their respective jurisdictions. Commercial properties could be built in
one zone, industry in another, and so on. By the 1920s, zoning was almost exclusively left to
local authorities, and within another two to three decades, the number of zone types had
expanded to encompass a range of activities within urban areas.104
States rarely became involved in zoning ordinances, and land use was generally
considered an urban issue even if a large city could negatively affect nearby areas. By the 1960s,
there was a shift in that approach. Hawaii became the first state to pass a land use law that
directed how government and private entities would make use of the islands’ lands in 1961.
Concerns about urban growth prompted Hawaii’s government to divide the state into four
districts: agriculture, rural, urban, and conservation. No urban uses of land, such as major
transportation hubs, would be allowed in the other three districts. A commission comprised of
seven private citizens and two government officials would oversee administration of the law’s
requirements to ensure that the state’s lands fulfilled a range of needs from agriculture to
tourism.105
Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin soon followed Hawaii and passed laws
that regulated the use of land in order to protect certain areas.106 Some federal officials also
explored the idea of applying regulation or comprehensive planning to land use at the national
level. In 1971, the Nixon administration proposed the National Land Use Policy Act, which
would provide federal grants to help states develop and administer land-use plans. The
recommended legislation stated that such a policy was necessary because “decisions about the
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use of land significantly influence the quality of the environment” and that current methods of
“regulating land use of more than local impact” were inadequate.107 Two years later, Nixon
declared in his State of the Union Message on Natural Resources and the Environment that the
goal of land management should be “to harmonize development with environmental quality.”108
A key element in this new approach to land use was the evolving perspective about the
purposes that land served. For much of American history, land was a commodity to be used by
its owner as a way of achieving economic goals. A subtle shift had begun taking place during the
rise of environmental awareness. Land was no longer just a commodity to be traded; it was also a
resource that had uses beyond economic benefits and could be protected to serve multiple
functions.109 However, the shift in perspective about land use should not be overstated. Nixon’s
proposed land-use bill never became law and there were few states that passed legislation as
comprehensive as Hawaii’s. Still, just a few years after Congress passed NEPA, the federal
government implemented legislation that targeted land use in more specific areas such as the
nation’s coastal zones. Louisiana’s approach to managing its wetlands would be influenced by
the new law, but the policy’s effectiveness would be complicated by long-standing issues
associated with politics, economics, and resource use.
Conclusion
The development of policies that contributed to the rapid loss of Louisiana’s wetlands
took place before the “environmental decade” of the 1970s. Engineering the Mississippi River or
draining wetlands for agricultural and urban sprawl reflected long-standing notions about how
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humans viewed their surroundings – nature was something that should be manipulated for the
benefit of society. However, new attitudes about the environment and the importance of
ecosystems such as wetlands began to manifest in the post-World War II period and challenged
existing notions about land or resource use. Environmental advocates maintained that healthy
environments ensured a better quality of life, and government officials responded with laws like
the Clean Water Act (CWA). There was also an element of practicality to passing laws to
encourage environmental protection in the 1970s. Unchecked development could lead to
situations like the one on Coubra Drive, and regulations that protected the environment were
intended to reduce the costs of a “build now, worry later” mindset.
Still, considerable gaps in policies and regulations remained in regard to the nation’s use
of land and resources as of 1979. Negotiating between older values such as the promotion of
economic growth and newer values such as reducing industrial pollution presented a challenge –
especially in a place like Louisiana that had based much of its economic development on the
exploitation and manipulation of its environment. As citizens in the state began to see the loss of
wetlands as a problem, potential solutions had to be incorporated into a system that treated the
coastal zone as a space for economic or social growth. Certainly, the deterioration of the
wetlands posed a significant risk to the economy or urban expansion, but the policies that led to
coastal erosion were difficult to undo without also threatening traditional approaches to
economic and social development.
The idea of “multiple use” management was intended to remedy the thorny problem of
balancing economic and social growth with environmental protection. Advocates of the approach
maintained that society could enjoy a robust economy that made use of environmental resources
while also protecting the integrity of sensitive ecosystems such as Louisiana’s wetlands. Yet
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policies that were based on multiple-use management ran into a consistent problem. By using
and exploiting environmental resources, humans inevitably contributed to the degradation of
their surroundings. While laws such as NEPA were important, they were ultimately tweaks
rather than a fundamental reimagining of how Americans should make use of their environment.
As a result, many of the policies that developed during the 1970s were piecemeal and often not
well-suited to address problems as complex as the persistent loss of Louisiana’s wetlands.
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CHAPTER 3: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1970s
“Texas Water Rustlers”
In 1966, Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation to investigate the possibility of moving water from the Mississippi River to the west
and southwest portions of Texas for irrigation and agriculture.1 Two years later, the Texas Water
Development Board published a report that stressed there were insufficient water sources within
the state to meet future needs and that “12 to 13 million acre-feet of water per year must be
sought.” According to the board’s “preliminary planning estimates,” water from the Mississippi
River could be siphoned off somewhere in the state of Louisiana and diverted through a series of
structures to provide the necessary amounts of water for cities or farms in western Texas.2
Officials in Louisiana were skeptical of the proposal, and members of the Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries Commission (WLFC) expressed concerns that the decline in fresh water from the
Mississippi River could have significant consequences. Clark Hoffpauer of the WLFC noted in
1969 that “the entire oyster, shrimp, and fur industries would be the first to feel the impact of
higher salinities in the estuarine areas.” He went on to say that the state should “immediately
organize a task force to combat this menace to industry, wildlife and fisheries resources. There is
little time to be lost. Texas has taken the initiative and Louisiana must prepare to meet this
threat.”3
The “threat” from the Texas Water Plan lessened in August 1969 when voters in the
“Lone Star” state voted down a bill that would have authorized over $3 billion in bonds to help
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pay for the construction of the proposed Mississippi River diversion.4 Supporters of the plan,
dubbed “Texas water rustlers” by opponents, tried to revive the proposal in 1976 to no avail.5
Though the massive construction project never happened, there were a number of studies
conducted under the auspices of federal agencies before advocates finally relented. In one case,
the Corps contracted a young professor named Sherwood Gagliano, who worked at the Coastal
Studies Institute at Louisiana State University. Gagliano examined hundreds of aerial maps
depicting southern Louisiana and what he discovered was alarming – the state’s wetlands were
sinking into the Gulf of Mexico at a faster rate than the deltaic cycle could rebuild them.6
Gagliano reported in 1970 that the state was losing 16.5 square miles per year of land and that
“the gradual loss of land threatens to upset the balance of nature by constricting wildlife territory
and by allowing greater salt water intrusion inland.” He went on to say that “Louisiana can ill
afford to have any of its water from the Mississippi diverted out of state since there are
considerably more resources at stake than just water.”7
The proposal to move water from the Mississippi to western Texas was one of the largest
public works projects proposed in the nation’s history, but the plan was not completely without
precedent.8 As discussed in the previous chapter, both the state and federal governments had
been manipulating the river for decades to facilitate navigation, commercial transportation, and
flood control. Private entities had also contributed to the reshaping of Louisiana’s coastal
environment by promoting activities such as oil exploration. The consequences of those actions
were beginning to manifest more dramatically by the early 1970s, or perhaps more accurately,
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humans were finally starting to pay greater attention to what they were doing to the environment
in which they lived. In fall 1970, Gagliano presented his findings at a conference for the National
Academy of Sciences and predicted that if nothing was done about the disappearing wetlands,
the state would lose another 500 square miles of land by 2000.9 Several months later, the TimesPicayune called for the state’s government to “begin serious consideration of a coherent, overall
and sharp-toothed system for managing its vast multi-parish wetlands.” The newspaper also
stated that the “key to the problem” was establishing “multiple-use development guidelines” to
oversee growth and expansion in the state’s coastal zone.10
As public officials and private citizens began to think about ways to address the
deteriorating condition of natural resources, multiple-use planning and management to guide
development became cornerstones of the environmental legislation and policies crafted during
the 1970s.11 Essentially, the idea behind the multiple-use strategy drew on the conservationist
approach to managing the country’s natural resources – to make use of those resources in a way
that produced what Gifford Pinchot characterized as the “greatest good for the greatest number
for the longest time.”12 “Multiple-use” did not preclude development of environmental resources;
instead, the approach allowed for regulated exploitation of the nation’s resources with an eye on
the many roles that environmental resources played. Laws and policies should afford protections
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to the environment, but they could also allow economic and social development to continue –
within limits.
However, multiple-use planning and management meant that society was not protecting
ecosystems from interference or alteration so much as attempting to insert environmental
protection into a development framework that already favored economic and social growth. As a
result, policies intended to protect sensitive areas such as Louisiana’s wetlands were piecemeal
and contained gaps in regulation to allow for continued development. Total protection of the
state’s marshes and swamps was not possible without fundamentally changing economic and
social trends that were deeply entrenched, particularly in regard to land use.13 This chapter will
trace the recognition of Louisiana’s disappearing wetlands as a problem and the responses to the
issue during the 1970s. The state and federal governments implemented several important
policies during the “environmental decade” to increase the protection of wetlands, but those
policies would ultimately slow, rather than stop, the deterioration of the state’s swamps and
marshes.

Defining what constitutes “protection” of the environment can be complicated, whether the spaces in question are
natural landscapes such as mountain ranges or human-made landscapes such as cities. Is a stream “protected” if
there is no detectable levels of pollution or if the pollutants are below thresholds that can harm human health? Is a
forest “protected” if timber removal is limited or banned completely? Are children living a city “protected” if only
ten percent of homes have lead-based paint? Answering questions such as these has challenged policymakers and
citizens alike, particularly as new laws designed to “protect the environment” were crafted after World War II. Eric
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Louisiana’s Coast in Crisis
Louisiana’s eroding wetlands began to receive considerable attention from state officials
after Gagliano published his findings in 1970, but worries about the health of the wetlands were
not unprecedented. In 1928, a biologist who worked for the Conservation Commission in
Louisiana published an article about the impact that humans were having on the state’s wet areas.
In “Louisiana Wet Lands and the Value of the Wild Life and Fishery Resources,” Percy Viosca
described the importance of wetlands as habitats for economic and recreational purposes.14 He
also detailed the damage being done to swamps and marshes by human activities, stating:
Man-made modifications in Louisiana wet lands which are changing the conditions of
existence from its very foundations, are the result of flood protection, deforestation,
deepening channels, and the cutting of navigation and drainage canals…Reclamation and
flood control as practiced in Louisiana have been more or less a failure, destroying
valuable natural resources without producing the permanent compensating benefits
originally desired. Reclamation experts and real estate promoters have been "killing the
goose that laid the golden egg." In view of the fact that the affected wet lands have been
impaired by the so-called improvements, and because they are not needed and will not be
needed for other purposes for many generations, if ever, our future conservation policy
should be a restoration of those natural conditions best suited to an abundant marsh,
swamp, and aquatic fauna, but under some degree of control at all times, to the end that
the state and nation may enjoy a more balanced diet, healthful recreation, and enduring
prosperity.15
Despite the warnings from Viosca, there were few efforts to stop such practices in
Louisiana or the rest of the nation. In fact, conservation policies during the New Deal proved
particularly detrimental to wetlands as several federal agencies had programs that encouraged
drainage.16 The population and housing boom that followed World War II put even more
pressure on the nation’s wetlands. Americans pushed further out into what had once been
marginal lands, and federal agencies continued to sponsor wetland drainage by providing

Percy Viosca, “Louisiana Wet Lands and the Value of the Wild Life and Fishery Resources,” in Ecology 9, no. 2
(April 1928): 223-226, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1929355.
15
Ibid., 228-229.
16
Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape, 173-174.
14

94

expertise or equipment to land developers. A few years after the war ended, over 170,000 acres
of wetlands were made dry by the use of electric pumps as recommended by the Soil
Conservation Service. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which had gained authority over the
nation’s wildlife and fisheries in 1940, had become increasingly concerned by the impact of
drainage and conversion on the nation’s wetlands.17
In the early 1950s, the agency launched a survey to take stock of wetlands in the United
States. Though the U.S. Department of Agriculture had previously conducted surveys of
wetlands, their intentions had been to identify areas that might be suitable for farming. The FWS
agenda was different in that the organization’s goal was to quantify and qualify wetlands based
on wildlife values. What the FWS found was concerning. Officials estimated that forty-five
million acres of the nation’s pre-colonial wetlands had been lost or converted for other uses.
They urged the federal government to develop better coordinated policies to protect the wetlands
that were being used by birds and other species.18 Scientists who worked for the FWS kept track
of wetland changes after the report was issued in 1956 and continued to release their findings to
the public.19
Slowly, the information from those studies made their way into public discussions as
school textbooks, popular magazines, and television documentaries started to portray wetlands as
valuable for a variety of ecological reasons.20 On March 16, 1958, a reporter for the TimesPicayune noted that flood control projects and drainage efforts had been “enormously destructive
of fish and wildlife values in the last quarter century within the [Mississippi River] floodplain,
from the Ohio river to the Gulf of Mexico.” The article also mentioned some of the other
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activities that been destructive in Louisiana, stating that the “damage along the delta coast is
being hastened by oil development and agricultural and industrial activities. New waterways for
navigation threaten the destruction of huge areas of marsh and the extinction of fisheries.”21
The growing attention being paid to wetlands as valuable spaces started to manifest in
public policy by the 1960s. Beginning with Massachusetts in 1963, a total of seven coastal states
passed laws that offered some measure of protection to wetlands by 1972.22 Though Louisiana
did not pass protective legislation in the 1960s, both the national government and public entities
in the state showed increasing interest in coastal management. In 1967, Congress directed the
Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a study of the state’s coast to determine if improvements
could be made for more effective hurricane protection, the prevention of saltwater intrusion, and
the protection of wildlife.23 The following year, Louisiana’s Wildlife and Fisheries Commission
partnered with the National Marine Fisheries Service as part of a multi-state examination of
estuary systems along the Gulf of Mexico. Researchers intended to use their findings to provide a
baseline of conditions in the state’s estuaries for comparisons in future investigations.24
Another group of studies began in 1969 and was conducted by the Coastal Research Unit
(CRU) in the Center for Wetland Resources at Louisiana State University. The scientists
involved concluded that Louisiana’s coastal zone was showing signs of “serious, perhaps
irreversible” stress as the result of flood control measures, hurricane protection, and mineral
extraction.25 Researchers also believed there were opportunities to manage the state’s coast more
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effectively and ensure that the area continued to support economic, social, recreational, and
ecological functions. Some of the recommendations made by the CRU included implementing
better maintenance programs for the state’s barrier islands and minimizing the impact of mineral
extraction in estuaries and fresh-brackish water marshes. The studies also emphasized that
unplanned development had contributed significantly the area’s deterioration and that continuing
to evaluate coastal activities on an individual basis was untenable.26
Two other events in 1969 had the potential to impact policymaking decisions for the
nation’s environment, including Louisiana’s wetlands. The first event took place near Santa
Barbara, California on January 28, 1969. A blow-out on a rig near Santa Barbara released
235,000 gallons of crude oil into the waters, much of which washed up along thirty miles of
pristine white beaches of the scenic resort town. Americans watched in disbelief as oil-drenched
birds died by the thousands and brought the fragility of coastal areas into sharp focus.
Environmental groups across the country pressured politicians to give the same amount of
attention to the preservation of the environment as was given to economic development – a shift
which was acknowledged by officials in Louisiana during the early 1970s.27 In 1973, a report put
together by a special commission studying the state’s wetlands commented that “Ever since the
Santa Barbara spill of 1969…there have been increasing pressures by environmental groups to
give preservation and protection of the environment equal stature with economic growth and
development.”28
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The second event of importance in 1969 was the establishment of a Sea Grant office at
LSU. Initiated by Congress three years earlier and administered by the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Agency, the national Sea Grant Program provided grants to universities to
pursue marine-related research. Along with conducting studies, researchers and scientists were to
provide information and technical advice to users of marine and coastal environments.29 With
that mandate in mind, LSU’s Sea Grant Office worked with Louisiana’s Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission to draft legislation that would create an advisory committee to study coastal zone
planning for the state. In 1971, the Sea Grant Office presented the draft to the Joint Legislative
Committee on Environmental Quality during a series of hearings being held about the
environment in Baton Rouge. The committee approved the office’s draft and subsequently
introduced the bill to the full legislature. Governor John McKeithen signed Act 35 into law on
June 29, 1971.30
Several months later, McKeithen appointed nine members to the Louisiana Advisory
Commission on Coastal and Marine Resources (LACCMR). Each commissioner represented
various groups and different interests along the state’s coast, including the oil and gas industry,
fisheries, transportation, landowners, marine scientists, labor, conservation organizations, and
state administration. The commissioners were charged with representing the public’s interests
rather than their respective groups and instructed to carry out two objectives. First, they were to
study the trends, activities, and conditions of Louisiana’s coast. Second, they were to ascertain
what role the state should have in coastal zone management and what policies might be
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developed to facilitate the “orderly, long range conservation and development of the state’s
coastal zone.”31
The commission’s first major report declared that the state was in urgent need of planning
for the coastal zone, an area which the group defined as being the lands roughly south of Baton
Rouge. Industrial activities, transportation, commercial fishing, and recreational interests all
competed to use the same area for different reasons. Declining oyster productivity, increasing
pollution, escalating saltwater intrusion, and the loss of land were some of the major results
associated with unchecked growth and unregulated uses of the coastal zone. Those factors, along
with a growing population and public-works projects designed to control flooding, had put
significant pressure on the coast. Without adequate management, the commission warned the
entire ecosystem that supported life in southern Louisiana was threatened.32 The LACCMR also
stated that any plans for managing the coast should consider the area as interdependent system
because development projects were not isolated in their effects.33 As of 1972, the state did not
have any policies in place that treated the coastal zone as a comprehensive ecosystem, and there
were serious deficiencies in how Louisiana’s bureaucracy regulated the multiple uses of the
coast. The commission stated that “with all of these conflicts over coastal resources, there are no
definitions of state policy about the coastal zone. There are no identified procedures for resolving
all the issues of the coastal zone.”34
Certain agencies such as the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission and the State Land
Office (SLO) did recognize the interrelated nature of problems on the coast, but the overall
legislative and regulatory agenda of Louisiana dealt with issues of development or deterioration
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on a case-by-case basis. When the WLFC reviewed projects at requested of state or federal
governments, the agency had no statutory guidance to follow when conducting evaluations.
Boards or commissions that might address coastal zone development were routinely underfunded
and understaffed. There was also frequent overlap among state organizations in regard to
planning for the entire state. For example, plans for water transportation were overseen by port
and harbor districts and the Department of Public Works. Highway and road planning was
carried out by the Highway Department in conjunction with the federal Department of
Transportation. Pipeline planning and construction were done by private groups who
subsequently received approval from the WLFC, the Department of Public Works, and the Army
Corps of Engineers.35
In short, there was no real system in place to monitor or manage the state’s wetlands as
an environmental resource. The LACCMR identified twenty-three separate agencies that had
some influence on coastal zone activities, but there was no central authority to coordinate among
them.36 Most agencies were viewed as being significant because of their regulatory mandates for
broad areas, not necessarily because they had specific coastal policies. For example, the Air
Control Commission (ACC) had no section devoted to the coast but was responsible for
monitoring emissions by petrochemical plants. Much of that industry was located in the coastal
zone.37 In another example, the State Land Office was responsible for surveying and appraising
state lands, and the SLO was also in charge of collecting royalties from the oil and gas industry.
Both of those facts required the SLO to pay special attention the coast, but the agency was
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routinely understaffed. The office had only two field investigators to conduct appraisals for the
whole state.38
To add more disorder to Louisiana’s coastal administration, the federal government also
played a role in decision-making about the activities on the coast. The Army Corps of Engineers
worked with local levee boards and the Department of Public Works on projects involving flood
control. Pollution control was overseen by the ACC, the Stream Control Commission, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Further, agencies sometimes had no clear statutory guidance
to direct their interaction with the federal government. The State Mineral Board consulted with
the Department of the Interior on mineral leases to receive advice on conservation issues, but the
arrangement lacked structure and was not clearly defined. Perhaps the most important issue in
regard to federal-state and federal-local interactions was that in a number of significant activities
such as flood control, the federal government was the primary decision-maker.39
The second report released by the LACCMR in March 1973 once again emphasized the
need for regional planning in the state’s coastal zone. In addition to the need to manage
industrial, infrastructure, and residential growth for “orderly” development, the commission
identified the growing environmental movement and recent environmental legislation at the
federal level as being important considerations too. The “awakening of environmental
consciousness” had led to projects being challenged that would have likely gone unnoticed a
decade earlier – across the country and in Louisiana.40 For example, in St. Bernard Parish,
residents had voiced strenuous objections to proposed plans to widen the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet. Supporters of the project said the extension would keep the Port of New Orleans
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competitive with other national ports, but opponents who lived in the area wanted the project to
be “drastically modified or abandoned altogether due to the possible adverse environmental
impacts.”41
In September 1973, the LACCMR released its final report which included a full analysis
of the state’s coastal activities, problems in the coastal zone, and detailed proposals for a coastal
zone management plan. The report concluded that the guiding principles in the state’s use of the
coast had been economic development and that considerations for conservation or environmental
impacts had been insufficient. However, the commission did not recommend halting
development activities in the coastal zone at all or even significantly. On the contrary, the
LACCMR stated that “Louisiana’s fundamental policy [should] be to encourage full use of
coastal resources by as many citizens as possible.”42 There were stipulations to that
recommendation though, including increasing the amount of scrutiny on projects that would
affect water quality and treating the marshes as comprehensive ecosystems.43 Indeed, the
emphasis placed on the wetlands was one of the prominent points in the 1973 prospectus, as was
the threat that land loss posed to the coast’s future. The LACCMR argued that because the
dominant feature of the coast was the wetlands, the fundamental task of coastal zone
management should be protecting the wetlands as much as possible while still planning for
continued development.44
Overall, the LACCMR prospectus provided a vision for how Louisiana could manage its
coast and its wetlands. By developing a comprehensive approach to management, streamlining
agency involvement, and treating the health of the wetlands as crucial for a productive coast, the
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commission was arguing for a systematic approach. The commission stated that their
recommendations should not be seen as a list of restrictions but rather a blueprint for a “positive
statewide program” that could ensure the economic, social, and ecological values of the coastal
zone for the future. By the LACMMR’s assessment, coastal zone management was
fundamentally an approach to the use of living and non-living resources with the long-term goal
of sustainability in mind. Physically, the coastal zone was where the influence of the tide was
evident and where the wetlands performed a number of ecological functions. The coastal zone
was also a social, economic, and recreational space. Each of those uses had to be properly
managed by the state in order to ensure that those uses could continue.45
The creation of the LACCMR was probably one of the most important steps Louisiana
took during the early 1970s to address the problems of coastal erosion. However, the commission
did not create legislation or policy; that would be up to the legislature, the governor, and various
state agencies. What the LACCMR did though was to frame Louisiana’s coast in broad way that
emphasized its economic, social, and ecological values. The loss of wetlands was seen through
the same lens – as a threat to those economic, social, and ecological values. Such a perspective
carried with it the long history that had defined how Americans had interacted with their
environment and used their lands. Treating the coast as a resource to benefit society had roots all
the way back to the colonial period. Trying to use those resources as efficiently as possible
echoed the ideas espoused by conservationists at the turn of the twentieth century. Finally, seeing
the coast as inherently valuable because its ecological functions improved the quality of people’s
lives was part of the emerging environmental movement. Yet the LACCMR was essentially
promoting the adoption of multiple-use planning to direct policy for the coast, and such an
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approach meant that activities which contributed to the loss of wetlands were more likely to be
limited rather than eliminated.
Incorporating the Coastal Zone and Wetlands into Policy
In Louisiana, a system of altering the wetlands to promote development and protect
property had evolved over multiple decades. Retooling that system to implement environmental
protections came with significant challenges – particularly regarding the issue of land use.
Efforts to pass a national land-use policy fell flat during the early 1970s, but Congress did pass
more precise laws that sought to encourage orderly development in specific areas. One example
of such legislation was the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).46 Due to a variety
of economic and social activities, Congress recognized that coastal lands and waters were at risk
for long-term harm due to multiple “competing, conflicting demands.”47 Based on the
recommendations from the Stratton Commission in the late 1960s, the CZMA encouraged the
voluntary participation of states to “inventory their valuable features…establish priorities for
land and water uses…and to plan for natural resource protection and orderly development.”48 By
planning accordingly, states could achieve multiple uses for their coastal zones while also
reducing the amount of damage done to fragile ecosystems such as estuaries. In fact, a key
feature of the CZMA was to encourage protection for coastal wetlands, a trend already reflected
in a handful of states. Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia had all
granted their coastal wetlands special legal status before 1972.49
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The CZMA became effective in 1973 and within two years, thirty coastal states had
applied for grant money to develop management plans.50 Louisiana received its first round of
funding on June 30, 1974, and used the recommendations made by the Louisiana Advisory
Commission on Coastal and Marine Resources as a starting point for the state’s coastal
management plan (CMP). At least six state agencies were identified as having a significant role
in managing activities in the state’s coastal zone, including the Department of Public Works and
the State Land Office. The State Planning Office and the Louisiana Coastal Commission (LCC)
had been put in charge of CMP development and were to consult with a variety of groups,
including the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission and the Sea Grant Program at Louisiana State
University.51
Local governments in Louisiana also became interested in developing management plans
for coastal and wetland resources. In 1975, the City Planning Commission (CPC) of New
Orleans published a three volume report on how the city could plan better for urban growth in a
way that protected the environment, specifically the area’s wetlands. The CPC recognized that
the seven million acres of wetlands in the city’s vicinity held both social and economic value –
recreation, hunting grounds, protection from storms, and flood water storage. Natural stresses
such as subsidence and human-made stresses such as canal construction had disrupted “runoff
and tidal change, watershed management, tributary dams, hurricane protection levees, [and] river
flood protection levees.” According to the report’s opening chapter, the “time [had] come to
manage the wetlands in order to preserve their value for mankind” and the city’s CMP would be
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the “needed management tool” to help New Orleans give full deliberation to “ecological,
cultural, historic and aesthetic values, as well as to needs for economic development.”52 The
commission went on to say that many of New Orleans’ economic activities were related directly
or indirectly to the environment and all development plans needed to be considered from
multiple perspectives.53
One of the main issues the CPC saw in wetlands management was also present in varying
degrees at the national and state levels of government. There was no clear plan or central
authority to guide development decisions and oversee the various activities that took place within
the coastal zone. The CPC identified twenty-six federal agencies, sixteen state agencies, and nine
municipal agencies as having a role or influence over what went on in the coastal zone near the
city.54 Without a defined management plan, New Orleans could not effectively strategize for
multiple organizations operating in the city’s vicinity. Additionally, the CPC noted that the
existing regulatory tools available to the city were not adequate for protecting wetlands because
the legal codes did not expressly recognize wetlands as an area that fell under the city’s
management jurisdiction. To correct that, the CPC recommended that amendments be added to
the city’s existing building and zoning ordinances by expanding the areas regulated with “land
use and control measures” to include “marshes, swamps, wetlands, estuaries, waterways, and
environmentally sensitive areas in the City of New Orleans.”55
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A final problem that the CPC noted was the lack of a statewide coastal zone management
plan. Though the city could gain more control over the use of its wetlands with a CMP, there
would ultimately be substantial deficiencies until Louisiana adopted a statewide management
plan. Even if the city could prevent or regulate construction or drainage protects within its own
jurisdiction, activities outside New Orleans could still negatively impact the area’s wetlands.
Commissioners also encouraged the state to ensure that any plan it adopted included measures
that gave substantial control to local authorities in making decisions about local environment and
resources. Finally, the CPC suggested that a single state agency be established to oversee local
CMPs and that the primary planning responsibility for the coastal zone be assigned to the
Wildlife and Fisheries Commission.56 Yet despite the encouragement from entities such as the
New Orleans CPC, the state legislature struggled to pass a CMP through the mid-1970s.
Challenges in Implementing Wetlands Policies
Legislative inaction in Louisiana was one difficulty with the formulation and
implementation of wetlands policies during the middle of the “environmental decade,” but there
were other challenges too. The official stance of the national government was to include
environmental awareness into decision-making as mandated by NEPA or the Clean Water Act.
However, some agencies were reluctant to embrace their new roles as prescribed by NEPA or the
Clean Water Act. For example, Section 404 of the CWA required that dredge and fill activities in
the nation’s waterways be approved by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps preferred to use
the traditional definition of “navigable waters” when applying Section 404 to permit
applications, which meant the USACE considered rivers, streams, and lakes obviously related to
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commerce to be under their jurisdiction. Wetlands that were not directly connected to such
bodies of water would not be subject to the Corps’ permit authority under Section 404.57
In reaction to the Corps’ limited application of Section 404, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) sued the agency in 1974. The court ruled in favor of the NRDC and
ordered that the Corps of Engineers extend its jurisdiction to include a wider array of wetlands in
the administration of Section 404.58 The Corps responded by consulting with the EPA to develop
guidelines that satisfied the requirements of the 1975 ruling and issued new rules by the end of
the decade. Despite that action, the issue of determining when wetlands fell under the jurisdiction
of Section 404 remained uncertain in the following years.59 Multiple federal agencies had diverse
methods for identifying wetlands, which complicated the delineation of wetlands for regulatory
purposes or administrative oversight.60
Another challenge that policymakers faced during the 1970s was the impact that wetlands
regulations had on areas of economic or urban development. Protections for sensitive ecosystems
began to present complications in areas such as transportation, which had previously been
constrained only by cost or technical feasibility. One such example was the proposed
construction of the “Dixie Freeway” or Interstate 410 (I-410) in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The initial project had been put forth by the St. Charles Parish police jury as a way of improving
transportation in a parish that was split in half by the Mississippi River. Additionally, the
parish’s population had been increasing steadily since World War II, and the economic base of
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St. Charles was transitioning from agriculture to industry. Parish officials deemed that
improvements in transportation routes were necessary to accommodate future socio-economic
growth. By 1971, the “St. Charles Expressway” had become part of a larger interstate project
aimed at improving transportation in the New Orleans metro area. The Dixie Freeway would
total over fifty miles, running south of the city of New Orleans and into St. Bernard Parish,
where it would terminate near Interstate 10.61
The environmental impact statement for the project noted that the proposed highway
route would cut through hundreds of acres of wetlands, farmlands, and timberlands. Despite the
impact that construction of a highway was expected to have on those areas, state and federal
officials believed that the negative consequences of the project would be minimal. Further, any
disruptions to the hydrology, soils, or wildlife near the Dixie Freeway could be reduced and
would likely be temporary with careful planning.62 The state and federal agencies that reviewed
the EIS generally concurred with the transportation departments and only a few noted that
perhaps greater consideration could be paid to the potential impact that I-410 might have on
hunters or possible archaeological sites.63 Overall, public officials supported the addition of the
freeway to the interstate system in Louisiana and asserted the “proposed action will have a
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positive social and economic impact” in the region.64 Business groups also voiced approval for
the construction of the highway and lobbied for parish governments to encourage construction.65
The 1971 EIS characterized the proposal of I-410 as mostly uncontroversial and stressed
that the benefits of the project outweighed possible environmental consequences. While officials
emphasized the need for improved transportation infrastructure, the environment had played a
role in the agencies’ evaluations of the project – in direct response to the National Environmental
Policy Act.66 However, opposition to the Dixie Freeway began to build over the next several
years, and critics charged that the EIS was inadequate.67 There were also accusations that I-410’s
construction would have little benefit to the average Louisianan and that real estate developers
would be the ones who profited from the highway’s construction. Opponents argued that the
entire project would place too much pressure on the state’s wetlands and that the estimated $1
billion price tag was far too expensive.68 In testimony before a legislative committee in Baton
Rouge, John Hammond of the New Orleans Center for Housing and Environmental Law stated
that “no other single public works project will have such a devastating impact on the wetlands as
I-410.” He went on to criticize the short-sightedness of the proposed freeway and noted that
“New Orleans is a man-made island floating on the Mississippi River floodplain in the center of
productive estuaries. We must recognize this and learn to plan with, not against, nature.”69
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As the controversy over I-410 continued, some coastal experts echoed Hammond’s
suggestion to work with rather than against nature. In 1973, an environmental consultation firm
recently established by Sherwood Gagliano after he left LSU, published its own report at the
request of Louisiana’s Department of Transportation and Development. Coastal Environments,
Inc., noted that the proposed route of I-410 took the highway close to two major estuaries, a fact
which was not uncommon for the state’s road construction at the time. The initial building of
interstates disturbed sensitive areas, but more importantly, interstates encouraged urban
expansion and growth into the wetlands over long periods of time. Coastal Environments, Inc.,
recommended that the state develop a land-use plan which would encourage the construction of
highways on natural levees and to use new transportation routes to direct growth away from the
wetlands. The report suggested that the Dixie Freeway follow those recommendations and that
the route be changed to minimize impact on the state’s wetlands.70
A few months after Coastal Environments, Inc., reported its findings, state officials
agreed to a new route for the Dixie Freeway and planned to take the interstate further away from
sensitive wetlands.71 Even after rerouting the highway, opposition to I-410 continued. In March
1974, several environmental groups joined forces with the Louisiana Shrimpers Association to
file a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway
Administration, and the state of Louisiana. The plaintiffs argued that the EIS was inadequate and
had failed to fully consider the impacts of Dixie Freeway in a comprehensive manner. Federal
officials disagreed with the complaints, and the Army Corps of Engineers issued disposal permits
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act in April 1974. Work began on the Luling Bridge
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portion of the Dixie Freeway in 1975, but a temporary injunction put a halt to any additional
construction. Court proceedings continued on for another year until the lawsuit’s parties reached
a compromise in 1976. Transportation officials withdrew thirty-fives miles of highway from the
I-410 proposal, and most of the suit’s participants agreed to no further action on the remaining
portions.72
State and federal officials intended to continue with construction on the Luling Bridge
and a small section of highway in St. Charles Parish, but the Dixie Freeway had essentially been
abandoned over concerns about land use, cost, and environmental damages. In 1977, Louisiana
officials petitioned the Federal Highway Administration to approve the transfer of $438 million
in funding that had been earmarked for I-410 to another project. Two years later, officials in
Jefferson Parish acknowledged efforts to revive the Dixie Freeway would be “fruitless.” Parish
President Douglas Allen stressed that despite the loss of I-410, his community still needed to
expand its transportation infrastructure. He agreed that future projects would have to consider the
economic and ecological costs of building freeways near wetlands and plan accordingly. 73
The Dixie Freeway had been approved as a project in the late 1960s during an era of
urban growth and expansion but also right around the same time that Americans were
increasingly urging public officials to protect the environment from degradation. Transportation
infrastructure was seen as a way to promote progress and economic development, and initially
government officials believed that I-410 could improve transportation without significant harm

72

Federal Highway Administration and the Louisiana Office of Highways, Draft Supplement to the Final
Environmental Impact Statement for State Project No. 700-07-72 and Federal Aid Project I-410-4(67)217,
Interstate Route 410 (Fort Worth, TX: Federal Highway Administration, 1977), 1-2 – 1-13; 1-16 – 1-18.
73
Federal Highway Administration and the Louisiana Office of Highways Draft Supplement to the Final
Environmental Impact Statement for Interstate Route 410, 1-17 – 1-18; “Funds Transfer to North-South Road is
Urged,” Times-Picayune, January 12, 1977, sec. 1, AHN; John LaPlace, “Jeff President Plans to Push for West Bank
Interstate Corridor,” Times-Picayune, January 13, 1977, sec. 2, AHN; “Louisiana Interstate Construction
Continues,” Times-Picayune, January 28, 1979, sec. 7, AHN.

112

to the environment. However, citizens living in coastal Louisiana disagreed, and by the mid1970s, they had effective legal tools at their disposal to force the government to respond to their
objections. The EIS requirement in NEPA mandated that state and federal highway departments
consider the environment, and when concerned observers deemed the EIS for the Dixie Freeway
to be inadequate, NEPA again provided environmental organizations with a basis for legal
action.
Admittedly, the Dixie Freeway controversy did not necessarily herald a new age of
restrained development in Louisiana. Infrastructure projects continued, but the debate over I-410
did reveal that government officials would have to do a better job considering the impact that a
project might have on the environment. The dispute also demonstrated that the new legal tools
provided by environmental legislation such as NEPA could allow citizens to force government
officials to take actions that protected the environment, even if politicians had greater incentive
to push economic growth and expansion. Finally, the controversy showed that the protection of
Louisiana’s wetlands had become one of the multiple interests that needed to be addressed by
policymakers. Protection of wetlands was certainly not the only concern that had to be
considered by officials, but neither could the ecosystem be completely ignored.
Creating a Policy to Regulate Louisiana’s Wetlands
As state and federal highway agencies struggled to move forward on the Dixie Freeway,
Louisiana’s legislature continued to wrestle with the creation of a coastal master plan. Though
state representatives were considering a draft bill that would have established a CMP in the mid1970s, there had been little substantive action after the LACCMR disbanded in 1973.74 Despite
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the limited progress, public officials generally agreed the state needed its own CMP. That
consensus was based on several factors, some of which included the idea that the state’s coastal
zone and wetlands were vital economically and ecologically. Another reason that state officials
concurred a CMP was necessary had to do with Louisiana’s relationship with the federal
government. Section 307 of the CZMA contained a “federal consistency clause,” which
mandated that federal agencies tailor their coastal activities to coincide with the requirements of
a state’s CMP. That meant once Louisiana had a federally approved management plan, agencies
such as the Army Corps of Engineers would have to implement projects that were in line with
the state’s CMP.75
Public officials expressed concerns that without a federally approved CMP, there was
little incentive for the national government to consult with Louisiana over development projects.
When speaking at a Coastal Zone Management Conference in February 1974, Governor Edwin
Edwards encouraged the legislature to develop a plan not only because of the economic and
environmental necessity, but also because “where the states don’t move, the feds will.”76 Three
years later, that crucial point was articulated again by the editorial board of the Times-Picayune.
“Many Louisianans complain that the federal government…has too much jurisdiction in our
wetlands, but an approved coastal zone management plan is the only way the state can assume
that jurisdiction.”77
Another reason officials in Louisiana agreed the state needed a CMP had to do with the
Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP). The CEIP was added as an amendment to the CZMA in
1976 and provided federal loans or grants to help states mitigate the economic and environmental
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costs associated with energy development.78 To qualify for the CEIP funds, a state had to at least
be in the process of forming a coastal zone management plan, which Louisiana was doing in
1977.79 However, federal funds that were available for planning activities would no longer be
available after July 31, 1978. A state could still get an approved coastal plan after that and
receive money for implementation, but once the July 1978 deadline passed, there would be no
more funds available for planning from the federal government.80 If Louisiana did submit its
CMP to NOAA before July 1978, then the monies from the CEIP could be jeopardy if the state
did not have funding to continue planning.
Complicating matters further, the proposal that government officials were considering as
Louisiana’s CMP in 1977 was widely seen as insufficient. The most serious issue was with the
recommended coastal zone boundary. As part of the CZMA, states were required to delineate
their own coastal zones. The Louisiana Coastal Commission, which was one of the bodies
responsible for developing the management plan, had proposed making the state’s coastal
boundary extend three miles inland from the shoreline. That definition excluded a substantial
portion of what was usually considered part of Louisiana’s coastal zone. With the three-mile
inland boundary, only small portions of ten parishes would be included and twelve coastal
parishes would be excluded entirely.81
Despite warnings from NOAA that a CMP with such a limited boundary would not be
accepted by the administration, the Louisiana legislature approved the plan in early July 1977
and sent it to Governor Edwards for final submission to NOAA.82 Those who supported the plan
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argued that more areas could be added later, but the important thing was to get a CMP approved
so that Louisiana remained eligible for federal funding. Opponents of the bill called it a “sham, a
farce, and a coastal cop-out” and criticized the plan for failing to adequately protect the wetlands.
Representative John Hainkel of New Orleans refused to sign the report and said that waiting
another year would not matter. In reference to his colleagues’ short-sighted approach to the
CMP, Hainkel stated, “I hope we’ll stop acting like a herd of turtles and act progressively.”83
The heated debate among state legislators over the 1977 plan revealed some of the
tensions involved in developing coastal management strategies. While there was general
agreement that the state needed to pass a CMP, there was also a question of who was going to
benefit from the money that came along with an approved plan. The LCC had suggested such a
narrow boundary due to pressure from parishes that wanted to ensure they would receive a larger
share of federal monies once the state had an approved plan. There was also pressure from
representatives who feared increased federal involvement in the state’s wetlands and wanted to
keep the coastal zone limited.84 Finally, there were concerns that inviting federal power into the
state with a CMP would undermine the state’s ability to profit from mineral reserves.85
However, Representative Ed Scogin of Slidell rejected those sentiments and said that
delaying the creation of an acceptable CMP was the real problem. Without a state-issued
management plan, federal agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers held greater authority
in Louisiana’s wetlands. Further, by failing to develop a plan with sufficient boundaries, the state
ran the risk of losing all federal money from the CZMA provisions – including monies from the
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CEIP. Scogin noted that his district was close to Lake Pontchartrain and that the area was
suffering extensively from poor management and ad hoc activities pursued by the USACE.86
Officials at NOAA rejected Louisiana’s 1977 plan, and the legislature did not come to an
agreement on a better framework for a new CMP until the following year. Facing an impending
deadline for the loss of federal funding, legislators passed the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act (SLCRMA) of 1978. The SLCRMA met the minimum requirements for what
NOAA would accept as a coastal zone boundary and included all or part of nineteen coastal
parishes.87 Through the SLCRMA, the state gained regulatory powers to manage activities in the
coastal zone and also included a directive to develop specific guidelines for administration.
While the SLCRMA garnered more approval than the plan in 1977, the new law did not pass
without controversy either. One area of particular tension was the role that local governments
would play in the state’s new coastal management duties. Parishes such as Terrebonne objected
to too much state control and lobbied for greater representation by local officials.88 To resolve
that dispute, the SLCRMA included a provision that allowed parishes to adopt their own CMPs
and if those plans complied with state regulations, then individual parishes could take over much
of the regulatory and management responsibilities normally delegated to the state.89
Another area of controversy was which agency would be responsible for administering
the SLCRMPA and its associated coastal management plan. After NOAA rejected the 1977
proposal, Governor Edwards assigned the secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Development (DOTD), George Fischer, to lead development for a plan that could meet federal
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approval.90 Fischer, whose selection likely reflected the fact that he had secured $14 million
worth of funding for the state under the Coastal Energy Impact Program in 1977, developed a
bill that kept administration of the coastal zone in the DOTD. After substantial debate about the
appropriateness of assigning coastal management to an agency that was primarily responsible for
development and not conservation, the legislature agreed to a compromise. In the future,
governors could move administration and management to the Department of Natural Resources
by way of executive order. However, the DNR was responsible for administering oil and gas
leases for the state, which also raised the question if that was the best agency to oversee
management of the coast’s wetlands. In 1973, the Louisiana Advisory Commission on Coastal
and Marine Resources had specifically recommended that the Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission be placed in charge of a coastal management program. The agency already had
experience in monitoring the coastal zone for wildlife and its technical staff was the most
qualified to oversee policies for coastal protection. Additionally, the commission’s primary
function was more conservation-oriented than developmental.91
Despite the controversies that had surrounded the SLCRMA, the law established a
framework for the management of the state’s coastal wetlands. The state would encourage
multiple uses of the coast, “while maintaining and enhancing renewable resources, providing
adequate economic growth, and minimizing adverse effects of one resource use upon another
without imposing any undue restriction on any user.”92 A lofty goal certainly, but the law
included several mechanisms to help the officials oversee activities in the coastal zone such as
“special management areas.” One of the reasons for such areas was to provide for protection or
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restoration.93 When the legislature passed the SLCRMA in 1978, two special management areas
were included. The first was the Marsh Island Wildlife Refuge and Game Preserve, which was
located in Iberia Parish and had been donated to the state in 1920 by the Russell Sage
Foundation. According to previous agreements and the SLCRMA, the state had to make
preservation of the island its number one priority when making management decisions.94
The second priority that the state had to consider in regard to the refuge reflected the
ongoing conflicts present in Louisiana’s debate about coastal management. Marsh Island was
home to herons, egrets, ducks, geese and American alligators, but there was the potential for
extracting oil and gas as well. Earlier agreements had allowed the state to pursue mineral
development, and authorities wanted to ensure that they would be able to continue under a CMP.
The SLCRMA designated Marsh Island as a special management area to preserve its natural
environment but also to preserve the state’s right to develop oil and gas too. The condition was
any development that took place had to disturb the area as little as possible. If that stipulation
could be fulfilled, then the state would meet its obligation under the second priority of the special
management area for Marsh Island.95
Another component of the SLCRMA that contributed to the framework for coastal zone
management was policy guidelines to help decision-makers apply regulations in an equitable
way.96 When the DOTD presented the draft guidelines for review to the public in spring 1979,
there were concerns that the proposals were too vaguely worded and could be used to stop all
activities on the coast or allow any action possible. Additionally, the guidelines did not provide
enough direction for how the state should evaluate activities in a cumulative fashion. That
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contrasted with the guidelines issued by the Army Corps of Engineers which required that all
activities be considered in a broad manner, since even small projects could have a larger impact.
Writing for the Times-Picayune in 1979, Cornelia Carrier noted that the guidelines seemed “to be
more oriented toward development than preservation and appear too often to ignore that
Louisiana’s wetlands are a public resource of importance not only to the state, but to the nation.”
She went on to say that the “conditioning, modifying terms seem to offer unlimited discretion to
administrators, making them vulnerable to undue influence from special interests and leaving the
door open to political abuses in the decision-making process.”97
Within a few months of releasing its proposed guidelines, the DOTD had to substantially
rework the draft to improve clarity because “most reviewers” concurred with the sentiments
expressed in Carrier’s reporting. Commenters complained that the “draft guidelines were too
ambiguous” and left “too much discretion to the administrator of the program” in regard to
enforcement practices. In May 1979, the DOTD issued revisions that reduced the use of
qualifying phrases such as “if feasible” and included a “balancing test” to help officials resolve
conflicting interests. The test included different evaluation criteria such as weighing the costs of
a proposed activity with the benefits of completion or investigating whether an alternative
location might be better.98
The conflicts over the coastal zone boundary, the guidelines, and the SLCRMA reflected
the varying interests in the state over how to use the coastal zone. Louisiana committed itself to
better protection of coastal wetlands, and there were several reasons for that decision – ensuring
the future productivity of the coastal zone, assuming more control over activities that took place
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there, and responding to the increasing deterioration of the state’s wetlands. Much the same
pattern had taken place on a broader scale at the federal level. Legislation such as NEPA, the
Clean Air Act, and the amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1972 had
resulted from growing pressures to protect the nation’s natural resources from degradation, while
also still allowing for economic growth. In the case of each law, there was a legitimate interest in
formulating policies that allowed government agencies to act as environmental stewards or
protectors of public health. However, the desire to use the country’s resources for economic
benefits did not disappear nor did it assume a lesser role.
Perhaps the best example of this mindset can be seen in how the federal government and
the state of Louisiana chose to regulate activities that could impact the quality of the
environment. Both the Clean Water Act amendments and the SLCRMA established permitting
systems to determine which activities would be allowed in sensitive areas such as wetlands.
Section 402 of the CWA required that parties wishing to discharge pollutants into the “waters of
the United States” had to obtain permits from the EPA before doing so. In 1975 alone, over
40,000 permits were granted by the agency, and each one detailed the conditions in which a party
could discharge effluents. Violators could face judicial injunctions or be placed on a public list
that outlined their records of non-compliance. Inclusion on the list barred facilities from
eligibility for federal grants, contracts, or loans until they sufficiently addressed pollution
problems.99 Section 404 of the CWA required that any party wishing to dredge or fill in the
“waters of the United States” had to first obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.
That section became particularly important for wetland regulation as the 1970s progressed,
though there was some controversy over jurisdictional interpretation.100
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Louisiana’s coastal zone law and management plan rested on a permit system as well.
Known as the Coastal Use Permit (CUP), the program required any entity wishing to take
substantial action in the state’s coastal zone to get a permit. Activities that might require a permit
were dredging or filling, levee construction, wastewater discharge, mining, drainage projects, or
hurricane protection efforts.101 To ensure that parties would not have to file for duplicate permits,
the state arranged a joint-application system that would streamline state agency responses and
coordination with the federal government.102 Neither the state nor federal permit system
expressly forbid any pollution or development from taking place in the “waters of the United
States” or in sensitive areas such as wetlands. Companies or individuals had to apply for permits
before taking action, which was meant to be the mechanism by which agencies such as the Corps
regulated activities. There were also exceptions to the permit systems that allowed certain
activities to take place without the need for a permit application. In 1977, Congress added
exemptions to the CWA for agriculture, silviculture, and ranching, as well as a “nationwide
permit” category that could be quickly issued for activities that were assumed to have minor
impacts.103 In Louisiana, the construction of a residence or camp did not require a permit, nor did
agricultural activities that had been ongoing for at least a decade.104
There was the possibility of outright banning certain activities in coastal zones, as had
taken place in Delaware in 1971. However, there seemed little interest in stopping economic,
urban, or industrial growth entirely. Instead, states such as Louisiana and the federal government
believed that comprehensive planning and permit systems would be sufficient protection for
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environmental resources and also allow continued development. Additionally, there was some
concern that too much regulation could lead to no regulation at all. By prohibiting activities or
heavily regulating them, the state and federal government could potentially run into an issue
known as “takings.” According to the U.S. Constitution, private property owners cannot have
their land confiscated by government authorities without being fairly compensated.105 During the
1970s, there was some question as to whether heavy regulation resulted in what was essentially a
“taking” of the property. In order to avoid questions of constitutionality, Louisiana and the
federal government relied on the permit system to allow maximum flexibility. Some activities
could be heavily monitored or restricted, but courts were more likely to uphold regulatory laws if
there was not a widespread pattern of denying property owners the value of their land.106
Conclusion
At the national level, the creation of laws such as the Coastal Zone Management Act
brought increased attention to sensitive ecosystems such as Louisiana’s coastal wetlands.
Drawing on the ideas espoused by the Stratton Commission and the WRPA in the preceding
decade, the CZMA was meant to blend environmental protection with a more orderly approach
to land use. In essence, policymakers subscribed to the idea that environmental quality could be
ensured if state governments adopted more systematic planning for a wide variety of uses in their
coastal zones. Encouraging states to take the lead on comprehensive land-use management was a
departure from earlier trends as municipal governments had once been the primary authorities for
overseeing land-use and zoning laws. Despite fears of an overbearing federal government,
provisions of the act mandated that the states have considerable control over what happened
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within their respective boundaries. Louisiana was one of thirty states that participated in the
CZMA, and the interaction between the government officials in Baton Rouge and Washington
D.C., led to the adoption of a coastal zone management law in 1978.
Still, the tide of environmental degradation in the state’s wetlands was not reversed so
much as slowed down. Regulatory gaps such as the exemptions for 404 permits limited the
oversight of the Clean Water Act, and there were a multitude of policies that contradicted the
goal of protecting the environment. Indeed, while laws such as the CZMA increased protection
for coastal zones, they also contributed to development – especially in the area of energy
infrastructure.107 Regulations were an important step in mitigating environmental degradation,
but even the most stringent regulatory schemes could not erase the consequences of past
activities. Perhaps just as importantly, regulations did little good if they were not effectively
implemented. Conflicting interests, controversies involving the scope of regulations, and fiscal
constraints continued to affect the protection and preservation of Louisiana’s wetlands well into
the years that followed the “environmental decade” of the 1970s. As a result, policies related to
the management and protection of wetlands continued to be piecemeal.
Finally, multiple-use planning and management still tended to favor economic and social
growth over stringent environmental protections.108 Federal policies continued to support the
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engineering of the Mississippi River, the conversion of wetlands to dry lands for agriculture or
urban sprawl, and the development of oil and gas production in Louisiana’s coastal zone. The
state also supported and benefitted from those policies as well, and even after a decade of
significant environmental legislation, the basic calculus in Louisiana’s coastal zone had not
substantially changed – economic and social developments that made use of the state’s natural
resources often took precedence over environmental protection. Laws such as the SLCMRA that
were implemented during the 1970s did have positive effects, but additional measures were
eventually going to be necessary. As the state transitioned into a new decade, scientists and
public officials recognized that simply regulating the use of wetlands would not be sufficient to
address the crisis of coastal erosion. Louisiana was going to need to adopt strategies of restoring
what had already been lost, but the development of a coastal restoration program would take
place in the same context of bureaucratic and economic circumstances that had contributed to
loss of the state’s wetlands for decades.

than the broader land-use policies seen in Congress in the early 1970s. Because of the complexities in trying to
balance land-use planning against the long-term treatment of property rights in American history, policymakers had
greater success in regulating pollution than land use. Pollution was thought to be a problem that could be solved by
the use of technology, whereas planning for the orderly use of land had the potential of alienating the rights of
property owners.
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1980s
“New Orleans’ Final Frontier for Future Growth”
In 1986, a subsidiary of Merrill Lynch and Co., two national environmental groups, and
members of Louisiana’s congressional delegation pieced together a plan that would create the
Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge “within twenty minutes of the Central Business
District” in New Orleans.1 South Point Inc., had acquired approximately twenty-four thousand
acres of marsh in the eastern portion of the “Crescent City” in 1985 as part of a debt settlement.
Developers had long seen the tract as “New Orleans’ final frontier for future growth” and hoped
to transform the wetlands into dry lands suitable for housing and commercial properties.
However, environmental groups were staunchly opposed to developing the area, and South Point
decided that donating most of its land for a wildlife refuge made more financial sense than
potentially litigating construction projects for years to come.2 After several months of
uncertainty about whether the deal would go through, President Ronald Reagan gave final
approval for the proposal when he signed the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act (EWRA) in
November 1986.3
The EWRA contained other provisions related to wetlands, but the creation of Bayou
Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge ensured that over eighteen thousand acres of marsh would be
protected from commercial and industrial development in New Orleans. Sitting between
Interstate 10 and Lake Pontchartrain, the Bayou Sauvage wetlands served as a habitat for a

“Wildlife Refuge for N.O.?” Times-Picayune/States-Item, August 5, 1986, sec. A, AHN.
James O’Byrne, “Refuge is Hailed as Possible Trendsetter in U.S.,” Times-Picayune/States-Item, August 3, 1986,
sec. B, AHN; James O’Byrne, “Major Wildlife Refuge Proposed for East N.O.,” Times-Picayune/States-Item, July
29, 1986, sec. A, AHN. South Point was hoping to get a tax write-off for donating the property the national wildlife
refuge program.
3
James O’Byrne, “Sauvage Refuge Bill Signed,” Times-Picayune/States-Item, November 11, 1986, sec. A, AHN.
1
2

126

variety of animals, fish, and plants and also provided a run-off basin for storm-related flooding.4
In a report prepared by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, the members characterized the area as “particularly valuable,” especially because such
a sizeable tract of wetlands was located so close to a major American city.5 Only a few other
metropolitan areas in the country could boast of an urban refuge, and none were as large as
Bayou Sauvage would be.6 Educational and recreational opportunities would be a boon to
residents and tourists from surrounding areas. Further, the refuge would preclude commercial or
residential expansion in most of the undeveloped marshlands to the east of New Orleans. The
expense of draining wetlands for subdivisions or shopping malls had served to block
development through the mid-1980s, as did the limitations imposed by Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act.7 Still, the potential for construction and growth remained while the land stayed in
private hands. By making the area into a national wildlife refuge, public officials agreed to
preserve the wetlands as an important ecological habitat.
Environmental groups and local observers hailed the authorization of Bayou Sauvage as a
major victory in 1986, but the proposal languished for nearly four years before becoming a
reality. Funding set aside for the purchase was diverted in 1988 during a particularly bad fire
season in the western U.S. After the money was restored, soil testing indicated high levels of
mercury might be present in the marshes, and federal officials balked at going through with the
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sale due to the potential risks of a costly clean-up. When secondary testing revealed there was no
need for concern, a leaky levee discovered along the bayou’s eastern boundary further delayed
the purchase of the land from South Point. Louisiana Representative John Breaux was able to
secure funding from the federal government to help pay for most of the repair costs for the
levee.8 The sale of the tract finally went through in May 1990 in what the Times-Picayune called
a “tangible victory” in a period “where there is much talking and writing about saving
Louisiana’s and the nation’s shrinking wetlands.”9
The saga of Bayou Sauvage offers a window into how wetland policies developed in the
state of Louisiana and the nation during the 1980s. Establishing a national wildlife refuge near
New Orleans generated support because of ongoing attitudinal shifts about the value of wetlands
and also because government policies had made reclamation less desirable. Carrying through
with the plan was more complicated than anticipated, and in many ways Bayou Sauvage was an
exception to the “business as usual” mindset that continued to characterize the management of
Louisiana’s coast in the 1980s. Despite some positive steps toward protecting the state’s
wetlands during the decade, policies often remained piecemeal and inefficient administration
continued. Sufficient funding for protection measures was another critical issue and was evident
even in the creation of Bayou Sauvage. When the proposal became threatened by a poorly
maintained levee, the state largely relied on federal dollars to fix the problem. In fact, the need
for federal intervention became increasingly clear over the course of the 1980s. Public officials
in the state realized that conservation or preservation efforts were not sufficient to halt coastal
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erosion. Louisiana was also going to need a large-scale restoration program to help combat the
rapid subsidence of its wetlands.
This chapter examines policy developments during the 1980s and discusses how state and
federal officials improved protection for Louisiana’s wetlands in specific cases. However, longstanding issues related to bureaucratic disorganization, fiscal problems, and resistance to landuse planning also persisted throughout the decade. Additionally, Reagan sought to reduce the
amount of government regulation and was generally less friendly toward environmental priorities
than previous presidents. As a result of these factors, policymakers failed to produce
comprehensive programs to conserve and restore Louisiana’s wetlands. Further, the creation of
new policies and the implementation of existing regulations were often undermined by ongoing
budget turmoil in Louisiana.
The Reagan Revolution, the Environment, and Wetlands
When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, he brought a new outlook on how
government should function. That perspective often carried over into specific policy
prescriptions such as those related to environmental protections. Reagan subscribed to an
approach called the New Federalism, which was an idea that had its origins in the Nixon
administration. For both presidents, the New Federalism involved changing the power
relationship between state and federal governments. With Nixon, states would assume more
control over areas like regulatory enforcement as was seen in laws such as the Coastal Zone
Management Act. Reagan’s implementation of the New Federalism continued the same policy,
but during his two terms states were left with fewer resources to carry out expanding
responsibilities. For Reagan, reducing the amount of money spent on enforcing regulations was a
key policy goal. In fact, decreasing the amount of regulation in general was one of the main
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tenets of Reagan’s approach to governance. He and those in his administration touted their
preferences to allow the “free market” find solutions to problems such as pollution.10
That philosophy manifested itself in appointments and new or revised environmental
policies during Reagan’s terms in office. In 1981, in its first report for the Reagan administration,
the President’s Council on Environmental Quality criticized the environmental legislation of the
1970s as being too rigid and said the time had come to re-evaluate the burdens placed on
businesses and individuals by legislative and administrative policies.11 “Whenever possible, the
achievement of environmental goals and the protection of environmental standards should be left
to free market mechanisms.”12 Reagan also placed controversial figures at the head of two of the
country’s most prominent resource agencies – the Department of Interior and the EPA. Both
James Watt and Anne Burford were outspoken critics of environmental regulation and
subscribed to the administration’s stance that economic development was incompatible with
environmental protection. Morale at the EPA declined significantly under Burford’s leadership,
as did the size of the agency’s staff. Her replacement, William Ruckelshaus, had been the EPA’s
first director under Richard Nixon and had a solid reputation among environmentalists. However,
lack of support from the White House caused Ruckelshaus to resign in protest after less than two
years, which further reduced the agency’s ability to properly enforce the policies for which it was
responsible.13
Despite Reagan’s anti-regulatory positions and controversial appointments to agencies
such as the EPA, public opinion remained favorable toward a strong government role in
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environmental protections throughout his presidency.14 When regulations seemed to pose
minimal risk to economic development or when congressional pressure was too substantial to
resist, Reagan did support protective legislation such as the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986.15
In other instances, Reagan enacted environmental regulations in an effort to promote greater
fiscal conservatism. One example of such an approach had a direct impact on Louisiana’s coast
in the early part of the decade. In April 1981, Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island introduced
the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA), which prevented the federal government from
providing assistance to construction projects on undeveloped portions of barrier islands.16
When Chafee introduced the CBRA, about two-hundred and fifty barrier islands stretched
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and those areas had seen several decades of intense property
development. In 1950, about ninety thousand acres of the nation’s barrier islands had been
developed for residential purposes. Thirty years later, that total had climbed to 280,000 acres.
The federal government had supported some of the expansion by contributing to disaster relief or
subsidizing flood insurance on the islands. Barrier islands such as Louisiana’s Isle Dernier were
especially vulnerable to wind or wave action and served as a “first line of defense” for the
shorelines of coastal states during powerful storms. Erosion problems on the nation’s barrier
islands were widespread, and deteriorating conditions posed a risk specifically to Louisiana’s
coastal wetlands.17
Reagan signed the CBRA in 1982 and barred almost all federal spending for 650 miles of
coastline along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The president said the law was

14

Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
2003), 223-224.
15
Daynes and Sussman, White House Politics and the Environment, 177-180.
16
Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, 1981: The Twelfth Annual Report, 162-163.
17
Ibid.

131

“precisely the sort of imaginative environmental legislation this administration encourages” and
that the CBRA would “enhance both wise natural resource conservation and fiscal
responsibility.”18 Supporters of the law estimated that the federal government could save as
much as $500 million per year, and the act also had the benefit of easing the pressure to develop
such sensitive areas. By paying for flood insurance subsidies, infrastructure, and disaster relief
on the nation’s barrier islands, the federal government had contributed to environmental
degradation. In that sense, the CBRA offered a limited correction to policies that had often been
at cross-purposes – infrastructure investment for property development and environmental
protection.19
However, there was an exception to the ban on federal spending for Louisiana’s barrier
islands. Representatives John Breaux and Billy Tauzin placed a measure in the legislation that
ensured the state continued to receive aid for projects that combatted coastal erosion – as long as
those projects did not encourage development. The two representatives convinced their fellow
legislators to agree to the provision by arguing that Louisiana’s problem was not overdevelopment. Instead, the deteriorating islands put the state’s wetlands in greater jeopardy by
exposing them to increased wind and wave action.20 The move by Breaux and Tauzin had
ecological benefits for Louisiana by ensuring the state could receive federal money for projects
to reinforce its deteriorating islands, but local officials were not concerned solely about the
environmental problems associated with erosion. The state’s three-mile boundary for keeping
one hundred percent of oil and gas taxes was tied to the shorelines of its barrier islands. If the
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islands eroded, then the three-mile marker moved inward and Louisiana lost revenues from
mineral production.21
In January 1981, Representative Robert Livingston said that stabilizing Louisiana’s
barrier islands to ensure the state kept “millions of dollars in oil and gas revenues” was necessary
because those “revenues provide public services vital to all citizens.” He went on to note that the
state could not “permit the passage of any legislation which would forbid the state to actively
preserve the islands.”22 Concerns about the relationship between the state’s barrier islands and its
mineral revenues continued while Congress debated the CBRA. About one week before the
president signed the law, Governor Treen and members of the legislature agreed to invest money
in several coastal erosion projects, some of which would include barrier island stabilization.
State officials were concerned “that if the barrier islands disappear and the coast erodes farther
inland, it could have a serious effect on the state’s offshore oil and gas rights.”23
Proposals for environmental protection at the national level continued after the passage of
the CBRA, and in some cases, the bills were modeled after the barrier islands act by combining
fiscal conservatism with protecting sensitive ecosystems. In 1983, the Department of the Interior
submitted legislation that was touted by the Reagan administration to increase protection for
wetlands and the wildlife that used them as habitats. The Protect Our Wetlands and Ducks
Resources Act (POWDR) mimicked the tactic used by CBRA and would have prevented federal
subsidies to programs that encouraged drainage or development in wetlands.24 However, the bill
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contained some serious issues that made POWDR more symbolic than practical for safeguarding
wetlands. Protection under the act first required a national survey to identify “environmentally
significant” wetlands, which would have likely taken decades to complete. Another major flaw
in the act was that there were a considerable number of exceptions to the ban on federal funding.
For example, projects approved by the Army Corps of Engineers could still get federal dollars as
could agriculture activities – weaknesses that likely contributed to the bill’s failure.25
Environmental protection did not become completely outsourced to the “free market”
during the early years of the Reagan administration, but neither did the president and his
supporters pursue the sorts of regulations that had been sought in the 1970s. The Reagan
administration wanted to see fewer regulatory schemes, even if stronger regulations might have
helped preserve sensitive ecosystems such as Louisiana’s wetlands. Still, as the decade
continued, Reagan’s support for reducing the amount of aid given to states for regulation
enforcement came just as Louisiana’s officials began to emphasize that the state needed more
federal assistance to combat coastal erosion.
Louisiana Begins to Manage the Coastal Wetlands
Despite some of the shifts taking place at the federal level in regard to environmental
policies, there were steps taken to protect Louisiana’s wetlands during the early 1980s. After the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration approved Louisiana’s coastal master plan in
September 1980, the state became eligible for additional funds to administer its management
plan.26 Approval of the CMP also ensured that Louisiana continued to receive revenues as part of
the Coastal Energy Impact Program. During the first year of the plan’s administration, the state
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received almost $9 million in funding, with about $7 million of that going to coastal parishes to
improve local infrastructure.27
Beyond guaranteeing revenues for administration, the CMP established a method of
balancing conservation and economic development in the state’s coastal wetlands via the Coastal
Use Permit. The CMP also ensured that federal projects that took place in Louisiana’s wetlands
had to be consistent with the state’s management plan, thus giving more control to the state in
how it managed its resources.28 Parish governments had the option of establishing their own
management plans to oversee development in their local jurisdictions.29 A number of parishes
did so, including Jefferson, Lafourche, and Orleans. Though the SLCRMA and the CMP gave
Louisiana mechanisms for controlling activities in the wetlands, the permit system could only
prevent possible future damage. Further, not all activities that took place in the coastal zone
required a CUP, so actions related to agriculture or aquaculture did not necessarily require a
permit and could be done without any kind of government approval.30
To counter erosion caused by past activities and offset erosion that resulted from CUP
exemptions, officials in the state began to stress the need for a restoration plan. In summer 1980,
the drainage of wetlands in Jefferson Parish led to debate among residents about the wisdom of
allowing development in such sensitive areas. The chairman of the Jefferson Parish Coastal
Management Commission, John Uhl, argued that the loss of several thousand acres was a
problem, but only a small one in comparison to what was happening in Barataria Basin. Uhl said
that the real issue was that the entire area was sinking into the Gulf Mexico. The Mississippi
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River was no longer depositing enough sediment to keep up with the erosive effects of wave
action and salt water intrusion. He believed the best approach to save the area was to “let the
Mississippi River out into the basin” with a series of control structures that could direct the
process of land building in a systematic way. Without a long-range restoration plan, Uhl stated,
“the marsh is doomed.”31
There was considerable agreement among Louisiana’s public officials that the state
should be doing more to ensure the sustainability of its wetlands. Experts had increased their
estimates of Louisiana’s land loss from sixteen square miles in the early 1970s to as much as
forty-seven square miles per year. In response to the ongoing losses, Governor Treen signed a
bill into law that created the Coastal Environment Protection Trust Fund (CEPTF) in late 1981.
The fund was established specifically to combat coastal erosion and was given $35 million out of
the state’s Enhanced Mineral Trust Fund. Fifteen anti-erosion projects had already been
approved by the state legislature, but almost all of them lacked funding. The CEPTF was meant
to provide financing for state projects, state-federal collaborations, and studies related to coastal
erosion.32
The year after state officials established the CEPTF, a task force formed that consisted of
representatives from the Louisiana Coastal Commission, the Department of Natural Resources,
the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (DWF), and the Department of Public Works.
Designated as the Coastal Protection Task Force (CPTF), the group recommended six projects
and one study to be implemented over the course of the next twenty-four to forty-four months.
Two of the projects were joint state-federal endeavors, while the remaining four were
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demonstration projects to test the feasibility of pursuing larger projects at a later date. Projects
included freshwater diversions and beach or barrier island nourishment, and all were designed to
encourage land growth.33 The CPTF report estimated that the six projects would cost the state
$9.5 million dollars and included $700,000 for matching funds on the freshwater diversion
projects with the Army Corps of Engineers.34 In 1983, the state used another $5 million from the
CEPTF for its remaining matching funds for the Caernarvon Freshwater Diversion (CFWD)
project.35 Despite some of the benefits that came out of the CEPTF, the program was
questionable in its effectiveness and suffered from inadequate funding and poor management
through the mid-1980s.36
Fiscal Challenges to Implementing Wetlands Policies
One of the factors that affected the CEPTF was ongoing budget turmoil. A drop in
mineral revenues after 1982 caused repeated fiscal woes for the rest of the decade and limited the
scope of projects that the state could take on, even for a problem as serious as coastal erosion.37
When officials confronted the need to balance competing economic, social, and environmental
interests, the issue of budget constraints simmered in the background. In April 1982, the state
faced “dire financial straits,” and Governor David Treen hoped to find a new way to pay for a
broad range of public services.38 He put forth the Coastal Wetlands Environmental Levy
(CWEL) in an effort to make up for declining oil and gas revenues. Under the proposed bill, a
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tax would have been applied to all oil and natural gas moving through Louisiana’s wetlands and
not just the mineral resources that originated in the state’s jurisdiction. Treen’s administration
estimated that the CWEL would bring $400 million in revenues annually, and the governor
wanted to use those funds to pay for capital improvements such as highway construction.39 He
argued that trying to pay for public services by raising income taxes or sales taxes would place
too much of a burden on individuals.40
The Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI), the Public Affairs Research
Council, and the oil and gas industry criticized the CWEL, which led to resistance in the
legislature for supporting Treen’s plan. Concerns ranged from the impact such a tax might have
on oil and gas development to a lack of specifics on how exactly the money would be spent.41
Additionally, legislators voiced opposition to the bill in the wake of an economic downturn and
said that the state should not tax an industry that provided so many Louisianans with jobs.42
Complicating matters further, former governor Edwin Edwards also opposed the CWEL and
actively lobbied the legislature to block the tax.43 Though the Ways and Means Committee in the
House voted to send Treen’s proposal to the floor in early June 1982, the legislation died on the
chamber’s floor several weeks later. The governor’s legislative leaders gutted the bill just before
the final vote and reduced the possible tax revenues from over $400 million to $12 million. Their
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efforts were still not enough to overcome the lobbying efforts of LABI, the oil and gas industry,
and Democrats loyal to Edwards.44
The failure of the CWEL hinted at the sway that the oil industry held in Louisiana during
the early 1980s. Between 1979 and 1981, mineral taxes brought in over $2 billion dollars of
revenue, but political officials in Treen’s administration warned that the surpluses of those years
were not sustainable. The federal Government Accountability Office also criticized Louisiana for
relying too heavily on mineral taxes to fund the state’s budget, and a professor of economics at
LSU warned that oil and gas revenues would likely begin to drop by the mid-1980s.45 Indeed by
1988, oil and gas taxes contributed to only fifteen percent of the state’s budget, a figure that was
down from a peak of forty-three percent in 1982.46 However, other public officials did not share
the Treen administration’s pessimism regarding the state’s budget. Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee in the legislature, Kevin Reilly, asserted that with “luck and good
management” Louisiana could be financially secure into the twenty-first century. One of the
reasons that a potential drop in oil production did not alarm officials such as Reilly was that he
believed Louisiana was highly competitive in the minerals industry.47
His position had some merit, particularly concerning the oil and gas infrastructure that
existed in Louisiana. Specifically, the state had recently become home to the nation’s only deepwater offshore oil terminal. In May 1981, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) opened for
business in the Gulf of Mexico, just south of Port Lafourche.48 Owned and operated by several
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private oil companies, LOOP had been approved by the Louisiana legislature in the late 1970s.
When construction began, there were concerns that another offshore oil terminal in Texas could
provide competition, but the Seadock project fell through.49 Louisiana officials advocated for the
project, stating that the superport would bring in hundreds of jobs and millions of dollars in
revenues. However, by the time the terminal began operations, the world was already
experiencing a decline in oil prices. One year later, the facility was operating at one-quarter its
maximum capacity and suffered operating losses of $40 million. In 1983, LOOP lowered its fees
for tankers to unload oil at the terminal, but volatility in oil prices continued to affect LOOP’s
profitability into the late 1980s.50
As had been the case with opposition to the CWEL, Louisiana’s reliance on the oil
industry to support the state’s budget and economy could be seen in official backing for LOOP.
In 1972, the legislature passed Act 444, which established the Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal
Authority to oversee operations once a deep-water oil port could be built. The authority was
granted “exclusive and plenary authority to do any and all things necessary or proper” to
“promote, plan, [and] finance,” a deep draft terminal.51 In 1978, the SLCRMA designated LOOP
as one of its two “special management areas” that would be excluded from the normal authority
of a coastal management plan. Instead, because of its “unique needs” and importance to the
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economy of Louisiana, the offshore oil terminal would operate under its own environmental
management plan.52
The decision to give special preference to the oil industry did not mean that Louisiana’s
officials could ignore potential impacts on the state’s wetlands.53 Environmentalists were
concerned about the impact of a deep-water terminal could have on the coastal wetlands,
particularly if there was a major spill. There was also trepidation about the impact of secondary
developments as facilities were built onshore to support LOOP’s operations.54 Act 444 required
the terminal authority “to take all necessary steps to protect Louisiana’s unique coastal
environment from any short-term or long-term damage” that might result from the development
of a superport.55 In compliance with the law, a three-person commission developed an
environmental protection plan (EPP), which became part of the overall legal framework for
LOOP. One of the commissioners was Jack Van Lopik, who served as the director for LSU’s
Center for Wetlands Resources. Another member was Lyle St. Amant, who was assistant director
of the state’s Wildlife and Fisheries Commission. Along with a representative from the superport
authority, the group’s report attempted to address some of the major concerns related to
secondary development by requiring that all onshore support facilities adhere to the EPP.56 The
plan also included provisions for monitoring equipment, training personnel, and an anti-pollution
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policy.57 Though the EPP did not satisfy all concerns related to the potential impacts to the
environment, the plan did provide the terminal authority with the legal means necessary to seek
monetary compensation from superport operators to repair environmental damages.58 When
LOOP began operations in 1981, the facility did so under the scope of an EPP that was meant to
protect Louisiana’s wetlands while also allowing for economic development in a state that
depended heavily on the oil industry.59
Challenges with Classifying Wetlands and Effective Implementation
Issues such as the budget crises of the 1980s and LOOP influenced Louisiana’s ongoing
attempts to deal with coastal erosion. Other factors affected policymaking as well, at both the
state and national levels. At a basic level of management, federal officials remained uncertain
about the topography of wetlands in the United States and how those landscapes were changing.
By the mid-1980s, there was still no comprehensive database on the country’s coastal wetlands,
and a lack of wide-ranging maps impeded federal officials’ ability to identify trends over long
periods of time and relay those trends to policymakers.60 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had
been mapping wetlands through the use of aerial photography since 1974, but the National
Wetlands Inventory (NWI) was only partially complete after a decade of work. Inconsistent data
or diverse methods for determining which areas should be documented as wetlands complicated
mapping the nation’s wetlands. The NWI had pulled information from twenty-three different
sources, which covered 242 coastal counties in twenty-two states. While the service’s efforts had
produced some useful information by the mid-1980s, much of what the FWS had collected did
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not help policymakers at the state level. Whatever trends the NWI had identified in its decade of
operation were mostly helpful for analyzing information on a national scale.61
In addition to insufficient mapping data, there were also lingering questions about
classifying wetlands and determining jurisdictional scopes. Throughout the 1980s, federal
agencies debated how to define and delineate wetlands – an issue that had carried over from
disputes in the 1970s. How an agency chose to quantify wetlands and where the borders were
relative to uplands impacted the implementation of laws such as the Clean Water Act.
Delineating and defining wetlands also affected the approval of permits, particularly at the
federal level. The agencies that were primarily responsible for identifying wetlands included: the
Army Corps of Engineers, the EPA, the FWS, and the Soil Conservation Service.62 Of those
four, the FWS used the most expansive definition of what constituted wetlands. By the end of the
decade, the agencies would sign a joint agreement about how to define wetlands – an agreement
based on the identification of three features: soil, hydrology, and vegetation. 63 However,
considerable confusion existed prior to that agreement among government officials, and ordinary
citizens often had an even less clear vision about what lands could be considered “wetlands.”
That fact manifested in legal battles over the interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s
Section 404 jurisdiction in regulating dredge and fill activities. The primary agency responsible
for enforcing Section 404 is the Army Corps of Engineers. Until 1975, the Corps had applied
Section 404 to traditionally navigable waterways. That year, the District Court for the District of
Columbia ordered the Corps to expand its scope of authority to include the “waters of the United
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States.” The ruling meant that the Corps was responsible for issuing permits for dredge and fill
activities on traditionally navigable waterways, as well as adjacent bodies of water that
influenced those waterways. Though its role has changed periodically over time, the EPA is also
responsible for the application of Section 404. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the agency
had oversight and veto authority for dredge or fill permits under Section 404.64 From the
beginning of the program, both the Corps and EPA had to contend with different understandings
of what constituted “wetlands” and when they were subject to Section 404 authority. Those
differences often resulted in tension between the two agencies. While the Corps wanted to
maintain a more traditional understanding of the scope of its authority, the EPA wanted to
expand the federal government’s ability to regulate wetlands in the U.S.65
Between 1977 and 1982, the problems of definition and regulatory authority formed the
basis of a court case that originated in Louisiana’s Avoyelles Parish. During the 1960s and
1970s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture oversaw a program that encouraged farmers to take
advantage of unused marginal lands for growing crops such as soybeans. In 1977, a landowner
named Albert Prevot began clearing trees near Long Lake for the purpose of planting soybeans.
Local hunters and fishers objected to his actions because of the impact it might have on nearby
wildlife and rallied together under the banner of the Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League (ASL). The
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) soon became involved in the controversy, and one of the
lawyers for the EDF suggested using Section 404 of the Clean Water Act to prevent Prevot from
clearing the rest of his land.66
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The ASL filed for a temporary restraining order in November 1977 in the federal Western
District of Louisiana in Alexandria. Both Prevot and the Corps maintained that the tract near
Long Lake was not wetlands, noting that the area was completely dry that year. The defendant’s
lawyers also argued that even if the area was wetlands, Prevot was not conducting dredge or fill
activities and therefore not subject to Section 404 regulations. Judge Nauman Scott was
unconvinced by those arguments and ruled in favor of the temporary restraining order while the
case proceeded through the adjudication process.67 Over the next two years, Scott heard evidence
from both sides about whether the Long Lake tract was comprised of wetlands and whether it fell
under Section 404 regulations. The head of Louisiana’s Department of Natural Resources
weighed in on the case in March 1980 and criticized the EPA for “an unlawful extension of
power…through a revision of the definition of wetlands.”68
In March 1981, Judge Scott decided that ninety percent of the lands in question contained
wetlands and ruled that “wetlands [were] not restricted to deep swamps and cypress swamp
areas.” Wetlands included areas that were inundated or saturated by water long enough to
support certain types of vegetation. Scott also decided the area fell under Section 404 authority
and ordered that no more land be cleared for farming unless the owners obtained the necessary
permits from the Corps.69 The ruling in Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League vs. Alexander did what
the EPA had hoped but what the Corps had dreaded. Judge Scott’s ruling expanded the legal
definition of wetlands, which in turn expanded the scope of Section 404 regulation. Prevot’s
lawyers appealed the decision, and the case continued on to the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court in
New Orleans. In September 1983, the appeals court upheld most of Scott’s ruling and stated the
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landowner needed a permit in order to finish clearing his lands. However, the three-judge panel
reduced the amount of land that qualified as wetlands, disagreeing with Scott’s interpretation of
how long a given parcel of land needed to be flooded to constitute wetlands. The court deferred
to the EPA’s definition and declared that eighty percent of the tract actually qualified as
wetlands.70 Still, the opinion expanded the definition of what constituted “wetlands,” and the
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League case increased the federal government’s authority to regulate
dredge and fill activities. The case also touched on the lingering conflicts between environmental
regulation and issues of land use. By classifying Prevot’s lands as “wetlands” and upholding the
Corps’ permit ruling, the courts inserted the federal government into the decisions about how a
person could make use of his property.
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion in U.S. vs. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., that expanded the federal government’s geographical jurisdiction over
wetlands and made some modifications to the practices of land use across the nation. The case
originated ten years before the ruling when a development company wanted to build a residential
neighborhood in Lake St. Clair, Michigan. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., received approval
from the town’s council and began preparations to fill eighty acres of land, some of which were
saturated by water and supported wildlife generally associated with wetlands. Citing its authority
under Section 404, the Army Corps of Engineers sued the company for failing to obtain the
necessary permits. In contrast to the Avoyelles case, there was not a question about whether the
area constituted wetlands; the question was whether those wetlands fell under Section 404
jurisdiction.71
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The courts initially ruled in favor of the Corps, stating that Riverside Bayview Homes
needed to obtain the appropriate permits to continue its fill activities. However, a federal appeals
court reversed the lower court’s opinion and sided with the company. The conflicting rulings
prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to take up the case and the high court issued its ruling on
December 4, 1985. In a unanimous decision, the justices held that Riverside Bayview Homes’
property fell under Section 404 jurisdiction and any fill activities that took place there required a
permit from the Corps. The court determined that even though the wetlands were saturated by
groundwater and not the nearby waters of Lake St. Clair, the area still interacted with adjacent
navigable waters and that it was a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent to regulate the
tract of land under Section 404. The ruling significantly expanded the Corps’ regulatory
authority and offered protection to millions of acres of wetlands that had previously been
excluded from federal oversight.
While those two court cases expanded the federal government’s ability to control
activities that could damage wetlands, there were still considerable gaps in the wetlands
regulation under Section 404. Agriculture, silviculture, and ranching activities were excluded as
long as they were not outside the scope of normal practices. Additional exemptions occurred as
the regulatory regime matured. Permit applications for dredge or fill activities at the state and
federal level experienced long delays in the first years of regulation. To speed up application
processing and alleviate complaints from businesses, the Corps developed nationwide permits
and general permits to cover a range of activities that did not affect more than ten acres of
wetlands. By 1985, processing time for permits had declined by half.72 The Corps maintained
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that its application of Section 404 was beneficial to wetlands without limiting development too
harshly. Critics of the Corps charged that the agency did not do enough. Out of approximately
11,000 applications processed annually during the early 1980s, the number of permits denied by
the Corps was about three percent. Less than one percent of applicants were required to develop
Environmental Impact Statements.73
In Louisiana, there were also exemptions in the Coastal Use Permit system for
agriculture, silviculture, and aquaculture, along with activities that were considered to have
limited impact on the wetlands. In the early 1980s, administrators in the Office of Coastal Zone
Management (OCZM) maintained the state’s permit process had a good balance between
protection and development. Seventy-five percent of permits were issued within two months, and
an official with the FWS praised the OCZM as “doing a real good job” in protecting wetlands.
However, the same official pointed out a fact that was endemic to Louisiana’s political culture.
The OCZM, like most government agencies in the state, was filled with appointees from the
governor’s office. While David Treen was supportive of wetlands protection, another governor
might not be and could appoint officials who were less willing to use the CUP system to protect
wetlands.74
The denial of permits continued to be relatively rare for federal and state officials
throughout the 1980s, and the nation was still losing 450,000 acres of wetlands annually.75 In
1987 and 1988, the Corps rejected nine out of 2,400 permit applications in Louisiana.76 Loss
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rates in Louisiana had leveled off but still remained high at an estimated forty square miles per
year. An official with the Louisiana Geological Survey (LGS) said one of the reasons losses were
not accelerating was because the most vulnerable areas had already washed away. Further, land
loss was slowing down in some areas but speeding up in others, which meant that “leveling off”
was an overall trend.77 Scientists who studied Louisiana’s erosion problem also cautioned that
the slowdown had less to do with an effective regulatory scheme and more to do with reduced
activity in the wetlands by the oil and gas industry.78
Wetlands and Policy Developments in the mid-1980s
The gaps in regulatory applications were serious problems for states such as Louisiana,
but there were some positive developments in the mid-1980s. In 1985, Congress took action to
correct some of the policies that had produced conflicting results in the management of wetlands.
That year the Food Security Act (FSA) became law and was designed to increase the value of
growth per unit of crop, reduce production costs, and make American commodities more
competitive on the world market. The FSA also contained conservation policies to discourage
draining wetlands for agricultural purposes. Known as the “swampbuster” provisions, the new
policies served two purposes – control the amount of land in production and reduce the use of
ecologically sensitive areas as cropland. Farmers who converted wetlands to cropland after
December 1985 became ineligible to participate in other agricultural programs that subsidized
their endeavors. The swampbuster provision applied to over five million acres of wetlands and
addressed one of the chief weaknesses in the nation’s wetland policy – the problem of
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contradictory programs.79 Agricultural conversion was the main reason wetlands had disappeared
nationally, and the federal government had encouraged those conversions by subsidizing farmers
who drained land. By reducing the amount of federal aid to farmers who grew crops on former
wetlands, the national government corrected part of that long-term problem.80
A second important development that took place in the mid-1980s was the passage of the
Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, which had contained the section that led to the
establishment of the Bayou Sauvage refuge.81 The law also encouraged states to use grants from
the Land and Water Conservation Fund to purchase wetlands acreage for the purposes of
preservation. The FWS administered other programs that led to the acquisition of wetlands for
habitat purposes, but the EWRA was the first effort to specifically emphasize purchasing
wetlands for the sake of preserving them as unique ecosystems.82 Congress passed the EWRA in
recognition that federal regulatory programs did not protect all wetlands in the United States and
that there should be a mechanism in place to preserve areas that were rare, diverse, or in danger
of being lost. The EWRA also required states to recognize that wetlands provided public
benefits. After 1988, each state with wetlands would be required to submit a wetlands priority
plan as part of its outdoor recreation planning to the Department of the Interior.83 States without
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approved plans would be ineligible to receive funding from the LWCF, a move that signaled
congressional intent to encourage state protection of wetlands as unique habitats.84
Louisiana’s Losses Continue
Even though laws such as the EWRA improved the preservation and protection of the
nation’s wetlands, Louisiana still continued to experience land loss as the state struggled with
funding issues and policy implementation. In 1984, the Department of Natural Resources lobbied
for a $41 million proposal to nourish Louisiana’s deteriorating barrier islands. Sherwood
Gagliano sharply criticized the agency’s plan as being inadequate and ineffective. He asserted
that the DNR’s proposal did little to help the state’s interior wetlands and was too limited in
comparison to the scope of the problem. “Fifteen years ago, our situation was desperate. Today,
it is at the catastrophic level…At best, we are faced with a salvage operation, and even that
salvage operation is going to cost billions of dollars.” The Louisiana Geological Survey, which
was leading the development of a master restoration plan that relied on nourishing barrier
islands, countered Gagliano by pointing out the plan was an initial step in addressing the state’s
land losses. There were other projects in the works, but barrier island restoration needed to take
place first. Not only would the nourishment help the coastal ecosystem, the preservation of
Louisiana’s barrier islands would ensure that state’s claims to oil and gas revenues did not erode
away with the coastline.85
Still, Gagliano’s criticisms proved to have considerable merit. The LGS plan added six
projects to the ones initially proposed the Coastal Protection Task Force in 1982, for a total of
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twelve restoration or protection projects.86 The first phase of the master plan was scheduled to
last five years and focus on barrier island nourishment, as well as the freshwater diversion
projects that had already been approved. Phase II of the master plan would include beach
nourishment and the stabilization of dunes.87 The level of funding needed to complete projects
slated for 1985-1986 was almost $50 million. Another $30 million would be required to
complete the first phase by the end of the decade – amounts that far exceeded the funds available
in the CEPTF.88 Though the legislature approved the LGS plan in 1985, the program experienced
limited implementation because of funding issues and bureaucratic delays. Barrier island
restoration was extremely expensive and the costs were not seen as worthwhile given the limited
benefits to inland marsh restoration.89 However, the state continued to base its restoration efforts
on the LGS plan through 1988, though marsh management eventually became a more prominent
feature.90
Other funding issues presented additional challenges to the protection of Louisiana’s
wetlands. While the state struggled to sort out its own financing issues regarding restoration
projects, the Reagan administration pushed to reduce the amount of grant money that states
received through the Coastal Zone Management Act. Officials contended that the grants had
been to help states establish programs, but the costs of administering them should be borne by
state governments. Louisianans such as John Breaux and Sherwood Gagliano did not want to see
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the amount of federal aid coming into the state decline. Part of the funding for Louisiana’s
regulatory program for coastal activities came from the money provided by CZMA grants – in
1984, $1.5 million and in 1985, $2 million.91 In July 1986, Gagliano argued that Louisiana could
not save its wetlands by restricting development alone and reiterated that restoration efforts were
necessary to replace the marshes that had already been destroyed. The coastal expert also
stressed a point that was becoming increasingly emphasized by political officials such as Breaux
– federal money was absolutely vital to save the state’s wetlands. Louisiana was incapable of
funding such a broad, long-term endeavor without national assistance.92
Breaux intended to bring federal dollars to Louisiana and introduced legislation in
summer of 1986 for that purpose. His bill required the Secretary of the Interior to identify coastal
wetlands that were in jeopardy of loss or serious degradation and then choose ten areas that were
the most threatened. Within five years, the secretary would have to develop a plan to save those
designated areas and work with the Army Corps of Engineers on implementation. The federal
government would bear seventy-five percent of development and construction costs, while states
were accountable for the remaining twenty-five percent. Breaux’s goal was to reduce the amount
of time that Corps projects normally took, as well as ensuring restoration efforts in Louisiana had
greater funding. The federal government would pay up to $30 million per year for each project
under the representative’s proposal.93
When Breaux gave a speech on the House floor in support of his bill, he stressed that land
losses in Louisiana could be directly attributed to federal policies such as those related to flood
control and navigational improvements. He also pointed out that the presence of oil and gas
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pipelines had exacerbated salt water intrusion in the wetlands. Because the nation benefited from
those activities, Breaux argued that the country had a responsibility to help restore an ecosystem
that benefitted the United States as a whole.94 His bill never made it out of the House, but Breaux
re-introduced his plan in March 1987 after his election to the U.S. Senate.95 Later that year, the
junior senator proposed another piece of legislation to create permanent funding for coastal
restoration projects. The Wetlands Enhancement and Turfgrass Research Fund would have
provided states such as Louisiana with grants from a percentage of taxes taken out of the
Highway Trust Fund. At the time, the state was getting about $2 million per year from the
Department of the Interior that could be used for restoration projects. Breaux emphasized once
again that the federal government’s policies had helped create the state’s severe wetlands erosion
problem and that the nation had a responsibility to help repair some of the damage.96
Funding uncertainty mixed with bureaucratic mismanagement in Louisiana as the decade
drew to a close. In 1988, workers at the LGS came under scrutiny over their handling of grant
money that came out of the state’s wetlands trust fund. Employees in the LGS were accused of
using the funding to pay for personal research or trips to academic conferences that did not
directly relate to state contracts for coastal erosion studies. Other concerns noted by the
Department of Natural Resources included studies that had been ordered but never delivered to
the appropriate authorities. The director of the LGS, Charles “Chip” Groat assured DNR officials
that his staff had been conducting research to benefit Louisiana’s land loss programs and that the
requested studies had simply been misplaced.97 However, the use of CEPTF revenues became a
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moot point the following month when the state’s deficit crisis led the Roemer administration to
eliminate the trust fund to help alleviate budgetary shortfalls.98 The move left Louisiana without
a specific method of paying for concerted coastal restoration efforts, even as the state’s coast
continued to erode.
A Stronger Foundation for Protection and Restoration?
In 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency along with the Conservation Foundation
convened the National Wetlands Policy Forum (NWPF) to discuss the establishment of goals for
the country in relation to wetlands.99 Representatives from state and federal agencies, business
interests, and conservation groups worked together on a report that was issued to Congress in
1988. The report criticized the nation’s existing policies and laws as being “too cumbersome and
the responsibilities too diffuse” to effectively protect the nation’s wetlands. To enhance
protection, the report encouraged legislators to add wetlands restoration and creation to the
mission statements of civil works agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers or the Soil
Conservation Service. The NWPF also advocated for a national policy regarding wetlands
restoration and the establishment of trust funds to help pay for such efforts. Forum members
drew special attention to the problem of coastal erosion in Louisiana, a fact that was welcomed
by public officials in the state. Governor Roemer said he hoped the increased attention would
bring more federal funds to Louisiana for restoration projects.100
The NWPF’s efforts to draw attention to the loss of wetlands became part of the
presidential campaign in 1988. Drawing on the forum’s discussions, George H.W. Bush
embraced an approach to wetland management that came to be referred to as “no net loss.”
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Federal agencies such as the EPA also embraced “no net loss.”101 The idea behind “no net loss”
was that the loss of wetlands could not be completely stopped. However, restoration and
mitigation efforts could make up for lost lands and the result would be no overall losses for the
country going forward. “No net loss” meant that public policies could still support development
in or near wetlands as long as there were plans to ensure that other wetlands would be protected,
restored, or created.102
On the surface, “no net loss” seemed like a positive policy goal, especially when public
officials voiced support. The EPA’s administrator said the policy would send a “clear message
that wetlands protection [was] a top agency priority.”103 The reality of “no net loss” was more
complicated because the precise meaning of “loss” could be interpreted differently. For example,
“loss” could refer to loss of acreage or loss of function depending on who was interpreting the
phrase.104 Further, implementing a policy of “no net loss” brought up questions of where
restrictions or restoration would take place. Would development in a state such as Louisiana
have to limit economic or industrial development more than a state with far fewer wetlands?
How would states and the federal government share the costs of implementing “no net loss”?105
The answers to those questions remained unclear even as federal officials adopted “no net loss”
upon Bush’s election as a guiding principle for wetlands policy.
Despite the growing interest and ongoing efforts to solve the nation’s problems of
wetlands loss, the situation in Louisiana remained dire. In September 1988, the Times-Picayune
lamented the lack of significant action taken to address coastal erosion and said Louisiana
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needed to “draw the state’s scattered coastal restoration programs together under one highranking official.” The newspaper agreed with state Senator Ben Bagert of New Orleans who
argued that the federal government was reluctant to get involved in Louisiana’s coastal
restoration efforts because of fragmented policies and the “maze of state agencies.” Bagert said
that “state officials must be able to tell the feds, ‘Here’s our policy. Here’s our plan. Here’s
where we’re going. Now help us get the money we need to save our coast.’”106
Bureaucratic disorganization was a major issue for Louisiana’s restoration efforts at the
end of the decade, and so was the continued lack of funding. In April 1989, the Roemer
administration hoped to pass a tax reform package that included the establishment of a wetlands
trust fund. Voters defeated the taxation changes, which also had the effect of rejecting the
creation of a new trust fund. After the election, Bagert decided to tackle the funding issue
separately and introduced legislation in May that contained a constitutional amendment to set up
a trust fund on its own. Bagert crafted his proposal to help shield future funding from being
dependent “on the personality of the governor” by giving the trust fund constitutional protection.
The state senator’s bill provided for the establishment of a wetlands preservation authority in
order to reduce some of the administrative confusion associated with coastal management in the
state.107
In July, both houses of Louisiana’s legislature approved the constitutional amendment
proposed by Bagert with no dissenting votes.108 Known as the Coastal Wetlands and Restoration
Act or Act 6, the legislation set up two new administrative offices – the Office of Coastal
Activities in the Governor’s Office and the Office of Coastal Restoration and Management in the
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Department of Natural Resources. Another entity created by Act 6 was a commission comprised
of state agencies to oversee the state’s restoration plans. Finally, Act 6 established the Wetlands
Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund (WCRTF), which would receive $5 million to $25
million annually and dedicate those funds to coastal restoration projects.109 In October 1989,
Louisiana voters approved Act 6 as a constitutional amendment by a margin of two-to-one.110
Act 6 was a critical step in Louisiana’s efforts to combat coastal erosion. Proponents of
the amendment saw the creation of a constitutionally protected source of funding as necessary to
secure federal support for restoration works in the state.111 Both public officials and
environmental groups continued to stress that Louisiana was incapable of handling its erosion
problems without federal assistance. An adviser to Governor Roemer estimated that the state
might need as much as $1 billion dollars for restoration projects and said the WCRTF was a
“sign of good faith” to national officials that Louisiana was serious about preserving and
restoring its wetlands. Aside from committing to the Caernarvon Freshwater Diversion in
Plaquemines Parish, the federal government had been reluctant to dedicate more substantial
funds to restoration projects. Officials had been uncertain whether Louisiana would be able or
willing to provide matching funds, but state politicians believed Act 6 would change that.112
Environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund concurred with that position and
maintained that the federal government had a duty to help Louisiana fight the loss of its
wetlands.113 The money set aside for the WCRTF was important, especially since the allocations
would be constitutionally protected and not subject to budget cuts as the previous trust fund had
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been. Still, even the maximum allotment of $25 million per year was not going to be enough to
address coastal land loss.
Conclusion
During the 1980s, state and federal efforts to address the deterioration of the nation’s
wetlands were affected by debates about the proper role of government in regulation, funding
issues, disputes over the scope of regulatory jurisdiction, and weaknesses in enforcement. While
there were some gains in expanding protection of wetlands, the piecemeal nature of
policymaking failed to bring an end to the rapid erosion of Louisiana’s coastline. Running as an
undercurrent beneath the administrative and regulatory challenges of wetlands policymaking was
the issue of land-use management. Laws such as the CBRA and the Farm Security Act of 1985
had used slightly different mechanisms to accomplish the same goal – influence land use without
undermining the rights of property owners or economic development. In Louisiana, the Coastal
Use Permit system had sought to achieve a similar result – regulate the use of the state’s
wetlands without stopping economic growth. The CUP program reflected the multiple-use
management strategy and was a way to allow development while also trying to stem the loss of
wetlands in the state.
Fundamental shifts in land use were rarer, though they could have a significant impact
when pursued. The creation of the Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge was an instance
when public and private entities agreed to disregard land-use practices that prioritized economic
and residential growth over ecosystem protection. By establishing the refuge, the state and
federal government ensured that future growth in New Orleans would not spill into the vital
ecosystem of Bayou Sauvage. Yet the refuge was the exception to the rule of persistent
expansion into natural spaces, and the limitation of activities through regulatory permit systems
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had slowed losses rather than stopped them. In the absence of fundamentally altering widespread
land-use practices or abandoning the strategy of multiple-use planning, officials and citizens
alike recognized that Louisiana was going to need another strategy to save its shrinking coast.
Throughout the 1980s, congressional leaders had shown increasing interest in helping protect the
nation’s wetlands, but there was lingering uncertainty about how much the federal government
should get involved in Louisiana’s coastal erosion problem. In late summer 1989, Congress
voted down bills from Senators Breaux and Johnston that would have created a source of funding
for restoration projects in Louisiana.114 Implementing projects to restore the state’s vanishing
wetlands seemed out of reach without federal dollars. Help was on the way, but it would take
some astute political maneuvering from Louisiana’s congressional delegation to secure national
assistance.
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CHAPTER 5: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990s
“A Part of the Yule Tradition in These Parts”
In 1987, a marine sciences professor at LSU convinced officials in St. Charles Parish to
let him build “brush fences” near the Bonnet Carré spillway as a marsh restoration project. The
fences were modeled on similar structures that John Day had seen in the Netherlands during a
research trip there. Day and a group of state contractors sunk wooden posts into shallow marsh
areas, strung fencing between the posts, and wove willow saplings into the wire mesh. The
purpose of the project was for the “brush fences” to capture sediments flowing through the
wetlands and allow mudflats to accumulate over time to encourage vegetation growth. Initially,
Day’s progress was slow and covered little ground because weaving the saplings was not
particularly efficient. The following year an employee with Louisiana’s Department of Natural
Resources suggested that Day use old Christmas trees instead of willow saplings, an idea which
yielded much greater success.1 Over the next several years, the project of building “brush fences”
with Christmas trees expanded from St. Charles into other parishes, including East Baton Rouge,
St. Bernard, Jefferson, and Orleans.2 Supported by grants from the state’s Wetlands Conservation
and Restoration Trust Fund, volunteers collaborated with local businesses, charities, and public
officials to collect and transport discarded Christmas trees to various sites along the coast.3 The
program was extremely popular in Louisiana, and the Times-Picayune declared that conservation
project was “rapidly becoming part of the Yule tradition in these parts.”4
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By the late 1990s, eight thousand volunteers had gathered and disbursed almost one
million Christmas trees to locations such as Hammock Lake in St. Mary Parish and Bayou
Sauvage near New Orleans. Even the federal government contributed to the program when the
White House sent seventy of its Christmas trees to Louisiana in 1997.5 The Christmas tree fences
worked by trapping sediments as water flowed through them and reducing wave action for areas
behind the structures.6 In 1998, officials in the DNR estimated that thirty-eight thousand feet of
fencing had been built along Louisiana’s marshy shoreline and that the project had benefited 250
acres of wetlands.7 While the Christmas tree program received praise from public and private
organizations, the creation or protection of several hundred acres of marsh was a “really and
truly a drop in the bucket” compared to the amount of land that Louisiana was losing every year. 8
Still, officials believed that involving the citizens of the state in restoration efforts was a worthy
goal and that the attention generated from adding White House Christmas trees to the program
could raise awareness of Louisiana’s plight. An increase in national interest could lead to greater
financial assistance from the federal government, something that was desperately needed to fund
a restoration program that was on par with the loss of wetlands.9
The Christmas Tree Fence Program was representative of wetlands policy developments
that took place during the 1990s. Government officials and the public sought to reduce the
erosion of wetlands while also rebuilding some of the marshy areas that had already sunk into the
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Gulf of Mexico. Yet even with dedicated funds from the federal government flowing into
Louisiana after 1990, the money was “really and truly a drop in the bucket” compared to what
the state actually needed. Administrative disorder and piecemeal policymaking persisted, which
continued to undermine conservation and restoration efforts. For much of the decade, when
projects did receive funding, there was a lack of coordination to ensure that each proposal was
part of a broader vision for coastal management. Additionally, many of the restoration efforts
were small and often limited in their impacts. Like the Christmas tree fences, the projects did
provide some benefits for the wetlands, but they were simply not enough to fundamentally alter
the pattern of loss. This chapter traces the creation of Louisiana’s first significant coastal
restoration program in partnership with the federal government, as well as some of the other
issues that affected policy developments – including the ongoing issue of land use in the coastal
zone. Officials attempted to address funding problems and disjointed administration during the
1990s, but their efforts met with varying degrees of success as differences in opinion persisted
about how much of the coast should be protected or restored.
The Breaux Act and Other Policy Developments
During the summer of 1990, Louisiana’s Senators, John Breaux and J. Bennett Johnston,
sponsored a bill that aimed to bring federal support to coastal restoration in Louisiana. The bill
created a task force that would be comprised of state and federal officials, which would select
restoration projects to help slow the loss of Louisiana’s wetlands. Funding of the projects would
be split between the federal government and Louisiana, at seventy-five percent and twenty-five
percent respectively. There was also an option that allowed the state to reduce its cost-shore
portion to fifteen percent if Louisiana developed a “no net loss” program to help manage the
coastal wetlands. Both Breaux and Johnston considered the passage of the bill as an indication
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that the federal government recognized it had a role to play in helping address Louisiana’s
wetlands losses. However, the bill did not specify how the task force or projects would be
funded. To ensure the bill passed, Breaux had to remove a provision that would have assigned
five percent of offshore oil and gas revenues to wetlands restoration. President Bush opposed the
funding proposal because he maintained it would have reduced the amount of revenues going
into the treasury and thereby increased the federal deficit.10 Representatives from Mississippi and
Michigan also objected to Breaux’s plan to funnel nearly $75 million a year to Louisiana; they
wanted some of the money for their own states.11
In order to get meaningful legislation for Louisiana, Breaux needed to get a dedicated
funding source for wetlands restoration, in addition to getting a corresponding bill passed in the
House. Over a month after the Senate approved his legislation, the House authorized $85 million
for wetlands protection and restoration as part of a $3.6 billion water resources development bill.
Under the House’s amendment, Louisiana would get sixty-eight percent of the funding, while the
rest of the money went to other states and waterfowl management programs. Louisiana’s
representatives had increased the amount of money in the overall program to ensure the state still
got the same amount of funding that was authorized by the Senate version. Still, there was no
dedicated source of funding for the wetlands program, which meant Congress would have to
appropriate money every year – a fact which caused the Bush administration to continue its
objections to the proposal.12
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The problem with funding Breaux’s bill was an ongoing issue for wetland protection and
restoration in Louisiana at both the state and federal level. During the 1980s, the state received
about $2 million a year from the Department of Interior that could be used for coastal restoration
projects, but there was no major source of dedicated funding.13 The state’s first wetland trust
fund created during the Treen administration had suffered from administrative difficulties and
been cut during the late 1980s due to budget constraints. Louisiana’s voters had approved the
creation of a new trust fund in 1989, one that would be constitutionally protected and not easily
subjected to cuts if there were another budget crisis. Still, the maximum amount of funding that
would go into the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund was $25 million per year.14
Despite the state’s initiatives to fund restoration with Act 6, federal officials were reluctant to
commit money.
A lack of national exposure for the problem and Louisiana’s unwillingness to adequately
fund wetlands restoration both contributed to the reluctance. The reasons were clear when the
state’s situation was contrasted to that of the Florida Everglades. During the 1980s and 1990s,
$3.2 billion in federal aid went to Florida to help the state restore and protect its southern
wetlands. Comparatively, the nation sent about $600 million to Louisiana in the 1990s. Florida’s
political leaders had engaged in an aggressive campaign to get federal money for its wetland
losses, but Louisiana had no national counterpart in the early 1990s.15 Though Louisiana’s
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congressional delegation advocated strongly for federal aid to the state, efforts to get money
from offshore oil revenues, Alaskan oil revenues, or general revenues had all failed. There was
still the lingering sense that the state’s wetlands losses were a Louisiana problem and not one
that deserved national assistance.16
Senator Breaux was determined to get money for Louisiana’s restoration program, and he
saw an opportunity in fall 1990 to secure a dedicated source of funding for the state. When the
Senate Finance Committee debated the merits of a $500 billion tax package aimed at deficit
reduction, Breaux quietly lobbied members of the committee to include an amendment that
would siphon off a portion of an increased gasoline tax for wetlands restoration. The majority of
the money from the tax hike would go to Louisiana, with a smaller portion going to other states
in need of restoration money. Agreeing to include such an amendment in a deficit reduction
package was unusual for the committee, but Breaux convinced the other senators to do so. He
characterized the move as “the most significant piece of legislation we’ve passed in regard to
saving wetlands in Louisiana.” According to the provisions of the amendment, the total amount
of revenues from the tax would come to about $275 million over five years, assuming the House
added a comparable measure to its version of the deficit bill. There was no guarantee that would
happen, and there was also a chance that the amendment could be scrapped entirely when the
two chambers reconciled the bill. However, Breaux reasoned that the measure would get little
attention in a package priced at over $500 billion and said he was “very confident” that the
increased gasoline tax would be in the final legislation.17
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The senator proved to be correct. Both the House and Senate approved the deficit
reduction bill without much discussion of Breaux’s amendment. Though the House version had
lowered the gasoline tax from nine and a half cents per gallon to five cents, Louisiana would get
about $35 million per year and another $15 million per year would go to restoration programs in
other states. The funds to be used for Louisiana’s wetlands restoration would come from money
generated by placing a tax on gasoline for small motors such as lawnmowers or chainsaws. The
guarantee of steady funding was a major victory for Louisiana, but there still needed to be a legal
mechanism to direct how the money was spent. Breaux accomplished that by attaching his
proposal for a wetlands task force and the authority to administer restoration funds to another bill
dealing with the problem of zebra mussels in the Great Lakes.18
Signed by President Bush in November 1990, the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection
and Restoration Act was more than a symbolic gesture in the effort to protect Louisiana’s
wetlands.19 There had been talk of protecting or restoring Louisiana’s wetlands for years, but the
CWPPRA was the first time such talk had been placed into legislation at the federal level.
Perhaps even more significantly, the funding was dedicated; the state would not have to ask
Congress for money every fiscal year. Still, there were limits to the Breaux Act, both financially
and politically. Though the money that would be provided by the CWPPRA and the state’s own
trust fund represented a considerable advancement, the estimate for a fully funded restoration
program was several billion dollars in the early 1990s.20 Louisiana officials hailed the Breaux
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Act as a sign the federal government cared about the state’s disappearing wetlands, but the
senator’s success had relied considerably on his legislative savvy. Breaux recognized an
opportunity to get funding through the Senate’s complicated budget process and calculated that
his colleagues in Congress would not oppose a relatively minor spending proposal in the context
of a $500 billion deficit reduction package.21 There did not appear to be widespread support in
Congress or the executive branch to commit billions of dollars to coastal restoration in
Louisiana, a fact which continued to influence the implementation of the state’s wetlands
restoration projects for years to come.
Despite its limitations, the Breaux Act established a financial and administrative basis
for restoration projects to move forward in a more coherent fashion. One of the main functions of
the act was to bring some order to the piecemeal and fractured administrative regime that had
troubled wetlands policy in Louisiana since the 1970s. The CWPPRA created a task force that
would be comprised of officials from the state of Louisiana and five federal agencies – the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce. Each agency’s secretary would
appoint a representative to serve on the task force, and every year the group would select a
certain number of restoration projects to be funded by the Breaux Act. The federal government
would fund the Priority Project List (PPL) at seventy-five percent per project, while Louisiana
would use money from its WCRTF to pay for the remaining twenty-five percent.22 Additionally,
the Breaux Act encouraged Louisiana to devise a conservation plan that included the goal of “no
net loss” for wetlands related to future development along the coast. The two plans –
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conservation to prevent future losses and restoration to address ongoing losses – were intended to
be complementary with regulation and allow for more comprehensive management of the
coast.23
There were other positive legislative actions in the early 1990s that contributed to the
protection and management of coastal wetlands, both at the federal and state levels. Signed in
November 1990, the Coastal Zone Reauthorization Act Amendments added new provisions to
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. In the twenty years since the CZMA had been in
effect, the federal government had invested $700 million in coastal states by the way of grants
for policy development and implementation. Congress decided to continue the CZMA program
and also added two new features that were intended to help states protect their coasts, while still
allowing for economic development. One of the amendments created a pollution control program
similar to one contained in the Clean Water Act. The legislation targeted “nonpoint sources” of
pollution, which included runoff from agricultural and forestry lands. Fertilizer or animal waste
from farms or commercial forests could have a negative impact on wetlands when river waters
made their way into sensitive estuaries. A second amendment in the CZMA re-authorization
established a new grant program that encouraged states to address at least one of eight “issues of
national importance” with new policies or regulations. The identified issues included wetland
protection and restoration, reducing development in high-risk areas such as floodplains, and
increasing public access to coastal resources.24
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At the state level, Louisiana passed two pieces of legislation in 1990 and 1991 to help
address the continued erosion of coastal wetlands. The first was Act 1040, which required
mandatory mitigation for any activity carried out under a permit on the coast. That meant if a
developer unavoidably damaged wetlands on a project, he or she would be required to fund
mitigation efforts in another area. A second law passed in 1991 mandated that non-contaminated
dredged material be used by developers for restoration, enhancement, or creation of wetlands.
Both laws were meant to counter the potential harm caused by development on the coast while
continuing to allow multiple uses of the coast.25
As with the Breaux Act, there were limitations to each new law. Under Act 1040,
mitigation was required for activities that took place in vegetative wetlands and were carried out
under a coastal use permit. That meant that activities that caused losses in forested swamplands
or activities that were exempt from the CUP system fell outside the scope of mandatory
mitigation.26 Likewise, developers had to use dredged materials for “beneficial use” only when
their projects excavated more than 500,000 cubic yards of material.27 The laws introduced more
tools for Louisiana to manage or restore its wetlands, but like most wetlands legislation, there
were gaps in protection. The laws also maintained a basic historical trend regarding land-use
practices – development was still permissible in the state’s wetlands. Regulations limited the
scope of activities but did not fully stopping the alteration of the coast.
Toward More Comprehensive Management
In addition to establishing a restoration agenda for Louisiana’s wetlands, the Breaux Act
was also designed to facilitate a more comprehensive approach for coastal management – to
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blend regulation and restoration into an overall strategy. The state took a step toward that goal
with the publication of the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration Plan (LCWRP) in 1993.
Authored by the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, the plan
articulated two key objectives.28 The first was “to sustain the ecological value and economic
productivity” of Louisiana’s wetlands, while the second was to “accomplish this by maintaining
and improving critical wetland functions.”29 According to the task force, the state’s wetlands
were ecologically important because they functioned as habitats for fish, wildlife, and plants. The
wetlands were considered economically productive because the natural resources found there had
commercial value. The wetlands were also integral in protecting billions of dollars’ worth of
infrastructure investment, providing opportunities for recreational activities, and playing a role in
the cultural heritage of the state.30 Without a healthy wetlands ecosystem, the economic
productivity of the region was threatened. However, the social and economic developments in
the area were not going to be undone and trying to minimize damage had been the basis of the
Coastal Use Permit program.31
That viewpoint was not new in discussions regarding the management of Louisiana’s
coastal zone, but the LCWRP departed from previous proposals with its commitment to support
the “natural processes” of the wetlands. In essence, the task force envisioned that conservation
and restoration projects would work with the deltaic system to build a sustainable coast. To
accomplish that goal, the LCWRP recommended developing conservation projects to “keep what
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we have” and restoration projects to “offset or reverse the remaining losses by wetland creation
and shoreline restoration.”32 Water, sediments, and barrier islands all worked together to build
wetlands, and projects should be geared to encouraging those natural features to create new land
when possible. By dividing the state’s coast into nine hydrologic basins across twenty parishes,
the task force recognized that the strategies in one area might not work in other areas and that
there needed to be some flexibility in setting priorities. The deltaic plain’s loss of marshy
swamps was a different scenario than the coastal erosion taking place on the Chenier Plain’s
mudflats. The LCWRP also recognized the need for short-term and long-term planning.
Vegetation planting was something that could be done for immediate benefit, but building land
on a large scale would require officials to plan for major projects such as freshwater diversions.
The LCWRP included specific project recommendations as well as a broader vision for
management, and the task force estimated that approximately 203,000 acres could be protected
or restored over two decades.33
One year after the Breaux Act task force released its plan, the state of Louisiana came out
with its own policy suggestions for coastal restoration and protection. In a letter dated August 10,
1994, Governor Edwin Edwards outlined the main goals for the state’s “environmental-economic
blueprint.” Broadly speaking, he said Louisiana wanted to encourage a “sustainable coastal zone
and an economic base for future generations.”34 More specifically, the state wanted to stop the
net loss of wetlands on the coast by harnessing the natural processes that had originally built land
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to preserve or create wetlands. Restoration projects were meant to complement the regulatory
scheme in place since the late 1970s.35
The state blueprint was similar to the LCWRP in that each contained policies meant to
stop losses with short-term projects, while also working toward land building as a long-term
goal. Both also emphasized the importance of protecting economic development along with
ecological sustainability. However, the two recommendations departed in terms of the time scale;
the LCWRP looked at projects and restoration over a twenty-year period, whereas the state’s
blueprint extended its timescale to fifty years. Secondly, the two plans differed in which natural
processes to emphasize, with the state advocating more heavily for freshwater diversions from
the Mississippi River. Finally, the blueprint wanted to approach management from a “major
natural system” standpoint instead of the hydrologic basins proposed by the LCWRP. Because of
the differences between the plans from the task force and the state, the Office of Coastal
Activities in the Governor’s Office suggested that the two be consolidated into a single
comprehensive plan.36 Until that consolidation took place though, the LCWRP guided the
Breaux Act task force in making decisions about which restoration projects to pursue.37
Policy Challenges in the 1990s – Classification and Compensation
After two decades of policy development, the state of Louisiana had pieced together a
regulatory and restoration framework to address the loss of wetlands on the coast. By 1994, there
seemed to be good reason for optimism that Louisiana was on its way to slowing down the rate
of wetlands losses. Yet there were still significant challenges to contend with, including
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continued disagreements about the delineation of wetlands and addressing competing interests on
the coast. To clear up ongoing discrepancies in classifying and mapping wetlands, the Corps, the
EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Soil Conservation Service published an
interagency manual for defining and delineating wetlands in 1989.38 The manual contained some
new proposals for determining which landscapes constituted wetlands. The expanded criteria for
assessing wetlands meant that some areas which previously been outside the scope of Section
404 would be brought under the regulatory authority of the Corps.39
Farmers, landowners, and oil and gas representatives complained to the Bush
administration that the new manual would bring “millions of acres under first time federal
regulation” and that could mean that land was “off-limits to development.”40 In summer 1991,
Bush proposed revisions to the 1989 manual to ease the potential restrictions on private
landowners and businesses. His proposals were widely condemned by groups such as the
Environmental Defense Fund. Jim Tripp, who served as the EDF’s general counsel, criticized the
administration’s recommendations in August 1991. “This wetlands destruction plan is a mockery
of President Bush’s campaign pledge of ‘no-net-loss’ of wetlands. The policy will remove a third
of our nation’s wetlands from federal protection and will put these precious resources in terminal
condition.” White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater dismissed the idea that the new guidelines
substantially reduced wetlands protection and said that the proposals simply rejected the premise
that “every muddle puddle is a wetland.” Officials in Louisiana were generally supportive of
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Bush’s proposals in 1991 because they believed the 1989 manual had limited the rights of
landowners to develop their properties.41
Opponents of Bush’s proposals countered assertions that the 1989 manual harmed
property owners or that the permit process was too cumbersome. For example, in Louisiana,
there were twenty general permits that covered minor activities in wetlands, which meant most
landowners did not need to apply for an individual permit. When an individual permit was
necessary, the Army Corps of Engineers in the New Orleans district approved far more than they
denied. In 1990, only one percent of the 1,255 applications for individual permits was rejected.
Long delays in processing times were also not a widespread problem. Between 1989 and 1990,
three-fourths of permits were approved within one hundred and twenty days. Only two percent of
permits took longer than a year to be evaluated and those were typically related to large
projects.42 While very few of the wetlands on Louisiana’s coast would be affected by the
administration’s proposals, wetlands further inland were at risk of losing protection. Forested
wetlands were not always inundated year round and might be excluded from regulatory
oversight.43
Central to the debate surrounding the delineation of wetlands were the rights of property
owners and how regulations could affect the use of private lands. Home builders, landowners,
and business interests such as forestry groups tended to favor less strict regulations like those
proposed by President Bush. In contrast, environmental groups tended to favor more robust
regulations like those in the 1989 federal manual. Despite the aggressive lobbying by the state’s
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representatives for passage and support of the Breaux Act, members of the Louisiana
congressional delegation wanted to see regulations that favored property owners and curbed the
enforcement power of federal agencies when it came to policies overseeing wetlands. In fact,
some members of Louisiana’s delegation went further than the Bush administration in trying to
reduce the amount of regulation that applied to wetlands.
In April 1991, Senator Breaux met with a homebuilders’ association in St. Tammany
Parish to discuss how regulations had affected economic development in southern Louisiana.
Breaux criticized the use of the Clean Water Act to determine the course of land development
and said that Congress never intended for the CWA to be a “land management tool.” He also said
that because the Corps of Engineers spent so much effort on “marginal wetlands,” the agency did
not have the time or resources to protect more vulnerable wetlands. The senator announced his
plan to introduce legislation to create a new system of wetlands classification, one that would be
aimed at reducing the scope of regulations carried out by federal agencies.44
The legislation that Breaux announced was intended to be a companion to the bill that
had been introduced in the House of Representatives by Louisiana Democrats Billy Tauzin and
Jimmy Hayes.45 Hayes and Tauzin concurred with Breaux and said that federal bureaucrats had
overstepped their authority by using the Clean Water Act to limit development in wetlands. The
new classification system in both bills would continue protecting places that were thought of as
“traditional” wetlands – zones such as swamps or marshes that were inundated most of the year.
Areas that were only seasonally wet or rarely wet on an annual basis would be less likely to
receive federal protection. Scientists and environmental groups were quick to point out that
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wetlands were complex ecosystems and did not always look like the bayous of southern
Louisiana, but that all wetlands played critical roles in habitat, water filtration, or storm
protection.46
The classification system proposed by the Hayes-Tauzin bill and the Breaux bill created
three categories of wetlands – A through C. Wetlands in Category A would receive the greatest
amount of protection, while wetlands in Category C would not be subject to any federal
regulations. There were also limits to how many wetlands could be included in Category A in a
given area. In Louisiana, no more than twenty percent of a parish could be classified as Category
A wetlands, and the Louisiana Farm Bureau said if the proposed legislation was enacted, over
four million acres of new land would open up for crop cultivation. Environmental groups such as
the Sierra Club in Louisiana said such a classification scheme was unnecessary as agricultural
activities were already exempt from regulation and that the Hayes-Tauzin bill would be more
beneficial to large land developers.47 In October 1991, a representative from the Coalition to
Restore Coastal Louisiana echoed those assessments on a trip to Washington D.C., and stated,
“Wetlands have prime development potential because you can buy it cheap and sell it for a lot of
money and then the builders, mortgage bankers and real estate interests get out. And when it
goes under the water, it is the rest of us taxpayers who pay for the damage.”48
The issue of wetlands classification simmered for the remainder of Bush’s term, and in
November 1992, the administration indicated it would take no further action on the matter.
President Bush charged the National Academy of Sciences with evaluating the regulatory

Rick Raber, “Wetlands Definition Spells Trouble for Congress,” Times-Picayune, April 15, 1991, sec. A, NB LA
(9104150074).
47
Bob Anderson, “Wetlands Issues Key to Louisiana,” Advocate, November 3, 1991, sec. B, NB LA (1526548).
48
Bruce Alpert, “Coalition Vows Wetlands Battle,” Times-Picayune, October 2, 1991, sec. A, NB LA
(9110020185).
46

177

changes brought about by the 1989 manual and then report their recommendations to the next
administration.49 In April 1993, seven southern senators lobbied President Bill Clinton to ease
restrictions and give greater leeway to farmers and property owners for development in “lowvalue” wetlands. That group, which included Senators Breaux and Johnston, pointed to a report
issued several years earlier by the Lower Mississippi River Delta Development Commission in
their appeal. Clinton had chaired the commission while he was governor of Arkansas, and the
commission’s members found that federal regulatory policies for wetlands presented “significant
challenges” for agricultural, commercial, and industrial interests in the region. The senators
urged Clinton to adopt the proposals in the commission’s report as a “reasonable compromise”
on the issue of wetlands regulations.50 Some of the suggestions made by the commission were inline with the bills that the Louisiana delegation had proposed in Congress – reduced regulations
with only one agency’s overseeing implementation, federal support to private property owners to
encourage conservation, and a new classification system that emphasized the function and value
of wetlands when determining which areas to protect.51
In May 1993, Clinton agreed to form a wetlands “working group” that would be
comprised of nine federal agencies, including the EPA and the Department of Defense. The goal
of the task force would be to devise recommendations for wetlands regulatory reform.52 When
the administration unveiled its proposals in August, there were mixed reactions in the “Pelican
State.” The Louisiana Farm Bureau praised the policy proposals for protecting farmers from
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suddenly losing the ability to develop their properties if those lands were declared to be
wetlands, though some environmental groups were critical of giving the Soil Conservation
Service authority over determining wetlands classification for farmlands. Mark Davis, who was
head of the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, praised the wetlands working group and said,
“The emphasis on restoring wetlands can only help us.” Senators Breaux and Johnston also
commended the policy proposals, with Breaux stating they were a “step in the right direction.”
However, Representative Billy Tauzin criticized the group’s recommendations because they did
not offer a new classification scheme and also commented that Congress needed to act to “set up
a firm system of compensation to private landowners.”53
Tauzin’s criticisms touched on another controversial aspect of wetlands classification and
delineation, which both he and Senator Breaux had attempted to address with earlier legislative
proposals. Both the Hayes-Tauzin bill and the Breaux bill in 1991 had required that private
property owners be compensated by the federal government if the owners’ lands could not be
developed due to regulations that protected wetlands.54 Proponents of that suggestion reasoned
when regulations limited development of property, that meant those lands were “taken.” Drawing
on the “just compensation” language of the Fifth Amendment, the Hayes-Tauzin and Breaux
bills made compensation compulsory in circumstances of regulatory “takings.” Issues of
“takings” and land-use regulations were not new, but the White House rejected mandatory
compensation. The administration insisted that compensation should not be automatically
granted and that the courts should sort through each “takings” case on an individual basis.55
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Despite the fact that Clinton’s wetlands proposals were seen as acceptable by a wide
range of groups, the issue of property rights and regulatory authority did not dissipate – even
among those who had been generally supportive of Clinton’s policy proposal. In October 1993,
Senator Breaux and Representatives Hayes and Tauzin spoke at the annual meeting of the
National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) in Washington, D.C.56 The NWC was a conglomeration of
agricultural, landowner, and land developer interests that had lobbied the Bush administration to
reject the 1989 federal wetlands delineation manual.57 In his prepared remarks for the
conference, Senator Breaux emphasized that private land owners needed greater protection and
flexibility in wetlands regulations. He also suggested that the federal government should
“relinquish the role of co-regulator and primary enforcer” and allow states to assume the lead in
regulating wetlands.58
Breaux’s assertion that Louisiana should have more regulatory control even as he
supported the federal government paying for the majority of restoration projects might have
seemed contradictory. Yet the senator had contended in the past that federal policies were
responsible for significantly contributing to coastal erosion in Louisiana. Breaux and other
congressional representatives from Louisiana saw the use of federal funds to repair the damage
caused by engineering the Mississippi River or running gas pipelines from the Outer Continental
Shelf through the state’s wetlands as fair.59 In that context, assuming the state could better
manage its wetlands than the federal government could have made sense, but one would also
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have to ignore that Louisiana had requested flood protection measures and benefitted
economically from the offshore oil industry. Additionally, despite the positive steps the state
took with Act 6 in 1989, the ability of agencies to effectively monitor, regulate, and manage the
coastal wetlands was questionable. For example, the DNR was not aware of the impact that
about half of the activities had on the coast as the department had no monitoring system in
place.60
Over the next several years, the support for fewer regulations and greater property rights
gained steam in Congress. In 1994, Representative Tauzin introduced the “Private Property
Owners Bill of Rights” which again stressed that overly broad regulations violated the “takings
clause” in the Constitution and that land owners should be automatically compensated. Under
Tauzin’s proposed legislation, if a regulation reduced the value of a piece of land by fifty
percent, then the owner would be entitled to compensation. Fifty-seven co-sponsors signed onto
Tauzin’s bill, including three other representatives from Louisiana. Proponents for mandatory
compensation claimed to support regulations as long as the rights of property owners were
considered, but the automatic payments were really a way of deterring regulation enforcement.
The federal government could not afford to compensate every landowner when the value of his
or her property was reduced by regulation. Such a policy would make regulatory programs too
expensive and not practically possible.61
Tauzin’s idea to require widespread compensation was tied to an anti-regulation, antienvironment trend in the United States known as the Wise Use Movement.62 Broadly speaking,
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the Wise Use Movement had developed during the 1980s and advocated that the rights of
individual property owners trumped the federal government’s mandate to regulate the use of
land. Though environmentalists tried to portray Wise Use proponents as fronts for corporate
interests, there was legitimate grassroots support at the local level and in Congress by the early
1990s.63 In March 1995, Wise Use advocates achieved a moderate victory when the House of
Representatives passed a bill that called for automatic compensation to landowners when the
value of their properties was reduced by more than twenty percent. If the value of land was
reduced by more than fifty percent, the federal government would be required to buy the
property outright. Two-hundred and seventy-seven representatives voted yes on the measure,
including five members from Louisiana’s delegation. Tauzin said that the legislation did not
preclude regulation, but rather it ensured that property owners would be compensated
appropriately if they lost the use of their lands.64
Groups such as the NWC, the National Council for Environmental Balance, and the
Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation supported the legislation.65 When speaking to a forum hosted
by a group of realtors and homebuilders in May 1995, six of Louisiana’s gubernatorial
candidates also vowed to protect the rights of property owners against federal regulations. 66 In
contrast, environmental organizations strongly opposed the Wise Use Movement in general and
the “takings” compensation bill specifically. A representative for the Louisiana chapter of the
Sierra Club criticized political supporters of the bill in March 1995, saying that the Wise Use
Movement was trying to portray itself as a defender of “hardworking Americans” but instead “its
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membership list reads like a who’s who of the oil and gas, timber, ranching and mining
companies.”67
In Louisiana, landowner perceptions about “takings” through regulation and
compensation appear to have been mixed. In 1996, Paul Corneil of Louisiana State University
conducted a survey of property owners who held between one hundred and 2,500 acres of lands
that were classified as wetlands. The two most popular concerns among landowners were the
protection of property rights and the threat of coastal erosion. Despite the role regulations had
played in the reduction of wetlands losses, owners did not have a favorable view of the
regulatory programs administered by state or federal agencies. Neither did they perceive the
regulations themselves in a positive light. Two-thirds of the respondents agreed that current
wetland regulation policies approached the threshold for the “taking” of their properties. Still, the
majority of survey participants said they had no intention of selling their lands in the near future,
and the landowners also indicated they preferred tax breaks over outright purchase of their
properties.68
One of the reasons why respondents might have preferred to hold onto their lands was
potentially related to why some property owners also fought state-sponsored coastal restoration
projects on their lands. Survey participants indicated that while they perceived oil and gas
activities to do the most harm to the wetlands, mineral production was also the most likely
source of revenue to be generated on their properties.69 Even though coastal restoration might
have protected owners from future losses, they were reluctant to allow the state to engage in re-
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creating new lands. Instead, property owners wanted to initiate restoration projects on their own.
The reason for that was once a parcel of wetland turned to open water, the state assumed
ownership of lands underneath the water. If the landowner paid to have their former lands
restored, he or she could then reclaim the surface and mineral rights to those lands. However, if
the state paid for a project that restored eroded lands, the previous owners could only reclaim the
surface rights. That made some landowners reluctant to support state-sponsored restoration
projects because they feared losing out on the potential of oil and gas revenues.70
To address the loss of mineral rights on eroded lands, the Louisiana legislature passed a
bill that put a constitutional amendment up for vote in the 1995 election. Amendment 9 allowed
the state to surrender its mineral rights on waterbottom lands, which would mean former
property owners could reclaim both surface and mineral rights. The Department of Natural
Resources had pushed for the amendment over the objections of the State Land Office. Citing the
loss of millions of dollars in oil and gas revenue, the SLO argued the amendment was a mistake
and that it benefitted private property owners while the taxpayers funded the bill for coastal
restoration.71 The Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana joined with the DNR to support the
amendment and said that allowing property owners to reclaim mineral rights was necessary to
encourage forward momentum on restoration projects.72 Whether voters agreed with the CRCL
or wanted to ensure that the rights of landowners were protected was unclear, but the amendment
passed with sixty-one percent of over one million ballots cast on the measure.73
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“Takings” compensation and the prominence of property rights continued to be an issue
in national politics for another year, though the matter had perhaps become more show than
substance. In 1996, the Senate took up a companion bill for the compensation package passed in
the House the previous year. Supporters of the Omnibus Property Rights Act continued to argue
that any regulation of how a property owner used his or her land amounted to a “taking” and
deserved compensation. Though Louisiana’s House delegation had supported “takings”
compensation, Senator Johnston voiced opposition to the measure and said that automatic
compensation for “a valid public welfare regulation” had no “place in our laws or history.”
Johnston characterized the proposed act as a distraction and insisted that Congress should focus
on regulatory reforms that protected both the environment and landowners. He said the Senate
should not be pursuing measures that shut down regulations altogether. Senate Majority Leader
Robert Dole indicated he planned to bring the measure to the floor for a vote in spring 1996, but
the bill ultimately failed to go anywhere.74
Though “takings” compensation never became federal law, the issue highlighted how
contentious and complicated the implementation of wetlands policy could be – nationally and in
Louisiana. The state and federal government regulated the use and treatment of wetlands because
those areas had been deemed to have value for the public welfare. Complementary to regulation
was the push to increase the funding of restoration projects to reduce future losses and create
new wetlands. However, since private individuals owned the majority of wetlands in Louisiana,
the state’s politicians and citizens had to confront how to ensure the sustainability of the
wetlands ecosystem while also protecting the rights of landowners. That tension was connected
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to the multiple-use management strategy – how to balance the interests of one user group with
the interests of another, while seeking to maintain conditions that allowed all coastal users
continued access to the many resources of Louisiana’s southern wetlands. In practice though,
some users received a greater number of benefits from the coast’s resources than other users. The
respondents to Paul Coreil’s survey saw oil and gas interests as having more influence on the
coast than they did, though businesses and citizens had long been recognized as users too.
As restoration efforts began to increase with the passage of the Breaux Act, coastal
restoration itself became a “user” of the coast and the benefits of a restoration project had to be
weighed against the drawbacks. That had happened in 1995 when the State Land Office argued
that Amendment 9 was disadvantageous to the state’s finances. In contrast, the Department of
Natural Resources maintained the legislation was necessary for coastal restoration projects to
proceed. There were also times when coastal restoration projects caused short-term harm to other
users of the coast. For example, when the Davis Pond freshwater diversion threatened the
productivity of oyster beds in St. Charles Parish, the state and federal government had to find a
way to assist the oyster harvesters. Congress responded by passing legislation that allocated $7.5
million help relocate the beds to another area.75 Yet the policy of providing monetary
compensation to users of the coast that were negatively impacted by regulation or restoration
remained an unsettled area of policy in the 1990s, at least for restoration efforts in Louisiana.
Policy Challenges in the 1990s – Money Troubles
While the state and nation debated classification and compensation in relation to wetlands
policies, the Breaux Act task force proceeded to fulfill its mandate to support restoration on the
coast. One of the requirements in the CWPPRA was for the task force to compile a Priority
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Project List on an annual basis. Meetings held in 1991-1992 helped decide on the hydrological
basin approach for the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration Plan and also influenced the
selection of restoration projects. The projects were intended to create new wetlands or enhance
existing ones by introducing sediments, freshwater, or fortifying barrier islands to help protect
inland marshes. In the early years of the Breaux Act, each project on the PPL tended to be a
small-scale activity aimed at reducing erosion in local areas. Between 1991 and 1993, the task
force selected forty-eight projects to benefit 46,000 acres of wetlands at the cost of $123
million.76
However, actually implementing the projects became another matter. By March 1993,
construction had yet to begin on any of the PPL activities. Part of the reason for the delay related
to cost-sharing arrangements between the Department of Natural Resources and the Army Corps
of Engineers. All coastal restoration projects required a federal and non-federal sponsor to
contribute funding, but the DNR had hesitated to sign a formal arrangement with the Corps on
cost-sharing measures for the Breaux Act projects. Both agencies accused the other of
deliberately delaying the process. The DNR stated that the agency was reluctant to commit funds
to the restoration efforts unless there was an agreement that allowed the state to influence project
designs and costs. In contrast, the Corps said it was willing to meet with the DNR to discuss an
agreement but had found the director of the DNR to be uncooperative. Eventually, Senators
Breaux and Johnston stepped in to bring both agencies together to sort out a cost-sharing
agreement that satisfied each party.77
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After decades of planning, funding issues, and bureaucratic delays, there finally seemed
to be momentum for coastal restoration efforts in Louisiana. A little over a year after the DNR
and Corps finally reached a cost-sharing agreement, the task force completed its first project in
West Hackberry, Cameron Parish. The state and federal government had also initiated
construction on five more projects, as well as having approved fifteen additional projects for
implementation.78 Yet progress soon became threatened when the state ran into financial issues
in 1994. The DNR used funds from the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund to
pay for the state’s portion of project costs, which was set at twenty-five percent per project. Act
6 in 1989 had guaranteed the WCRTF would receive $5 million annually, but for more money to
be moved into the account, oil and gas revenues had to surpass $600 million. When oil prices
slumped in the early 1990s, only the first $5 million went into the trust fund and the state could
not pay for its share of restoration projects beyond that. Since Louisiana could not contribute
more than $5 million, the state received a smaller portion of the money allocated to it for Breaux
Act activities.79
The problem of funding issues continued into the next year, and the Department of
Natural Resources stopped all state-sponsored coastal restoration projects in September 1995 to
generate enough cash to qualify for Breaux Act money. Having already turned down $22 million
in 1994, the DNR did not want to risk losing additional funds for coastal restoration projects. The
state needed at least $10 million per year in matching funds to receive the full $30 million
allocated under the Breaux Act. Officials in the DNR had suggested selling facilities or doing
“in-kind” transactions to help the state qualify for full funding, but the department’s
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undersecretary said the state really needed to change how money was allocated to the Wetlands
Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund.80
Lowering the threshold for how much oil and gas revenues needed to be generated in
order to adequately fund the WCRTF was a difficult task and did not take place until 1999.81 Yet
the state was able to resume sufficient matching fund payments before then because oil and gas
prices rebounded in 1996.82 The state’s funding problems in 1994 and 1995 were more than the
result of a temporary slump in oil and gas prices though. Rather, the issues with meeting its costshare requirements happened because Louisiana was so heavily dependent on mineral resources
for funding. While oil and gas revenues were no longer the major source of income for the
government that they had been in previous decades, the state still relied on the oil and gas
industry to help pay for coastal restoration projects – even when such projects were necessary in
part because of the oil and gas industry’s activities in the wetlands.83 Further, political officials
made plans for projects on the assumption that oil and gas prices would remain high – a mistake
in budgeting practices that had dogged Governors Treen, Roemer, and Edwards throughout the
1980s and 1990s.
The state was not just dependent on oil and gas revenues to help fund coastal restoration;
in fact, Louisiana was even more reliant on the federal government. In 1997, the state completed
a conservation plan that outlined how the state would achieve “no net loss” as the result of future
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developments in the wetlands. Once Louisiana had an acceptable plan approved, the state only
had to pay fifteen percent of project costs as opposed to twenty-five percent.84 The conservation
plan recommended no new laws or regulations to help prevent losses, but the report did introduce
policy suggestions for monitoring primary and secondary losses and provided more structure to
the state’s mandatory mitigation program.85 Gathering more data on secondary losses – those
losses that occurred after the direct removal of wetlands – was particularly important since there
was a lack of information on the extent of the problem.86
A New Vision for Louisiana’s Coast
In April 1998, the Breaux Act task force authorized one of the largest restoration projects
yet for the Isles Dernieres, a chain of barrier islands off the coast of Terrebonne Parish. The
project was centered on nourishing ten miles of beach shoreline spread across three islands in the
chain, each of which had been damaged by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Once completed, the
restored barrier islands were expected to help create 685 acres of marsh and protect an additional
11,000 acres of wetlands. Priced at $26 million, the Isles Dernieres restoration effort represented
a new approach for Breaux Act projects in terms of scale and cost.87
During the first few years of operation, the CWPPRA had funded small, localized
projects that primarily benefitted the immediate vicinity. Those smaller projects had been
successful, but they were not going to stop wetlands loss on a large scale over a long period of
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time.88 Groups such as the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana and members of the
Department of Natural Resources began to advocate for bigger projects that could address losses
across the entire coast in 1995. In September of that year, the Breaux Act task force agreed that
large-scale projects such as freshwater diversions and barrier island restoration should receive
priority status on the annual lists. Going forward, the task force would dedicate two-thirds of its
yearly project funding to large-scale projects and the remainder for small-scale projects.89
The shift to prioritizing large-scale projects was an important step toward more effective
restoration projects, but a change in strategy alone was not going to be sufficient. There needed
to be a financial commitment to restoration on par with the scope of wetlands loss, and the
maximum amount of money that could be provided by the Breaux Act and the Wetlands
Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund was not going to be a sufficient.90 The state and federal
government also needed a single vision for Louisiana’s coast, with clear ideas about what would
constitute a successful program and how best to efficiently administer that program. In the mid1990s, there were still dozens of agencies that had authority in and around the wetlands without a
unifying vision to guide their activities. Bureaucratic disagreements and multiple plans, reports,
and suggestions for restoration created confusion.91 Finally, individual coastal restoration
projects needed to be parts of a whole – though there were regional differences in Louisiana’s

Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, “Funding Shifts to Large-Scale Projects,”
WaterMarks, Spring 1996, 1-2, https://lacoast.gov/new/Data/WaterMarks/watermarks_1996_spring.pdf.
89
Bob Anderson, “Coastal Restoration Changes Opposed,” Advocate, September 21, 1995, sec. A, NB LA (1292);
Bob Anderson, “Plan Laid for Large-scale Coastal Wetlands Project,” Advocate, September 22, 1995, sec. B, NB
LA (1104).
90
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration
Plan, ES-9; Bob Anderson, “$30 Million for Wetlands May be Lost,” Advocate, March 11, 1996, sec. B, NB LA
(2311).
91
Mark Schleifstein, “Sinking Treasure,” Times-Picayune, March 26, 1996, sec. A, NB LA (9603280026);
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and Louisiana Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Louisiana Coast (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources, 1998), 2; Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force
“State, Federal, and Local Officials Unveil Coast 2050 Initiative,” WaterMarks, Winter 1998, 2,
https://lacoast.gov/new/Data/WaterMarks/watermarks_1998-winter.pdf.
88

191

wetlands, the entire coast was an ecosystem. Both Louisiana and the federal government’s
approach was still piecemeal, even after several years of project development under the Breaux
Act. If the state and federal government continued with current policies, the estimates were that
only twenty-two percent of future losses could be avoided.92
In 1997, political officials in Louisiana’s government and representatives from federal
agencies initiated a series of meetings to address those problems. The Breaux Act task force and
the state’s Wetlands Authority in the Governor’s Office led the process of developing a unifying
strategy. Representatives from agencies such as the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality assisted on what would become the Coast 2050
initiative. The goal was to build a consensus about what Louisiana’s coast should look like in the
year 2050, ensure cooperation among the variety of agencies involved in coastal management,
and determine how to administer a unified restoration plan.93 The Coast 2050 initiative would
not be a report that contained multiple project suggestions but instead, would outline broad
strategies for a single vision on how to approach wetlands restoration in southern Louisiana.
Over the course of eighteen months, public officials met with concerned citizens sixty-five times
to determine what coastal users wanted to see in a restoration plan.94 The Coast 2050 task force
also made sure that the best available science guided their decision-making about future
restoration policies. Finally, as had been the case in virtually every proposal and plan preceding
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the Coast 2050 report, the task force asserted that the restoration plan must cater to multiple-use
management.95
Coast 2050 built on previous plans and decades of research but also included elements
that had been poorly incorporated or neglected altogether. There was still an emphasis on
balancing wetlands protection with economic development, as well as the recognition that there
were multiple interests invested in using Louisiana’s coast for a variety of purposes.96 Agencies
agreed that there was no way to return Louisiana’s coast back to the way it had been prior to the
1930s, but there was a consensus that a smaller, sustainable wetlands ecosystem was possible.
The state’s 1994 environmental blueprint had stated that there was no going back, and the Coast
2050 task force concurred.97 Restoration efforts under Coast 2050 would work with natural
processes and emphasize returning functionality along with productivity. That meant projects
should encourage accumulation of sediments, a balanced gradient from salt to fresh water, and
links between the various areas in the coastal ecosystem to promote biological diversity. The
southern coast would be organized into four separate regions, and each region would be managed
to address problems specific to that area. However, efforts in the individual management areas
would also contribute to coast-wide restoration efforts. Projects would be selected to help
rebuild the coastal wetlands, not just wetlands in localized spaces.98
The vision of Coast 2050 echoed sentiments from the broader environmental movement
of the twentieth century and several decades of recommendations for coastal restoration from

95

Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, Coast 2050, 7-8.
96
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, Coast 2050, 51; Mike Dunne, “Balance Sought in Louisiana’s Coastal Use Plan,” Advocate,
September 14, 1998, sec. A (2771783).
97
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, Coast 2050, 1-2; Gagliano, An Environmental-Economic Blueprint, 18.
98
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, Coast 2050, 79-81.

193

experts such as Sherwood Gagliano. Efficient use of resources, ensuring that resources were
available for future generations, and managing resources with policies that regulated use and
minimized damage were central to Coast 2050, but those were not necessarily new principles.
Rather, the “newness” of Coast 2050 was that the plan outlined how to finally do what experts
had been calling for since the mid-1970s – treat the coastal wetlands as a large system with
multiple moving parts that required coordinated ecological and administrative management. One
indication that government officials and concerned citizens had finally accepted that a broad plan
and coast-wide management were necessary was the price tag of the Coast 2050 initiative - $14
billion over thirty years.99
The official response to the Coast 2050 report was largely positive in Louisiana. All
twenty coastal parishes formally endorsed the plan, and Governor Mike Foster also voiced his
support for the adoption of Coast 2050 as a unified coastal management strategy.100 There was
also some tentative encouragement offered by the Clinton administration for Coast 2050. Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt commended the state for its work and said that Louisiana’s efforts were
an important step in generating the same amount of national attention afforded to the Florida
Everglades.101 The Army Corps of Engineers also praised Coast 2050 and suggested that the
Water Resource Development Act could be a useful mechanism for approving large-scale
projects such as sediment diversions or barrier island nourishment.102 Environmental
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organizations such as the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana acknowledged their support for
Coast 2050 as well and saw the plan as a “road map” for the state’s future.103
Yet, despite the acclaim, there was still the issue of who was going to pay the billions of
dollars necessary to implement the coast-wide restoration and management plan envisioned by
Coast 2050. While the Breaux Act was renewed in 1999 and Louisiana adjusted how the
Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund received oil and gas revenues, those two
money sources were not going to be sufficient.104 At $14 billion over thirty years, that equated to
roughly $460 million per year. Funding from the Breaux Act and WCRTF would only cover
around ten percent of the estimated costs. Governor Mike Foster argued that the nation should
contribute significantly to coastal restoration efforts because Louisiana’s wetlands had been
“sacrificed” for the good of the country, but the CRCL saw that attitude as a mistake. The federal
government had contributed billions of more dollars to wetlands restoration in California and
Florida, but that was in part because each state had a fifty percent cost-share arrangement with
the federal government.105 Louisiana and the federal government were going to have to find new
sources of funding to pay for a plan on the scale and scope of the one envisioned by Coast 2050.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the 1990s, there was reason to be optimistic about Louisiana’s
policies and planning to tackle coastal erosion. The state had established a regulatory framework
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to minimize damage in the wetlands and had created a constitutionally protected trust fund to pay
for coastal restoration projects. There was also an increase in the attention, funding, and
assistance provided by the federal government to Louisiana to help the state deal with the loss of
coastal wetlands. As the decade progressed, there were other positive steps in moving the state
and national government toward policies that further decreased erosion rates, while increasing
the protection for existing wetlands, land creation, and more coordinated management practices.
Yet for all the progress, there were still significant issues in implementing a coastal
restoration plan that was equivalent to the scope of the problem facing Louisiana. The rates of
loss were estimated at twenty-five to thirty-five square miles per year. Seventy percent of the
state’s population lived in the coastal zone, with 1.2 million people in the New Orleans metro
area alone. Navigation channels, oil and gas infrastructure, and the levee system were all at risk
if losses continued without substantial action, and the day-to-day risks did not factor in the
consequences of a major hurricane hitting southern Louisiana.106 The state had struggled to pay
for its share of restoration projects and even when the legislature adjusted the funding
mechanism for the wetlands trust fund, Louisiana was still dependent on high oil and gas prices
to pay for its share of restoration. Further, there was no clear indication that the federal
government was going to contribute billions of dollars to help implement Coast 2050. In the
early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration instructed the Army Corps of Engineers to
develop a plan that cost much less than $14 billion estimated by Coast 2050.107 Not until one of
the costliest hurricanes in the nation’s history led to the flooding of a major American city would
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the state and nation commit to supporting a plan that was on par with the scale of the crisis on
Louisiana’s coast.
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 2000s
“A Self-Inflicted Wound”
In December 2000, a jury in Plaquemines Parish awarded five oyster harvesters $48
million in a lawsuit against the state of Louisiana. According to the plaintiffs, the Caernarvon
Freshwater Diversion had destroyed over three thousand acres of oyster beds in Breton Sound
and “rendered their leases worthless.”1 The state and federal government had built the diversion
to address the loss of wetlands in southern Louisiana, and the structure had been in operation
since 1991. If the settlement terms for the case were extended to other oystermen whose leases
had allegedly been damaged by the diversion, the state could be forced to pay over $1 billion.
Officials were alarmed by such a prospect and protested the price-per-acre formula used to
determine the award amounts. Secretary Jack Caldwell of the Department of Natural Resources
stated “it’s unrealistic to expect the taxpayers of Louisiana to pay $21,345 for every acre of
oyster leases.” He also asserted that the verdict threatened the opening of another freshwater
diversion located in St. Charles Parish. The state’s attorney for Avenal, et al. v. the State of
Louisiana criticized the judgement as well and argued the entire future of coastal restoration was
in jeopardy if the decision was upheld upon appeal. “Basically, the state can’t afford to go
forward with coastal restoration if this is what’s going to happen.”2
As the case moved through the court system over the next four years, uncertainty about
the verdict and the state’s anti-erosion programs lingered. During that time, at least a dozen
coastal restoration projects were put on hold, and the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
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issued a moratorium on new oyster leases.3 Finally, in October 2004, Louisiana’s Supreme Court
reversed rulings by the lower courts and relieved the state of having to pay settlements to any
oyster fishers whose leases might have been damaged by Caernarvon.4 The decision was good
news for coastal restoration, but the circumstances that had led to Avenal were partially the result
of poor planning by the state government. The Department of Natural Resources had wanted to
issue a moratorium on leases in Breton Sound, while the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
argued that the state should continue the leasing program. Despite warnings from the Army
Corps of Engineers in the mid-1980s that the diversion could negatively impact oyster leases,
officials in the DNR relented when the DWF agreed to insert indemnity clauses into new leases
or lease renewals to protect the state against legal action.5 Yet the “hold harmless” language
failed to stop the lawsuit, and the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana referred to Avenal as “a
self-inflicted wound.”6
The technicalities of the indemnity clauses mattered for the specifics of the case, but
there was a deeper issue at work in Avenal. A lack of comprehensive planning for Louisiana’s
coast had contributed significantly to the broad circumstances of the lawsuit. Despite the Breaux
Act and the widely praised Coast 2050 initiative, insufficient management and problem
resolution persisted. Indeed, three state agencies noted the weakness in the proposal when they
published a white paper on oyster leasing in 2001. The report stated that “Coast 2050 does
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not…produce a picture of the future of the coast which is adequate for planning such activities as
oyster production.”7 Even the most comprehensive management proposal put forth by public
officials still failed to consider how restoration projects could affect and be affected by the
multiple users of the coast. The public and government officials acknowledged the importance of
the wetlands to Louisiana’s socio-economic development, but that recognition had not yet
translated into a well-funded, comprehensive plan of action. The “self-inflicted wound” of
Avenal demonstrated the weaknesses in Louisiana’s coastal management, but another more
devastating event would confront the state and the nation when Hurricane Katrina made landfall
in 2005. As vital as wetlands were for buffering storm surge and wave action, incorporating
hurricane protection planning into wetlands policy and coastal conservation had not happened.
This chapter traces major policy decisions that took place during the first decade of the twentyfirst century in regard to managing the state’s coast and wetlands and also examines the
significance of the 2005 hurricane season. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita changed the calculus in
southern Louisiana, but long-standing issues of funding, administration, and conflicting interests
in how to use the lands and waters of the state continued to challenge policymaking and policy
implementation.
Funding Issues Continue
While the Breaux Act had produced tangible benefits for the state’s wetlands, there was a
growing consensus among Louisiana officials that the program was simply too small to properly
address the large-scale problem of wetlands losses.8 Bigger projects that could have wider
impacts were going to need more funding, and politicians from the “Pelican State” sought
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additional sources of revenues. Starting in the late 1990s, officials began advocating for the
passage of a law that would give Louisiana a share of money generated from the offshore oil
drilling located in federal waters. Governor Mike Foster declared that the state was entitled to
some of the revenues generated by Outer Continental Shelf production because of the impact that
it had on the state’s wetlands and infrastructure. “Our state has borne the brunt of 90 percent of
the federal offshore mineral development, and it is time to provide relief.”9
Senator Mary Landrieu concurred with those sentiments and took the lead among the
state’s congressional delegates in advocating for passage of the Conservation and Reinvestment
Act (CARA) in 1999. Under the legislation supported by Landrieu, half of all OCS income
would remain with the federal government. The other half would be divided among coastal
states, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and programs dedicated to wildlife education or
conservation. Support for CARA seemed robust, especially in the House of Representatives.
Three hundred and fifteen members of the House had signed on as co-sponsors for the bill, and
President Bill Clinton indicated he favored some form of revenue sharing with coastal states.
Yet, the future of CARA was less certain in the Senate. Property-rights proponents feared
increasing LWCF funding could set off a land-grab in the western U.S., and environmental
groups lamented the potential for states to support an expansion of drilling in order to boost the
amount of revenues they received.10
Backers of CARA made changes to the legislation in an effort to appease critics by
adding provisions that limited incentives for increased drilling and also restricted the amount of
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land that could be purchased through the LWCF.11 Additionally, legislators included specific
measures to ensure that OCS revenues would not be used for projects that contributed to further
environmental damage in states such as Louisiana. Section 104 of the bill mandated that CARA
revenues could only be spent on activities related to improving the quality of air, water,
wetlands, estuaries, or other coastal resources, as well as activities authorized by the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 or Clean Water Act.12 Spending on infrastructure was restricted,
and states had to develop management plans for how they would distribute their funds.
Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club dropped their objections to CARA due to the
revisions, and over three hundred representatives voted for the bill in May 2000.13
When the Senate took up its version of CARA, there was hope among the proposal’s
proponents that the upper chamber would also vote in favor of passage. Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott of Mississippi announced his support for the bill in mid-May 2000, citing several of
the reasons used by Louisiana’s senators – offshore oil drilling had placed a strain on Gulf Coast
states and the revenues from CARA could help pay for wetlands restoration projects. Senators
from Alabama, California, Florida, and Louisiana joined Lott in praising the legislation as well.14
Despite that backing, the act soon become tied up in procedural motions. Property-rights activists
pressured their allies in the Senate to block the bill from making it to a vote on the floor.15
Groups such as the American Land Rights Association charged that CARA was a “frontal assault
on private property rights” and little more than “pork money for Louisiana and Alaska.”16
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Senators from several western states asserted that CARA would allow the federal government to
increase its ownership of land or force new regulations on private owners. “The greatest
American legacy is the right to own private property,” claimed Montana Senator Conrad Burns.
“The general concept of CARA is wrong…The federal government now controls one-third of the
land of this nation…Government ownership of land has not been that successful.”17
Despite the broad backing from Congress, the White House, and every governor in the
country, support for CARA was not sufficient to overcome the objections of the property-rights
activists. By October 2000, the act was essentially dead as opponents continued to use procedural
methods to keep the Senate from voting on it.18 One year later, Louisiana’s congressional
delegation tried again to get CARA passed, but their efforts fell short. Instead, Congress passed
the Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP) in October 2001. Nicknamed “CARA-lite,” the
bill granted a one-time appropriation of $150 million to be divided among seven states.
Louisiana’s share of the money was about $28 million dollars and was to be used for “coastal
impact projects.”19 Louisiana officials were disappointed by the small scale of CIAP, and
Landrieu continued to push for legislation that would authorize OCS revenue-sharing on a
permanent basis. In 2003, she attached an amendment to an energy bill for that purpose, and in
2004, she introduced the American Outdoors Act. The proposed law would have provided $1.2
billion in funding to coastal states for the purposes of coastal restoration.20
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Each of those efforts failed, though Senator Breaux managed to rally support in Congress
for a renewal of the CWPPRA.21 However, securing a permanent funding source aside from the
Breaux Act proved to be out of reach for Louisiana legislators. Even support from the Army
Corps of Engineers for an ecosystem restoration plan did little to move congressional members.
After the introduction of Coast 2050 in 1998, the Corps issued a reconnaissance report on the
proposal under the auspices of the Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) program. The Corps’ analysis
of Coast 2050 acknowledged that the limited scale of CWPPRA projects was insufficient and
that more significant investments would be beneficial.22 The Corps concluded that the approach
taken by Coast 2050 was more comprehensive and better suited for preserving and restoring
Louisiana’s wetlands over the long run. Agency officials stated that additional studies would
need to be conducted to determine specifics, but the initial assessment of Coast 2050 was that the
plan was in-line with federal priorities for coastal restoration in Louisiana.23
Drawing upon that supposition, the Corps began conducting public meetings in 2000 to
gather input about which large-scale projects the agency should consider evaluating. The Corps
was looking into three possibilities that involved barrier island restoration, marsh creation, and a
Mississippi River diversion.24 Corps officials were not necessarily proposing the immediate
implementation of those projects, but rather, the agency was looking into a variety of alternatives
that might abate coastal erosion. Agency representatives imagined that the Corps would conduct
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a series of “feasibility studies” over the next decade to determine what was workable and would
tailor those studies at projects that fit into the Coast 2050 vision. By 2002, the Corps realized
that studying individual projects was not the best option, and officials began pursuing their own
plans for a comprehensive coastal restoration plan – one that would still complement the state’s
vision and could serve as a blueprint for future activities.25
Public meetings continued in 2003, and a project manager for the Corps said that the
agency and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources hoped to submit a plan for
congressional approval in a water resources development bill the following year.26 A preliminary
draft of the restoration plan was supposed to be made available to the public in October 2003 and
included seven sets of projects that could be implemented to combat coastal erosion. However,
the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the president’s Council on
Environmental Quality asked the Corps to postpone release of the plan. Officials were concerned
the high costs of the proposal, which were estimated to be somewhere between $4.3 and $14.7
billion. The OMB also questioned whether the suggested projects would be effective in
addressing coastal erosion problems.27
By spring 2004, the Bush administration instructed the Corps to scale down the LCA
restoration proposal from a thirty-year timeframe to one that could be enacted over ten years.
The OMB also told the Corps that the cost of the proposal had to be substantially reduced. In
response, USACE officials drafted a “near-term plan” that consisted of five projects, which
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would cost no more than $2 billion and be implemented in areas with the most urgent needs.28 In
summer 2004, the Bush administration announced tentative approval for the LCA near-term
plan, but officials had already informed Senators Breaux and Landrieu that the proposal would
be competing with other projects for federal dollars.29
Louisiana’s politicians believed the LCA near-term plan was not substantial enough and
should only be the beginning of a state-federal restoration effort. The Chief of Engineers for the
New Orleans District, Colonel Peter Rowan, acknowledged that perspective in summer 2004
when he stated, “Clearly, we have heard the state in their message that they view this as the first
installment…the key is to start the process, to begin to put work on the ground that moves
critical areas towards restoration.”30 However, congressional approval of the LCA proposals and,
more importantly, appropriations to fund the LCA plan remained elusive. Congress stripped
funding for coastal erosion from an energy bill and declined to pass a water resources bill, which
meant the only major source of restoration funding going to Louisiana was still coming from the
Breaux Act.31
Certainly the lack of funding was a major issue in implementing coastal restoration
projects, but the LCA near-term plan had other weaknesses. The projects did not address erosion
in the Chenier Plain; most of the work would be done around the New Orleans area.32 Further,

Louisiana Coastal Area – Addressing Decades of Coastal Erosion: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment, 108th Cong., 15-16 (2004) (statement of Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
Secretary Scott Angelle); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area, vol. I, MR 4-6; Mark
Schleifstein, “Corps Seeks Help to Scale down Plan – Public Hearings Set on Coastal Restoration,” Times-Picayune,
April 10, 2004, NB LA (419771650).
29
Mark Schleifstein, “Coastal Aid Pitch to Feds Falls Flat – White House Officials Balk at Pledging Cash,” TimesPicayune, May 1, 2004, NB LA (419808328); Bruce Alpert and Mark Schleifstein, “Bush Backs Plan to Restore La.
Coast – Some Demos Blast Timing of Decision,” Times-Picayune, July 7, 2004, NB LA (419924398).
30
Mark Schleifstein, “Steps toward Restoration – President Bush has Pledged to Support a nearly $2 Billion Plan to
Restore Louisiana’s Coast,” Times-Picayune, July 18, 2004, NB LA (419943361).
31
Michelle Millhollon, “Coastal Deal Signed – Blanco, Corps Agree on Joint Strategy,” Advocate, February 1,
2005, NB LA (0503494373).
32
Mark Schleifstein, “Louisiana Officials Alarmed by Coastal Erosion – It’s Later than Feds Think, They Warn,”
Times-Picayune, January 26, 2005, NB LA (420294111).
28

206

when the National Research Council (NRC) reviewed the LCA near-term plan, the committee in
charge of the evaluation process found that the proposals laid out were still “too modest an
effort” – even as the foundation for long-term restoration.33 In particular, suggestions for
stabilizing the shoreline of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) were considered too
poorly planned to be a worthwhile pursuit. The NRC questioned the Corps’ intentions to repair
the outlet instead of closing it. Both the Louisiana legislature and the authors of Coast 2050 had
called for decommissioning the shipping corridor because of the damage MRGO had done to the
wetlands in St. Bernard Parish.34
Other critiques included a lack of zoning and land-use strategies to complement coastal
restoration and the absence of a “new map” to guide overall planning. The NRC maintained that
state and federal officials needed to decide which areas could be saved and which would have to
be abandoned to the Gulf of Mexico; there could be no restoration plan that brought back the
Louisiana coast to early twentieth century conditions.35 Important decisions about land and water
use needed to be made and clearly communicated to the public. Though the LCA near-term plan
was important in that the Corps seemed to understand the need for federally-backed restoration
efforts, recognition alone was not going to save Louisiana’s wetlands. The stunted development
of the LCA near-term plan and ambivalent commitments from Congress and the White House for
adequate funding were simply more of the same for coastal restoration: a lack of action on par
with the size of the problem.36
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Some progress was made in funding Louisiana’s coastal restoration efforts by early
August 2005 when Congress approved the passage of another Coastal Impact Assistance Plan for
states that contributed to oil development in the Outer Continental Shelf. Nearly $1 billion in
expected revenues would be split among six states, with Louisiana getting a share of $540
million. The funds would be distributed starting in 2007 and could only be used for projects
related to coastal erosion.37 Attached to the Energy Security Act of 2005, the new CIAP required
that states use revenues for “projects or activities” related to coastal restoration, wildlife
protection, the development of conservation management plans, or paying for the costs
associated with implementing any of those programs. Further, the legislation limited the amount
of funding that could be used for infrastructure repairs and administrative costs to no more than
twenty-three percent per year.38
Officials in Louisiana had mixed reactions to the new CIAP funds. Any money that could
be used for coastal restoration was welcomed, but Gregory Stone from the LSU Coastal Studies
Institute commented, “The $540 million doesn’t go very far given the magnitude of the problem.
You take what you can get, but if it’s not sustained, it’s a problem. Chronic problems need
sustained funding.”39 Securing the CIAP funds was a victory, given the resistance to committing
to a large offshore revenue-sharing scheme just five years earlier. Still, the CIAP monies were
slated to last only for a few years, and Louisiana’s coastal restoration efforts needed the
“sustained funding” mentioned by Stone. Based on the length of time that had gone by between
the Breaux Act’s passage and the CIAP in 2005, Louisianans had reason to believe securing a
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consistent source of revenues could take many more years. However, just a few weeks after
Congress passed the Energy Security Act of 2005, one of the most devastating hurricanes in the
nation’s history ravaged southeastern Louisiana. A few weeks later, another powerful hurricane
hit the southwestern portion of the state. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita set a chain of events into
motion that would have a profound impact on coastal restoration in Louisiana.
“Devastating Damage Expected”40
On August 23, 2005, a tropical depression developed southeast of the Bahamas. Within
two days, the cyclone became a category one hurricane before making landfall in southern
Florida. Katrina weakened slightly onshore, but once the storm moved into the Gulf of Mexico, it
quickly regained hurricane status. Between August 26-28, Katrina reached its maximum strength
as a category five hurricane while located 170 miles southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi
River. According to the National Hurricane Center, Katrina was an “extremely intense and
exceptionally large” storm. Winds with hurricane strength extended ninety miles from the eye,
and winds with tropical storm strength went up to two hundred miles from the center. As the
system moved closer to land, its wind strength decreased though the size of the hurricane
remained “exceptionally large.” When Katrina’s eyewall made landfall close the LouisianaMississippi border on the morning of August 29, the hurricane ranked as a category three.41
The storm’s strongest winds were measured in Popularville, Mississippi at 135 miles per
hour. Instruments on Grand Isle, Louisiana recorded sustained winds of 87 miles per hour. Rain
gauges in Big Branch, Louisiana recorded 14.92 inches of precipitation, while instruments in
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Perrine, Florida recorded 16.33 inches of rain. A total of sixty-two tornadoes from Louisiana to
Pennsylvania were associated with Katrina.42 Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the storm
came from the surges generated by the enormous size of the system and the fact that landfall
occurred at high tide.43 Katrina sent surges up to six miles inland in some areas of Mississippi,
with the greatest heights reaching anywhere from twenty-four to twenty-eight feet. In Louisiana,
surges in St. Tammany, Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes ranged from ten to
nineteen feet.44
New Orleans, which had been under a mandatory evacuation order for the storm,
seemingly dodged the worst of the Katrina’s wrath. The city experienced winds the equivalent of
a category one or category two hurricane.45 However, as the storm passed out of the New
Orleans vicinity, residents who remained in the area became aware of a serious problem. Flood
waters were flowing into neighborhood streets, much of which resulted from catastrophic
failures in the levee system that was designed to protect the city. By September 1, approximately
eighty percent of the New Orleans metropolitan area was under water, with about two-thirds of
the water having come from breaches in the levee system.46 In total, about fifty ruptures occurred
across one hundred and sixty-nine miles of the New Orleans hurricane protection system,
including breaks in both levees and floodwalls.47 Removing all of the flood waters from the city
took forty-three days.48
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The process of draining water from New Orleans became complicated by the landfall of
Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005. Rita came onshore near the Louisiana-Texas border,
packing winds of 120 miles per hour and carried a storm surge that reached up to twenty feet in
some places. Though the three parishes most directly affected by Rita had smaller populations
than the New Orleans metro area, the region contained a significant portion of the state’s oil and
gas infrastructure. Two refineries, twenty-two petrochemical plants, and one of the nation’s
busiest deep-water ports were located near the city of Lake Charles.49 In comparison to Katrina’s
death toll of approximately 1,500 people in Louisiana, only one person was thought to have died
as a result of Hurricane Rita. Insured losses from Rita were estimated to be around $10 billion,
while the costs for Katrina were over ten times as much.50
Both storms caused significant amounts of damage, and Katrina was particularly
devastating for the numbers of lives that were lost. However, hurricanes striking the Gulf Coast
was not unusual, and New Orleans in particular had long been susceptible to storms. According
to the National Weather Service, “the mean return period for a major hurricane in the New
Orleans area is nineteen years, one of the most frequent along the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic
coastline.”51 The state of Louisiana evacuated about 1.5 million people before Katrina made
landfall, but 150,000 to 200,000 residents remained in the New Orleans vicinity.52 In the wake of
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the storm, those who were still in the area had to wait for days to be rescued off rooftops or
moved from rapidly deteriorating conditions at the Superdome. As the flood waters rose,
Hurricane Katrina became more of a human-made disaster than a natural one.53
In the months following the storm, numerous entities conducted multiple investigations
about the disastrous response to Katrina. Those inquiries revealed a fatally flawed levee system
and institutional failures at every level of government. Among the variety of issues identified by
investigation teams, the importance of one specific matter became increasingly clear – the loss of
coastal wetlands had contributed to the risks to life and property in southern Louisiana,
especially when considering the impacts of storm surge. The loss of wetlands reduced a natural
barrier that storms had to traverse before moving into populated areas, and the storms themselves
had worsened the situation. Between Katrina and Rita, approximately one hundred and eighteen
square miles of wetlands were destroyed.54
Shelter from the Storm
The relationship between hurricane protection and coastal restoration was not unknown
in 2005, but neither the state nor the federal government had any specific policies in place to
treat each as being related to the other. As coastal restoration in Louisiana became more popular
during the 1980s, “officials recognized that wetland work and flood protection [were] related,”
but according to Secretary of Natural Resources, Scott Angelle, “we had a structure that treated
them separately.” Angelle, who served as the head of the DNR from 2004 to 2012, was referring
to a change in the state’s Constitution during the 1970s that had the effect of decentralizing flood
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control efforts.55 Yet the problem of organization was not limited to Louisiana. The primary
agency responsible for building hurricane protection systems in the southeastern part of the state
was the Army Corps of Engineers, but the federal government and local entities often needed to
coordinate their activities with one another to complete projects. Poor communication and
planning among the various agencies had stymied effective system-wide management for
decades before Katrina made landfall, and the Corps’ involvement in hurricane protection in
southern Louisiana evolved over the course of multiple decades.
Even before the Corps’ involvement in hurricane protection projects in southern
Louisiana, the citizens of the state had extensive experience with tropical cyclones and were well
aware of the damage that the storms could cause. Since 1759, one hundred and seventy-two
hurricanes have struck southern Louisiana, and thirty-eight of those caused flooding in the New
Orleans area. Hurricanes had the potential to cause greater losses of life and more damage to
property as people began to move out from the core of the “Crescent City” in the early twentieth
century. Two particularly powerful storms in 1915 and 1947 increased concerns about flooding,
especially near Lake Pontchartrain. After the 1947 hurricane, the Army Corps of Engineers
raised the height of levees along southern portions of the lake and extended them into Jefferson
Parish. Less than twenty years later, Hurricane Betsy crossed Grand Isle with winds of 160 miles
per hour and caused $1 billion in damages, while also killing over eighty people.56
After the destruction caused by Betsy, Congress directed $250 million toward
strengthening the hurricane protection system around New Orleans.57 Federal officials reasoned
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that the city’s large population and shipping infrastructure warranted public funding. The Flood
Control Act of 1965 authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
(LPVHPP) to better safeguard 502,000 acres of “developed and developable land” from
“hurricane-induced flooding” in areas close to the tidal basin of the lake.58 Within a decade, the
costs for the project grew four times, though mostly due to inflation. Additionally, the schedule
for completion had been extended from 1978 to 1991 because of engineering challenges. When
the Corps constructed a floodwall or levee, the agency often had to wait several years for
embankments to settle before adding new layers. Procuring rights-of-way also slowed
construction; local entities were responsible for securing them and there were frequent objections
by landowners that delayed acquisition.59
Finally, the issue of cost-sharing presented another potential challenge. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) expressed concerns that local governments would be unable to pay the
thirty percent of construction costs required by federal-state agreements.60 When the GAO
evaluated the Corps’ performance on the LPVHPP in 1976, there was little indication that the
USACE had considered the state’s coastal wetlands as part of the hurricane protection system. In
fact, one of the proposed projects – a levee in St. Charles Parish – was scrapped by the Corps
because of objections from environmentalists. According to the GAO, “the justification (benefit)
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for this feature was almost exclusively land enhancement, which would convert about 25,000
acres of open aquatic marsh to urbanization for long-term human occupation.”61
By the early 1980s, ongoing technical and political delays threatened to push the
completion date for the LPVHPP to 2008. The Corps’ original plan to construct barrier features
to block storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain had been hampered due to environmental
objections and issues with securing rights-of-way. Instead, the Corps intended to pursue a plan
that would allow storm surges to enter Lake Pontchartrain but then contain the water with levees
and floodwalls. However, before fully implementing the “high-level plan,” officials in the Corps
said several studies needed to be conducted to determine the costs and potential environmental
impacts. Tension between local and federal officials further contributed to the delay because they
could not agree on the decisions regarding the floodwalls for the three main drainage canals in
New Orleans. The Corps believed the height of the floodwalls was insufficient to protect against
storm surge, and the agency also maintained that the pumping stations which drained water into
Lake Pontchartrain would be inadequate against hurricane-induced flooding. To achieve the
project’s stated level of protection for the city, state and federal officials would have to negotiate
a mutual agreement.62
The GAO criticized the Corps for not including the cost estimates for the canal
improvements in budget requests to Congress, but the agency said that reliable financial
evaluations could not be made until plans were fully settled. Parish officials complained that the
Corps had not made the LPVHPP a priority, but the GAO still questioned whether local
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jurisdictions could pay for a project that kept ballooning in expenses. In 1982, there were some
estimates that put construction totals at $924 million, and the non-federal share of that would be
thirty percent.63 Even with the growth in costs, the Corps began to pursue the “high level plan” in
the mid-1980s because it was the most economically viable by that time. Construction continued
for several more decades, and when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, about one hundred and
twenty-five miles of the LPVHPP levees had been built. Completion rates for the entire project
varied, but anywhere from sixty to ninety percent of the planned structures had been finished.64
“I Don’t Think Anyone Anticipated the Breach of the Levees.”65
Investigations about what went wrong during and after the hurricane focused on two
broad areas: storm preparation and response by local, state, and federal agencies and the
hurricane protection system around New Orleans. Reports compiled by Congress, the Army
Corps of Engineers, the American Society of Civil Engineers, and the National Science
Foundation found that there were long-standing, systemic issues within government agencies
regarding communication, leadership, organization, staffing, and planning. There were also
fundamental flaws in the hurricane protection system, including levee designs, construction, and
maintenance. Institutional weaknesses contributed to the problems with the protection system.66
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When President Bush told Diane Sawyer in an interview on September 1, 2005, that no one had
anticipated the breach of the levees, he was partially correct – no one had anticipated potential
failures because “none of the relevant government agencies had a plan for responding to a levee
breach.”67
However, the lack of planning for levee failures did not stem from a lack of knowledge.
There had been concerns about the performance of the LPVHPP for decades.68 In 1981, a
consulting firm informed officials that the 17th Street Canal “would fail in high water” if the
Corps did not raise the levees beyond the proposed heights. One year later, the same consultants
stated that “computations indicate the possibility of a blow-out during extreme high water in the
[17th Street] canal.” In 1988, the Corps issued a report that showed a field test meant to assess the
strength of soil conditions similar to those in New Orleans had resulted in failure of the floodwall
when water levels reached eight feet. Additionally, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, a
number of “design memorandums” were issued by the Corps of Engineers that expressed
continuing concerns about soil stability. Yet little appeared to be done. In 1998, a contractor
hired to do construction work on the 17th Street Canal complained to the Corps that the
company’s activities had been significantly complicated by “a lack of structural integrity” and
“the weakness of soils.” The Corps review board for contracts rejected the company’s assertions
as having no basis.69
Flooding from Hurricane Georges in New Orleans in 1998 prompted the state of
Louisiana and FEMA to enter discussions about developing a master response plan for a major
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hurricane. Studies and tentative planning continued through 2003, and in 2004, fifty agencies
assembled in Baton Rouge to conduct a series of workshops over the course of about a week.
The “Hurricane Pam” exercise envisioned a storm with 120 mile-per-hour winds that dropped
twenty inches of rain in the New Orleans area. Planners assumed up to one million people would
need to be evacuated, many of them without access to transportation. One official stated even if
all agencies performed according to plan, “residents need to know they’ll be on their own for
several days in a situation like this.”70 Other conditions of “Hurricane Pam” projected thirty
million cubic yards of debris and the need for one thousand shelters to be open for at least one
hundred days during recovery operations.71 Curiously, the training exercise did not consider a
scenario in which the levees breached.72
The Army Corps of Engineers did not account for the possibility of levee failures either.
In its assessment of the hurricane protection system, a special committee for the American
Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) noted that all major systems should include a “margin of
error” in design plans. The organization stated that the LPVHPP plans essentially ignored the
possibility of failure when designing levees and floodwalls. Nearly every part of the protection
system had to perform perfectly at all times in order to function properly. Perhaps an even more
fundamental problem was that the “system” was a “system” in name only. The ASCE committee
noted that the project had been constructed over the course of forty years, experienced several
planning revisions, and was built in a piecemeal fashion with differing design specifications for
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various structural parts. Incorrect data contributed to flawed results as well, particularly when
considering the issue of subsidence. Land sinking over time was not fully accounted for by the
Corps, and in some cases, levee walls were three feet below what they were supposed to be.
Lines of authority were unclear, and there was no system-wide oversight in place to ensure
cooperation among the various entities responsible for building and maintaining the levees.73
Though officials did not anticipate the failure of the levees in Hurricane Katrina, there was ample
evidence that they should have planned for potential breaches.
There were also some warnings that coastal erosion could impact hurricane protection
structures along the coast. In 2002, John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein published a special
report in the Times-Picayune that laid out a case for why the city faced significant risks from a
hurricane. In the “Washing Away” series, the two journalists detailed how flood control
measures, levee construction, and oil and gas infrastructure had exacerbated the natural
subsidence of southeastern Louisiana. Flooding from weather events such as hurricanes would
only grow worse due to the combination of sinking land and rising sea levels. Further, the loss of
wetlands amplified flooding in urban and non-urban areas because there were fewer marshes to
slow wind and wave action as storms moved onshore. An official for the South Lafourche Levee
District commented, “There’s no doubt about it. The biggest factor in hurricane risk is land loss.
The Gulf of Mexico is, in effect, probably twenty miles closer to us than it was in 1965 when
Hurricane Betsy hit.”74
The Army Corps of Engineers maintained that “chance of the New Orleans-area levees
being overtopped [was] remote,” but the assertion was based on modeling data that had been
assembled forty years earlier. Agency officials indicated they intended to do more studies, based
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on newer information and computer models. Suggestions for remedies to the vulnerability of
New Orleans included “higher levees, a massive coastal-restoration program, and even a huge
wall” across the Crescent City.75 That same year, an editorial in the Times-Picayune noted “that
the elaborate levee-water control projects built…to help keep water at bay have contributed to
the erosion of the protective buffer of wetlands provided by nature.”76
Despite the lack of connectivity in official policymaking, coastal restoration and
hurricane protection shared a number of similarities that speak to some of the broader problems
in managing Louisiana’s coast. In both cases, state and federal officials cobbled together
different projects to protect human lives, private property, and public infrastructure in piecemeal
fashions – and only when prompted to do so in the aftermath of catastrophe. Hurricane Betsy led
to the LPVHPP, and the loss of wetlands totaling fifty square miles per year prompted the state
to form a regulatory scheme in the late 1970s. The policies did not follow a broad vision of
coastal management, but rather responded to specific problems in specific locations without
considering Louisiana’s coast holistically.
Additionally, policies for hurricane protection and coastal erosion were pursued as
reactions to undefined risks with unclear goals of what constituted success. The basis for
hurricane protection in New Orleans was the “standard project hurricane,” a theoretical storm
that was supposed to be akin to a fast-moving category three. However, the criteria for the SPH
was initially under-designed and subsequent revisions were not incorporated into engineering
considerations.77 For coastal erosion, a “sustainable coast” became the benchmark for restoration
projects after Coast 2050, but there was not a plan to put that vision into effect. Further, there
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was no clear consensus about which parts of the coastal wetlands would be saved – a problem
which prompted the National Science Foundation to instruct the USACE to develop a “new
map” for Louisiana. In neither case did public officials pursue policies that would have limited
development in flood-prone areas, and in some instances, concerns about property rights
impacted both hurricane protection and coastal restoration projects.78 Finally, each issue required
political and financial cooperation between the state and federal government to achieve results, a
fact that was often complicated by the lack of clear authority and oversight.
Master Plans
On September 8, 2005, an editorial in the Baton Rouge Advocate connected the loss of
wetlands to the damage of the storm. “With diminished wetlands to mute the fury of Katrina, and
erosion-related subsidence in New Orleans, the Crescent City is now a wasteland.” The
newspaper also noted that national interest in coastal erosion in Louisiana had been lacking, but
with the hurricane, “America and the world have gotten a gruesome lesson in the consequences
of coastal erosion.”79 Environmentalists from the Natural Wildlife Federation and the
Environmental Defense group echoed those sentiments the following month. Representatives
from the two organizations encouraged Louisiana and the federal government to set aside money
for coastal restoration, along with funds to help clean up and repair the damage left by Katrina.80
Before the end of the year, President Bush signed a relief bill that directed $29 billion to
Louisiana for hurricane recovery efforts.81 In Louisiana, state officials took action to address
some of the long-standing administrative issues with coastal restoration by bringing many of the
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disparate coastal activities under the scope of a single agency. Governor Blanco signed Act 8
into law in November 2005 to create the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority
(CPRA), an entity that replaced the Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Authority. The new
body was directed to coordinate “the efforts of local, state, and federal agencies to achieve longterm comprehensive coastal restoration and hurricane protection.” Act 8 charged the CPRA with
creating a “master plan that presents a conceptual vision of a sustainable coast based on the best
available science and engineering.” Projects related to the Breaux Act, the LCA near-term plan,
and funds from the CIAP would be organized “toward a common goal.”82
Legislators held that “the state must have a single agency with authority to articulate a
clear statement of priorities,” and that “without this authority, the safety of citizens, the viability
of state and local economies, and the long-term recovery from disasters such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita remain in jeopardy.” Though the new authority gained control over two of the
most important activities on the coast, the efforts at consolidation were not complete. The
Department of Natural Resources would implement the activities related to restoration and
conservation, while still overseeing the state’s Coastal Management Plan and Coastal Use Permit
program. Meanwhile, the Department of Transportation and Development would be responsible
for “carrying out the elements of the plan relative to hurricane protection.” Act 8 directed the
secretaries of each department and the Governor’s Executive Assistant for Coastal Activities to
form a task force to develop the master plan, but implementation of those plans was still divided
between two separate agencies.83
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Thirty-one of thirty-seven senators voted in favor of Act 8 while ninety-three of ninetyeight representatives said yes. Governor Blanco and her administration pushed heavily for the
bill as well, but reactions to the legislation’s passage were mixed – particularly regarding the
organization of levee boards. An opponent of Act 8, Senator Craig Romero of New Iberia,
questioned if the CPRA would actually accomplish anything substantive. “The bill does nothing
to eliminate…all these little levee situations.” Romero’s criticism was in reference to a postKatrina proposal that would have consolidated the levee boards into a single regional entity,
staffed with experts who had no political ties and possessed knowledge about flood control.
Inefficient management and poor training had been identified as two issues that contributed to
the shoddy maintenance of the levees around metropolitan New Orleans. The U.S. Senate’s
report on Katrina cited an instance in which officials spent only four hours inspecting one
hundred miles of levees and noted there was no manual available to provide guidance for
adequate inspections. 84
Sponsored by state Senator Walter Boasso of St. Bernard Parish, the levee-reform bill
passed in the senate in November, but the legislation failed to gain traction in the House. In
December 2005, a grassroots organization called Citizens for 1 Greater New Orleans gathered
46,000 signatures for a petition that called on the state government to reform the levee districts.85
However, residents living in the West Bank hurricane protection vicinity did not want to see a
regional levee board, and debate over the issue dragged on into the next year. The federal
government also applied pressure to Louisiana’s politicians by making $12 million for a levee-
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improvement study contingent on the state reforming its management. After months of political
maneuvering and a compromise that created two levee boards in southeastern Louisiana, eight
out of ten voters approved a constitutional amendment in fall 2006 to revamp levee oversight. In
addition to the new boards, assets not related to levee maintenance were transferred to another
state agency and committee appointments were to be given to qualified professionals who had
knowledge in fields related to flood control or engineering. Voters also said yes to the
constitutional amendment that replaced the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Trust Fund
with the Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund, as well as approving a measure that directed
all potential income from an OCS revenue-sharing scheme into wetlands conservation, coastal
restoration, and hurricane protection.86
The revenue-sharing amendment was passed in anticipation of Congress authorizing the
Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act (GOMESA) in 2006. In contrast to the Breaux Act or the
2005 CIAP, GOMESA was designed to provide a much larger scale of funding over a longer
period of time. Support for the new revenue-sharing scheme was tied to concerns about the
damage caused by Katrina.87 The proposal directed that 37.5% of revenues from a specific set of
new lease tracts on the OCS be split among Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas until
2016. Afterward, 37.5% of revenues from all new OCS leases would be divided among the four
states. Louisiana’s share was estimated to be about $20 million per year for the first decade and
then approximately $650 million per year starting in 2017. Though GOMESA promised another
important source of funding for restoration in Louisiana, coastal advocates warned even that
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large amount of money was insufficient for the scope of the problem. Mark Davis of the CRCL
praised the new revenue from GOMESA and said it was “hugely important, but it’s also hugely
important to know that it’s only a down payment.”88
An increase in reliable funding was a positive step for coastal restoration; the money
from CIAP and GOMESA could allow Louisiana to implement some restoration projects in a
more timely fashion because the state would not have to wait for Congress to authorize funding.
Indeed, the state had already compiled a list of approximately one hundred projects that could be
implemented with CIAP funds when Congress approved GOMESA. Larger projects such
freshwater diversions would still require a federal partnership, but smaller-scale activities could
be pursued by the state on its own.89
Improved flexibility for the state was important, and yet the source of funds for the CIAP
and GOMESA was coming from one of the very causes of coastal erosion in Louisiana – oil and
gas drilling. Though OCS production did not necessarily impact the state in the same manner that
onshore activities did, the pipelines that transported much of OCS petroleum cut through the
coastal wetlands. There was also the matter of secondary development; as oil and gas production
increased offshore, facilities in southern Louisiana grew to support OCS activities. The state had
been using oil and gas revenues to pay for government services for decades, and now the state
would be using oil and gas revenues to pay for coastal restoration – which was partly caused by
the petroleum industry. Katrina had prompted a shift in how the state and nation looked at
coastal restoration and hurricane protection in Louisiana, but the continued reliance on oil and
gas industry called into question just how fundamental that shift was.
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Even as officials celebrated the passage of GOMESA, Louisiana still needed a plan order
to coordinate coastal restoration and hurricane protection. The state legislature had charged the
CPRA with developing a master plan, and the committee worked throughout 2006 to accomplish
that goal. A preliminary draft released in November included a tentative vision for merging
coastal restoration and hurricane protection and proposed some recommendations that had been
previously seen as politically toxic. One such idea was closing the Mississippi Gulf River Outlet.
The state had requested that the Corps close the MRGO before the 2005 hurricane season,
though the federal agency had been reluctant. A small number of shippers still used the channel,
but after Katrina, decommissioning the MRGO seemed more feasible. There were concerns that
the navigation corridor had acted as a “super highway” for storm surge, and officials in St.
Bernard Parish welcomed the closure.90
Other proposals in the initial draft report brought criticism for the heavy emphasis on
levees to provide hurricane protection. Indeed, levees had contributed to coastal erosion and then
failed to perform adequately during Katrina due to improper designs and maintenance. Rather
than depend too heavily on human-made structures, some coastal advocates envisioned another
approach. John Lopez, a former member of the Corps of Engineers who had joined the Lake
Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, offered a different framework for hurricane protection and
coastal restoration in early 2006. His proposal was called the Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy
(MLODS) and recommended enhancing eleven types of “defense lines” to mitigate impacts from
hurricanes and coastal erosion. Most of the “lines” fell into two basic categories: artificial
features such as levees and pump stations and natural features such as barrier islands and
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marshes. The MLODS also called for improving evacuation routes and encouraging property
owners to elevate their houses to avoid flood waters.91
Beyond suggesting that coastal restoration and hurricane protection projects be tailored to
the MLODS, Lopez advised that the state should use the natural ridges of southern Louisiana to
guide economic development – a clear call for land-use planning to protect lives and properties.
Because areas such as Bayou Lafourche were already high ground, they could be better protected
with levees since the elevation complemented human-made structures. Further, Lopez
recommended focusing restoration efforts in places that still had substantial amounts of
wetlands; areas that had already sustained heavy losses should probably be left out of planning.
To coordinate projects, Lopez suggested that the state develop a map to guide efforts and
communicate with citizens what the goals of restoration and protection would be. The MLODS
differed from the Corps’ LCA near-term plan and the Breaux Act by emphasizing flood
protection over vegetation restoration and shunned the incremental approach of piecemeal
projects. In essence, the MLODS sought to protect human life and property from flooding and
hurricanes by using natural features to support human-made ones.92
After the criticism that the CPRA received from its initial draft release in 2006, the
committee revised the master plan to rely less on levees for hurricane protection and pursue
something closer to the MLODS.93 The master plan put forth by the CPRA in 2007 divided the
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coast into five planning regions and set a “one hundred year horizon” for assessing risks and
proposing solutions. Four objectives were identified to reflect the broad vision of the plan,
including the reduction of damage from storms and promoting a “sustainable coastal ecosystem
by harnessing the processes of the natural system.”94 The master plan also outlined the types of
projects that the state and federal government should pursue to achieve objectives. Freshwater
diversions, marsh restoration, barrier shoreline stabilization, and salinity control in navigation
channels were suggested as the types of activities that should be pursued for restoration. For
hurricane protection, the master plan stated structural features had to complement the natural
features of the coastal ecosystem and that non-structural methods of storm reduction should also
be pursued. Home elevation, more stringent building codes, and better evacuation policies, were
recommended.95
Much of the 2007 master plan was visionary rather than a list of specific projects to
pursue, and in that sense the document resembled the Coast 2050 report. There were some
specific suggestions such as closing MRGO or building the Morganza to the Gulf levee system.96
Overall, the CPRA’s first master plan, which was accepted by the state legislature in March
2007, was a blueprint for the future.97 To implement more specific actions, the CPRA would
release annual reports with more targeted suggestions.98 All ongoing projects – including ones
funded by CIAP, the Breaux Act, and the LCA – needed to be consistent with the state’s master
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plan.99 Hurricane protection systems, coastal restoration, and to some extent, decisions about
navigation channels would become integrated into the master plan. Many of the activities on the
coast that impacted wetlands would no longer be considered separately from the ecosystem in
which they took place.
The 2007 master plan was not a radically innovative idea, but integrating restoration with
hurricane protection was a new step. Further, there seemed to be an increased commitment to
funding a plan that treated both activities as related after Hurricane Katrina. However, reception
of the master plan was mixed. A review panel criticized the state over the “breakneck pace” at
which the CPRA’s Integrated Planning Team “attempted to craft solutions for a complex and allimportant task.” Other observers took issue with some of the proposals in the plan that were
based on questionable scientific evidence. One example included plans to use “leaky levees” to
allow fresh water and sediments to move into marshes that were contained inside a levee system.
Another hotly contested idea was a proposed system of levees in Terrebonne Parish, dubbed the
“Great Wall of Louisiana.” Coastal expert and researcher Paul Kemp of LSU said, “The one
thing we’ve learned – and Katrina taught us again – is that earthen levees do not work…the most
economical and sustainable storm defense in the long term is to build wetlands – and levees kill
wetlands.”100
State officials contended that the urgency behind the CPRA’s rush to finish a master plan
was to influence the coastal restoration and levee plans being drafted by the Army Corps of
Engineers. There was no specific cost estimate included in the 2007 plan, but the director of the
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CPRA noted that some calculations put the totals between $50 billion and $55 billion. Even with
the funds provided by programs such as the Breaux Act or GOMESA, Louisiana would be
incapable of paying for coastal restoration and hurricane protection without federal assistance.
The state’s efforts to influence its federal partners did have some limited success. Karen
Durham-Aguilera, who served as director for the Corps’ long-term study, used the state’s master
plan “as a springboard for the way to go forward.”101 Indeed, when the Corps published its final
technical report in 2009, the agency’s plan to provide for hurricane protection and coastal
restoration included some of the same features contained in the state’s 2007 master plan. The
Corps intended to use structural and non-structural methods for improving hurricane protection
systems, but the report did not select a specific plan for congressional authorization. Decisions
about which coastal restoration measures to pursue required “additional analysis and
refinement.”102
While the Corps suggested some new alternatives such as the buyout of risky properties,
the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LACPR) study was not all the different from
the CPRA’s proposal. However, if state officials were hoping the Army Corps of Engineers
would draft a more detailed plan based on the efforts of the CPRA, they were likely to be
disappointed. Though the Corps was supposed to have developed a long-term comprehensive
hurricane and restoration plan with the LACPR, the National Research Council found that the
agency had not accomplished its goal. The peer review panel from the NRC stated “the lack of
advice on initial high-priority steps and projects, represent substantial shortcomings” and that
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there appeared to be “only limited efforts to synchronize” activities between the CPRA and the
Corps.103 The state and the federal government had moved closer to agreeing to a more
comprehensive master plan for hurricane protection and coastal restoration, but as the decade
drew to a close, there was still much to be done. In the meantime, Louisiana’s wetlands
continued to sink into the Gulf of Mexico.
Conclusion
For coastal restoration policies, the first decade of the twenty-first century brought
significant changes but also more of the same – bureaucratic inefficiency, conflicts between
different interests along the coast, and struggles to secure an amount of funding adequate to the
scale of the crisis. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita changed the calculus among state and federal
officials in terms of more integrated planning and also prompted the federal government to agree
to a revenue-sharing scheme that was similar to one originally proposed during the Truman
administration. As important as the decision to combine hurricane protection and coastal
restoration was, the proposals by the state and then the Army Corps of Engineers were not as
fully comprehensive as was often portrayed by officials. For example, suggestions to manage
agricultural runoff or ground water use were not incorporated into the plans and perhaps the
broadest reforms necessary remained elusive – those related to land-use planning and barring
development in areas that are prone to hazards such as flooding.
Fundamentally, the erosion of Louisiana’s wetlands has been tied to decisions about how
humans have used the lands and waters of the United States. In addition to trying to manipulate
nature to accommodate human settlement, governments have also subsidized risk-taking with
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policies such as the National Flood Insurance Program. In December 2012, there were 5,555,915
policies in the NFIP program across 21,881 communities in the United States. Properties that
were located behind “accredited” levee systems were immune from the requirements to purchase
flood insurance or land-use regulations to control where people built structures.104 Over eighteen
million people lived in “special flood hazard areas” located along the nation’s coasts or rivers,
which meant those areas had a one percent chance to experience a one hundred year flood on an
annual basis.105 Government policies have contributed to the construction of homes and
businesses in harm’s way because risk has essentially been subsidized by American taxpayers.
As one example of that phenomenon, “repetitive loss” claims for properties insured by the NFIP
have accounted for thirty percent of annual payouts during the program’s forty year history
despite being only one percent of all policies. After Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP had to take out
a loan from the U.S. Treasury to help cover claims that totaled over $16 billion.106
While state and federal officials vowed to learn from the mistakes made before the 2005
hurricane season, there was ample evidence that a truly comprehensive management and
restoration plan was still out of reach by the end of the decade. The 2007 master plan was based
on modifying the landscape to better simulate the natural deltaic processes but was not meant to
significantly restructure the ways humans used the land and water of southern Louisiana. One of
the primary objectives for the 2007 plan was to “reduce economic losses from storm based
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flooding to residential, public, industrial, and commercial infrastructure,” which highlighted the
continued importance of protecting the coast to ensure economic growth and viability.107 If a
storm as catastrophic as Hurricane Katrina could not spur policymakers into rethinking how
humans used the land in fundamental ways, one might have been forgiven for wondering how
many more crises were going to be necessary to save what was left of Louisiana’s wetlands.
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EPILOGUE
Following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the state of Louisiana revamped the
administration of its coastal zone management. The 2007 master plan laid out a broad vision for
how the state’s coastal management should proceed and detailed “which actions will sustain
Louisiana’s coastal ecosystem, safeguard coastal populations, and protect vital economic and
cultural resources.”1 Governor Bobby Jindal further improved bureaucratic consistency in 2008
when he issued an executive order that directed “all state agencies to administer their activities,
to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with the 2007 Coastal Master Plan’s
recommendations.”2 The streamlined administration and unified vision of coastal restoration
generated some positive results. Within five years, the CPRA had overseen projects related to
building or improving one hundred and fifty-nine miles of levees, constructed thirty-two miles of
barrier islands or berms, placed one hundred and fifty projects in design or construction, and
benefitted over nineteen thousand acres of wetlands.3 By 2014, forty-five miles of barrier islands
or berms had been built and coastal restoration and protection programs had benefitted 26,241
acres of land.4 As of 2015, the state planned to monitor or maintain two hundred and thirty
projects, while overseeing the design and construction of seventy-nine more.5 The rate of losses
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was down significantly from its height in the 1970s, but the state was still losing approximately
sixteen square miles of land per year.6
Damage from the Deepwater Horizon spill further complicated the problems of coastal
erosion and restoration efforts starting in April 2010.7 For nearly three months after the initial
blowout, over three million barrels of oil spewed from the Macondo Well before British
Petroleum (BP) was able to plug the leak. The size and scope of the disaster was unprecedented
in American history. Officials estimated that the uncontrolled release of oil was “equivalent to
the Exxon Valdez spill reoccurring in the same location every week for twelve weeks.”8 The
Natural Resource Damage Assessment of the spill concluded that oil washed up on 1,300 miles
of shoreline from Texas to Florida, affected the survival and reproduction of marine organisms,
and injured marsh vegetation and wildlife on coastal shores.9
The event also worsened Louisiana’s coastal erosion problems, particularly on its barrier
islands.10 Before the Macondo blowout, Cat Island sat just offshore from Plaquemines Parish and
consisted of two strips of land that had long served as nesting grounds for thousands of birds.
Wave action and hurricanes had whittled away at the barrier island, with their impacts worsened
by a lack of replenishing sediment. In 1930, Cat Island-West was three hundred and sixty acres,
but by 2010, the island was just four acres in size. Cat Island-East was slightly larger at five

Amy Wold, “Washed Away – Locations in Plaquemines Parish Disappear From Latest NOAA Charts,” Advocate,
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Chapter 1 of their book, Hydrocarbon Hucksters: Lessons from Louisiana on Oil, Politics, and Environmental
Justice (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 2014). The 2016 report from the Deepwater Horizon Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Trustees also provides a good summary of what happened and the impacts associated
with the spill (see below for full citation).
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Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage Assessment Trustees, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Final
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acres. Within a few years after the BP spill, the eastern portion of the island was only about one
hundred yards long and thirty yards wide. Oil from the blowout had washed onto the barrier
island, killing the marshes and trees that had held the land together. Without the living vegetation
to keep the soil in place, remaining bits of the island washed into the Gulf of Mexico and
thousands of birds lost their nesting spot. Officials in Plaquemines Parish had a plan to repair the
island, but finding the $8 million necessary to fund the project proved difficult. Restoring Cat
Island was not part of Louisiana’s master plan and the state could not allocate any fiscal
resources for the construction project.11 By 2015, Cat Island was little more than “two tiny strips
of sand and shell, with a few skeletal remains of mangrove trees.”12
While the BP disaster had devastating environmental consequences, the event resulted in
a massive windfall to Louisiana’s coastal restoration funding. In 2015, state and federal officials
reached an agreement with BP for the company to pay an $8.8 billion settlement to help fund
restoration projects designed to repair damages from the spill. Because Louisiana’s environment
suffered the worst effects from the oil, the state received $5 billion plus another $787 million
collected from penalties levied under the Clean Water Act. Payments were scheduled to begin in
2017 and would be spread across sixteen years.13 Another major source of funding will start
flowing to the state in 2017 as well. By the terms established in the Gulf of Mexico Energy
Security Act, the state is scheduled to start receiving a greater share of royalties from offshore
drilling. Both of these funding sources have been targeted by the CPRA to help pay for the
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estimated $50 billion cost of the 2012 master plan.14 Combined with other monetary sources
such as the Breaux Act or the state’s own coastal trust fund, the prospects of paying for the
master plan appear to be substantially improved when compared to previous decades of anemic
funding.
However, there are potentially some serious issues with how the CPRA estimated the
total cost of the master plan and how the state would pay for it. First, the budget was based on
revenues that authority members believed would have a “good chance of coming to the state
from various state and federal sources between [2012] and 2061.” In other words, the funds were
not guaranteed.15 Further, the sources themselves present potential problems. Only a few of the
revenue streams are recurring; the BP settlement money will be spread out over the course of
multiple years, but after 2033, those funds run out. The Coastal Impact Assistance Program has
been a major source of funding for Louisiana’s restoration, but all allocations from that source
will be spent by 2017. Money from the state’s trust fund and GOMESA are currently the only
major revenue funds that are expected to exist through 2061, the final year of the master plan’s
time frame.16
When all sources of revenue that have been identified by the CPRA are added together,
their estimated totals come to $20.167 billion. The projected final cost of the 2012 master plan is
$91.693 billion, which means that over seventy-seven percent of funding still needs to be
found.17 Worse, the CPRA designed the plan so that the bulk of money would be spent in the
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first several decades, and the state needs to expend $1.3 billion per year until 2032 to meet that
goal. Yet spending has consistently fallen short of that requirement since 2012; annual
projections have fluctuated between $492.1 million and $729.62 million.18 The continued
shortage of funds is concerning, but perhaps even more worrisome is that a sizeable chunk of
expected revenues are set to come from the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe. A report published
in 2015 by the Tulane Institute on Water Resources Law and Policy commented, “the fact that
implementing the 2012 Coastal Master Plan depends to a significant degree on dollars generated
by disasters is a major red flag. Calamity is not a viable financing tool.”19
The state’s master plan suffers from other issues, some of which call into question just
how “comprehensive” Louisiana’s restoration agenda truly is. Operation and maintenance costs
for completed restoration projects are only budgeted until 2062, but many of those structures will
continue to exist past that date. Additionally, “levee rehabilitation” is not included in the CPRA’s
annual analyses. Once the Army Corps of Engineers completes a levee, the agency cedes
responsibility for repairs and maintenance to local levee districts. Municipal drainage is also a
critical component of flood protection from hurricanes and those systems are maintained and
funded by local entities as well. Both of these programs require funding and residents may not be
eager to raise taxes on themselves. Voters in the Lake Borgne Levee District rejected millage
increases twice in 2015 despite the fact that the money was needed for levee repairs.20 Nor does
the master plan include strategies to deal with groundwater use or land-use planning as part of
coastal zone management.
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Considering these recent events and the forty years of policymaking in regard to
Louisiana’s coastal zone, several lessons can be gleaned that can be useful to the public and
political representatives. First, Louisiana's general political and economic climate have a
substantial impact on the wetlands and efforts to save them. The state has long encouraged
activities that contributed to coastal erosion and undoing those policies has been exceedingly
difficult. Oil and gas revenues paid for the expansion of government services during the
twentieth century, and the state is still relying on them to pay for restoration. Setting aside the
damage that the industry has caused in the wetlands, relying on mineral revenues has not always
been fiscally wise. When the price of oil slumps on the world market, Louisiana loses flexibility
in its budgeting. The oil crash of the 1980s hampered David Treen, Edwin Edwards, and Buddy
Roemer. Another dip in prices stalled several Breaux Act projects during the mid-1990s.
Recently, the state has faced yet another budget crisis, which has again highlighted the
need for stable, consistent revenue sources. Due to the decline in oil prices, the coastal trust fund
will receive approximately $17 million in 2016 compared to previous annual contributions of
$25 million. More alarming is that during a special session to address a $750 million budget
shortfall in the upcoming fiscal year, legislators introduced seven pieces of legislation that
sought to eliminate or reduce the amount of funding the state puts into its coastal trust fund. As
the state continues to wrestle with funding issues, the BP settlement money that begins to arrive
in 2017 could be a “tempting target for legislators looking to fill budget holes.”21
A decline in oil prices is only one part of the state’s budget problems. Over the last eight
years, politicians in Baton Rouge have approved multiple tax credits and exemptions, redirected
money from trust funds to pay for general operating expenses, and repealed the Stelly Plan
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income tax increases. The result was a $1.6 billion gap by 2015.22 General budget problems
become coastal restoration problems. To create a stable, reliable source of funding for the master
plan, Louisiana’s officials will need to address the “big picture” of the state’s entire budgetary
structure. If the government cannot consistently generate enough funding to pay for basic
bureaucratic functions, then coastal restoration projects will be – at best – routinely underfunded.
At worst, they will not be funded at all.
A second lesson that can be learned is that the loss of Louisiana’s wetlands are
unquestionably a national problem. Certainly disruptions to energy supplies will impact people
across the country, but it is not solely the impacts of coastal erosion that make the disappearance
of swamps and marshes an American issue. The loss of wetlands has resulted from engineering
the Mississippi River for flood control not just in Louisiana, but in states as far north as
Minnesota.23 Dams on the Missouri River built after World War II caused a significant decline in
sediment loads carried by the Mississippi.24 Other structures have also impeded the flow of
sediments to the wetlands. A study published in 2012 noted as much as forty-four percent of the
annual sediment load failed to move past the Old River Control Structure during the time period
between 2008 and 2010.25 Further, not all of the water and sediments that arrived in southern
Louisiana have had beneficial effects. The “dead zone” that appears in the Gulf of Mexico every
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summer results from upstream runoff that contains significant amounts of nitrogen and
phosphorus. The nutrients lower oxygen levels, worsen water quality, and kill marine species in
the area.26 Though the 2012 master plan proposes several measures to deal with the annual
hypoxia events, the strategies depend on building large structures to redirect water or relying on
upriver states to voluntarily alter farming practices. Those approaches have not been effective. In
August 2015, scientists estimated that the “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico was 5,052 square
miles which was far larger than the target size of 1,930 square miles.27
Louisiana cannot legislate or regulate what happens in the rivers of Minnesota or on the
farms of the mid-West. Even if the next master plan incorporated land-use planning and all
funding needs were fully met, factors outside the state would still continue to impact what
happens in the swamps and marshes of southern Louisiana. Negotiating agreements among the
many states that comprise the river’s drainage basin seems daunting and rightfully so.
Administrative or legislative action that compels compliance will likely be necessary, and that
means the federal government will need to take the lead on that matter. Nature does not much
care where Louisiana ends and Arkansas begins, and the borders between states are essentially
political boundaries. The federal government has the statutory and constitutional authority to
ensure multiple states cooperate with interstate policies. Still, agencies such as the Corps of
Engineers, which contributed to the loss of Louisiana’s wetlands, will need to work closely with
all states to ensure that local interests are fully considered. Likewise, residents within each state
must realize that activities undertaken to improve their lives and protect their properties have
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effects that ripple throughout the nation. To save Louisiana’s wetlands, political representatives
and the public are going to have to think bigger than the comprehensive plan currently in place.28
Finally, studying the policy progression of the last four decades, we can assert that the
loss of Louisiana’s wetlands is not an environmental or ecological issue with political and socioeconomic consequences. Instead, coastal erosion is primarily a problem born in political and
socio-economic choices that have adversely impacted the environment. To achieve a sustainable
coast for future generations, Louisianans and Americans will need to make different political,
economic, and social decisions. We will not engineer our way into a healthy ecosystem of
wetlands if we do not also fundamentally alter how we use the land, the water, and associated
resources. Drawing on what Aldo Leopold wrote in A Sand County Almanac, Americans will
eventually need to accept that we are citizens and stewards of the land we live on, not merely its
users. The vitality of Louisiana’s wetlands, as well as our own, depends on us learning this
lesson.
History can serve as a useful guide in such an endeavor. By examining significant events
over a long period of time, we can trace how political, economic, and social choices contributed
to coastal erosion and how they also worked to combat the loss of the state’s swamps and
marshes. Historical analysis contextualizes those choices and gives us insight into the decisionmaking process that produced specific policies for the management of Louisiana’s wetlands. If
we can develop a clear understanding of how and why we made certain choices, we are better
positioned to pursue a different path in the future. Other authors have provided a strong
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foundation for the history of coastal erosion and various responses to the crisis, and this study
has built on their efforts.
However, this dissertation provides a new perspective by looking at the loss of
Louisiana’s wetlands through the lens of policymaking. This approach provides several
advantages for the citizens and public officials who hope to rebuild the state’s coast. First, this
study puts together a basic chronological narrative of how legislation and regulation progressed
over the course of multiple decades. While other authors have addressed laws or regulatory
practices in relation to their own works, there has not been a comprehensive examination of
policy decisions from the earliest initiatives in the 1970s through the major changes that
followed Hurricane Katrina. This study corrects that deficiency while also explaining the context
in which policy choices were made. Knowing how policies such as the engineering the
Mississippi River contributed to the loss of wetlands is important, but so is recognizing the
negative impact that Louisiana’s bureaucratic disorganization had on anti-erosion efforts. Even
the most advanced coastal management plan in the world will do little good if the government
cannot effectively administer – and pay – for its implementation. By laying out the evolution of
policymaking and examining problems that have persisted in undermining an effective
management program, government officials and the public have a more detailed map to build
toward a “sustainable coast.”
This dissertation also makes a contribution to the field of history by demonstrating that
environmental history is a crucial component for understanding events of past. The political,
economic, and social circumstances that historians examine are often related to environmental
conditions, especially in a place like southern Louisiana where control of the environment has a
tremendous impact on the lives and livelihoods of the coast’s inhabitants. Much ink has been
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devoted to explaining the nature of the state’s politics or the dire consequences of ignoring
coastal erosion, but these things are not unrelated and never have been. Louisiana’s political
climate influenced choices about environmental resources and in turn, environmental resources
affected the decisions that politicians could make. Earl Long did not have to raise taxes to pay
for the expansion of government services because of the wealth generated by oil and gas
revenues. Yet the extraction of oil and gas has had a detrimental impact on Louisiana’s wetlands,
and the loss of marshes subsequently places the infrastructure of oil and gas extraction at risk.
Environmental history should not be treated as an addendum to other fields of historical
analysis. Rather, the topic should have greater prominence in the professional works, teaching,
and discussions undertaken by historians. Our understanding of the environment and humanity’s
prerogative in manipulating nature has changed over time, but the consistent influence of
environmental factors is too often an unacknowledged factor in the works of historians. This
dissertation is specifically a policy history of the response to coastal erosion in Louisiana but
more broadly serves as an examination of how politics, socio-economic decisions, and the
environment are related to one another and how their interactions help shape the communities
that Americans build.
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